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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the role of composition, immigration and the cost-of-living 
on wage inequality. 
I begin by investigating to what extent changing characteristics of the labour force 
can help explain the fact that residual or within-group wage inequality –wage 
dispersion among workers with the same education and experience- is generally 
thought to account for most of the growth in wage inequality observed in several 
industrialised countries over the last thirty years. I compare the results for men 
and women in Italy, the UK, and the US from 1987 to 2003 or 2004. I find that 
even though residual does account for most of the wage variation in all countries, 
there is no common increasing trend in residual inequality. I also find that 
workforce composition does not always act to increase the residual wage 
inequality.  
In the second part of the thesis, I investigate the effects of immigration on  
residual wage inequality in the UK and the US between 1994 and 2008, by  
assessing whether and to what degree immigration contributed, along with 
technology, institutions and traditional explanations, to widening inequality.  
The analysis reveals that residual wage inequality is higher amongst immigrants 
than amongst natives. However, such differences do not contribute (much) to the 
increasing residual wage inequality observed in the two countries.  
The final section of this thesis questions how existing estimates of inequality 
change when differences in the cost-of-living and the differential concentrations 
of individuals with different levels of education across regions are taken into 
account. I focus on changes in the difference in the hourly wage for workers with 
a college degree and high school degree in the UK between 1997 and 2008. 
Results show that the national RPI underestimates the cost-of-living of workers 
living in the most expensive regions (London, South East) and overestimates the 
cost-of-living for “cheaper” regions (Northern Ireland, Scotland). When deflating 
hourly wages by the regional RPI, the average level of wages is lower, by 8% to 
11% an hour for all workers in London and the South East, whilst it is higher, by 
around 2% to 9% in the remaining regions; similarly the level, but not changes, in 
wage inequality is lower when deflating by the real regional RPI. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“…the distribution is a focal point at which the functioning of the economic 
system impinges upon the human beings […] .It follows that better knowledge and 
comprehension of the subject are indispensable, not only in and of itself but also 
as a step in learning more about the functioning of society-in both the long and 
short run.” 
                                                                                             Kuznetz, 1955 
  
The study of the structure of wages has been a preoccupation of economists for a 
long time and dates back at least as far as Adam Smith. Since wages are an 
important part of  household  income and economic well-being, the  trends (and  
increase)  in the dispersion of wages mirror very closely the trends in income, 
consumption and poverty rates, affecting health condition as well as social 
exclusion.  
The existence of and persistent increase in wage inequality has several 
important macroeconomic implications in an economy. Wage inequality is an 
indicator of the level of prosperity and performance of a country, since it directly 
reflects on the level and growth of the GDP, strongly influencing economic 
growth rates and convergence. Inequality in wage, implying inequality in income, 
is often associated with inequality in savings that determines the economic growth 
of a society (Kuznets 1955). 
Economists pointing out the connections between health, earnings and 
education, have also emphasised the negative correlation between socio-economic 
status and various risky behaviours, such as smoking, excessive drinking, obesity, 
and lack of exercise.  
Deaton (2000) gives evidence that health inequality in the United States is 
rising in tandem with income inequality. Growing income differences are 
associated both with an increase in spread in the distribution of health, as well as 
with an increase in the gradient linking education and health.  
Wage differentials are often associated with labour market disparities   
(Blau and Kahn, 1996).  This embodies a significant concern in many countries, 
13 
 
mainly because countries experiencing higher wage differentials and labour 
market disparities are also countries that differ dramatically in standards of living 
and therefore show increasing poverty amongst individuals (Lucifora, 2001).  
Some concerns of the consequences of wage dispersions are related to 
individuals located at the bottom end of the earnings distribution who are more 
strongly affected in terms of poverty and social exclusion. Differences in wage 
inequality are also linked to the low wage employment problem. Countries with 
wide wage differentials are often characterised by a larger proportion of low paid 
individuals (those whose earnings fall below two-thirds of the median wage).  
Hence, understanding the determinants of wage inequality is the key to 
understanding how to increase the standards of living of individuals in the world, 
and thereby to lessen poverty. 
While there is a vast amount of literature investigating the reasons and 
patterns of wage inequality, the persistent increase of this phenomenon in certain 
countries over the past thirty years still attracts lots of attention. There is 
substantial agreement among researchers with reference to some of the basic 
“facts” that need to be explained. According to Autor and Katz (1999), in the 
U.S., changes in wage structure over the last few decades have been characterised 
by an expansion of wage dispersion within demographic and skill groups. Wage 
differentials have particularly increased by education, occupation and age 
(potential experience) groups; from the end of the 1970s to the mid-1990s, wage 
dispersion for both men and women experienced a substantial increase.  
Empirical evidence (Machin and Van Reenen, 2008) documents that most 
changes in wage inequality in both the UK and the US have taken place from 
1979. To illustrate the magnitude of changes in both the US and the UK wage 
structure, figure 1.1 and figure 1.2 plot respectively for the US and the UK, the 
evolution of the 90-50 log earnings ratio and 50-10 log earnings ratio since the 
1970 until the late 2000s. 
Figure 1.1 (taken from Goldin and Katz, 2007) documens the divergence 
in inequality trends in the US between the top and the bottom half of the wage 
distribution between 1974 and 2005.  The figure contrasts trends in the 90-50 and 
50-10 log hourly wage differentials for all workers showing the substantial 
increases in wage inequality occurred in both the upper  half (90-50) and the 
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lower half (50-10) of the distribution from 1979 to 1987. After 1987 the trends in 
the upper and lower half wage inequality diverged, with the former continuing to 
rise steadlilt and the later ceasing to rise, contracting by 4 log points from 1987 to 
2005.  
Figure 1.2 (taken from Machin, 2010) plot the evolution of the 90-50 log 
earnings ratio and 50-10 log earnings ratio since the late 1970 until the late 2000s 
for full-time male workers in the UK. As documented by the figure, the upper tail 
wage inequality (90-50 wage ratio) rises sharply from the late 1970s, and 
consistently throughout the entire period up until 2009. The 50-10 wage gap also 
shows a significant increase, but most of its increase is concentrated in the 1980s 
and the early to mid 1990s. Following that it flattens out.  
Comparing the experiences for both countries, the 1980s shows a clear 
picture: wage growth was more pronounced at higher points of the distribution 
and this is almost monotonic in both countries, leading to large increases in wage 
inequality. The picture is more complex post 1990. In both countries the 90-50 
continues to diverge whereas the 50-10 in the US actually shrinks, indicating 
wage compression. In the UK the 50-10 is stable, increasing a bit in the 1990s and 
shrinking a bit in the 2000s. Overall then, the increase in wage inequality has been 
stronger in the upper tail than the lower tail taking the period as a whole and has 
been more pronounced in the 1980s than post 1990. 
The substantial existing literature on wage inequality does not reach any 
consensus on what has caused this secular rise in wage dispersion across countries 
and in particular what has been driving the divergence between the upper and 
lower tails of the wage distribution. Researchers agree that the causes seem to lie 
with a variety of components, rather than one exclusive factor, that jointly affect 
the wage structure.  
 The main explanations proposed to describe the rise in wage inequality 
include: demand-side explanations; the supply-side explanations; changes in the 
composition of skills, the role of trades and the Skill Biased Technological 
Change. In research that tries to reconcile cross-country differences in change in 
wage inequality, an emphasis has been placed upon the role of labour market 
institutions that affects wage structure differently in different countries.   
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The leading explanations regarding rising wage inequality such as 
declining unionization, the falling real value of the minimum wage, increased 
trade and skill-biased technological change, do not seem to help explain recent 
trends in wage inequality since they have less to say regarding the dominant 
trends of the 1990s, namely increasing upper-tail inequality and declining lower 
tail inequality (Autor, Katz and Kearney 2005). These factors also fail to explain 
that residual wage dispersion among workers with the same education and 
experience “…is generally believed to account for most of the growth in overall 
wage inequality” (Lemieux 2006 page 461). As pointed out by Lemieux (2006), 
the standard human capital variables like education and experience explain only 
about one third of the variance of wages. Intuitively, years of schooling and 
experience do not capture returns to other skills. By contrast, regression-based 
residuals include unmeasured aspects of human capital such as school quality, 
ability, effort or innate skills. 
One factor that has been recently offered as a potential explanation of 
increasing residual wage inequality is the changing age and educational 
composition of the labour force. However, the existing literature investigating the 
effect of changes in the education and experience composition of the labour force 
on the evolution of the residual (JMP 1993, AKK 2005, 2008, Lemieux, 2006) in 
part because of different methodologies, provides (different) results that are 
relatively difficult to compare. 
The first chapter of my empirical analysis (Chapter 2) is concerned with 
reassessing the evolution over time of the two wage components (between and 
within-group) in a comparative framework for Italy, the UK and the U.S. by 
applying the same methodology.  Specifically, Chapter 2 seeks to test the validity 
of Lemieux’s composition effect hypothesis (2006), i.e. that composition effects 
exert an upward mechanical force on the residual wage inequality. Therefore, 
Chapter 2 aims to evaluate whether changes in the education and experience of the 
work force that occurred during the last few decades, can help to account for the 
increase in residual wage dispersion in the UK and Italy, as appears to be the case 
in the U.S.   
This comparison is motivated mainly by the fact that the majority of 
evidence documenting the role of the residual in the overall wage evolution is 
based on the U.S. experience. Less evidence exists for both Italy (Naticchioni et 
16 
 
al., 2008) and the UK (Gosling et al. 2000, Machin and Van Reenen 2008). 
Moreover, the divergent experience of Italy, the UK and the U.S. in terms of wage 
institutional pay settings and inequality makes the comparison particularly 
fruitful. Italy differs from both the UK and the U.S. in the more centralized wage 
structure; in Italy collective bargaining agreements, generally at the industry level, 
set minimum rates for the lowest pay group in a collective agreement. The three 
countries have also been characterised by the labour force growing older and more 
educated, though at different rates across these countries. 
 
Over the last few decades, the UK and the U.S. have not only experienced 
notable increases in the degree of wage inequality, but in both countries 
immigration has increased significantly.   
There is a huge empirical debate on the social and economic consequences 
of international migration, one of the core concerns related to the impact of 
immigration on the wages of native workers. Despite the common-sense intuition 
behind the theoretical implications of the laws of supply and demand, the 
international migration literature has struggled to arrive at a consensus on the 
impact of immigration on the wages of workers in the receiving countries.  
A consensus emerging from a recent stream of the empirical literature is 
that immigration not only has little impact on natives’ wages, but also, on average, 
exerts a positive rather than negative effect on natives’ wages (Ottaviano and Peri 
2006; Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth 2007; Dustmann, Frattini, Preston 
2008).  
The aim of Chapter 3 is to adapt one of the main challenges of the 1990s 
wage literature to the immigration context: wage dispersion is not fully explained 
by variables linked to the standard human capital model, like education and 
experience. Residual or within-group wage inequality – wage dispersion among 
workers with the same education and experience - accounts for most of the growth 
in overall wage inequality (Juhn et al. 1993; Acemoglu 2002; Autor et al. 2005, 
2008; Lemieux 2006). Therefore unlike previous studies, Chapter 3 of this thesis 
focuses on the effects of immigration on residual wage inequality in the UK and 
the US between 1994 and 2008. It seeks to assess whether and to what degree 
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immigration contributed, along with technology, institutions and traditional 
explanations, to widening inequality.  
 
Wage inequality is often measured as the difference between the wage of 
workers with a college degree and those with a high school degree. In a recent 
contribution, Moretti (2010) questioned the relative real wage increases for U.S. 
graduates by re-examining how wage inequality is measured. He demonstrates 
how existing estimates of wage inequality for the US change when accounting for 
differences in the cost-of-living across locations and the relative concentration of 
graduates in certain high cost areas. 
Chapter 4 aims to address this issue for the UK, where similar trends in 
wage inequality, changes in educational characteristics of workers, and 
concentration of graduate workers in more expensive regions are observed.  
The returns to graduate education in the UK has increased since the 1970s;  
while were high and either increasing or stable in the 1980s and the 1990s 
(Machin, 2003).  
Figure 1.3 (taken for Green and Zhu, 2010) plots quantile regression 
estimates of the returns to graduate education in Britain, using consistent male 
employees data taken from the UK Quarterly Labou Force Survey (QLFS), 5th 
wave only. The estimates give the log pay increase associated with the difference 
between achieving GCSE grades A_C or equaivalent (Level 2) and graduating 
from tertiary education with at least a college degree or professional qualification 
(level 4 or above). The figure presents a “before and after” picture of the effects of 
the participation surge on the dispersion of returns to graduates quantiles rose 
from 0.01 to 0.11 log points for men. 
The proportion of graduates in the UK labour force has risen from 9% to 
more than 13% over the last 15 years to 2006 (Walker and Zhu, 2008). By the 
beginning of the current decade several years of the now-larger graduate cohorts 
had entered the labour force, replacing retiring cohorts with much lower levels of 
educational achievement (Green and Zhu, 2010).  Figure 1.4 (taken by Green and 
Zhu, 2010) plot the share of graduates in the labour force, considering the 
proportion of 25-60 year-old workforce with qualifications at level 4 or above 
between 1994 and 2007. The figure documents that the proportion of graduates in 
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the labour force grew rapidly, the supply of female graduates in particular 
appearing to accelerate after 2002.  
 
The existing literature investigating trends and causes of wage inequality 
in the UK usually measures wages in real terms by deflating nominal wages using 
the national Retail Price Index (RPI), however the RPI does not account for 
differences in regional housing costs. Expenditure on housing represents the 
largest component of total household expenditure but this varies considerably 
across British regions. As such, differences in regional housing costs might be 
expected to play an important part in determining cost-of-living differences 
between regions. This implies that deflating the nominal wage by a regional RPI 
might lead to different estimates of the observed real wage dispersion; on the 
other hand, one based on a national index might fail in being fully representative 
at the regional level. 
In Chapter 4, I reassess how estimates of wage inequality from 1997 to 
2008 vary when regional differences in the cost of housing in the UK are taken 
into consideration.  In order to do so, the real wage is deflated by a specially 
constructed regional RPI; this is a new measure of the cost-of-living that partially 
updates the national RPI with a regional housing index, therefore allowing the 
RPI to vary by regions.  
 
This thesis therefore provides a thorough consideration of the role of 
compositional changes of the labour force, the increase of immigration and the 
regional differences in the cost-of-living on the increasing wage inequality in the 
UK and in other countries from the late 1980s to 2008. 
In next chapter, I begin by investigating to what extent changing 
characteristics of the labour force can help to explain the fact that residual or 
within-group wage inequality is generally believed to account for most of the 
growth in wage inequality. I compare the results for men and women in the UK, 
the US and Italy from 1987 to 2003.  
Chapter 3 of the thesis focuses on the effects of immigration on the 
residual wage inequality in the UK and US between 1994 and 2008. It seeks to 
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assess whether and to what degree immigration contributed, along with 
technology, institutions and traditional explanations, to widening inequality.  
In Chapter 4 of this thesis, my aim is to assess how existing estimates of 
inequality for the UK change when differences in the cost-of-living across the 
British regions are taken into account.  
The conclusions of chapter 5 enable me to address future research. 
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Figure 1.1 Changes in the US wage structure, 1974-2006. 
 
Source: Goldin and Katz, 2007. 
Figure 1.2 Changes in the UK wage structure, 1970-2010. 
 
Source: Machin, 2010.  
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Figure 1.3: The evolution of the returns to education in the UK, 1995-2006. 
 
Source: Green and Zhu, 2010. 
Figure 1.4: The  expansion of graduates in the UK, 1994-2007. 
Source: Green and Zuh, 2010.  
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 Chapter 2: Increasing Wage Inequality: a Comparative Analysis 
between Italy, the UK and the U.S. 
 
2.1   Introduction  
      While there is an abundance of literature investigating the reasons and patterns 
of wage inequality, the persistent increase of this phenomenon in certain countries 
still attracts lots of attention from economists. The majority of the literature 
focuses on the U.S. where wage inequality increased most, and on the UK. By 
contrast, wage inequality in major European countries like Germany and Italy is 
characterised by a more stable wage structure over time, although it has been 
rising slowly recently (Blau and Kahn 1996, Gosling and Lemieux 2004, Machin 
and Van Reenen 2008). 
Wage inequality in the UK has increased sharply since the late 1970s. 
Between the late 1970s and the 1990s the extent and pattern of wage inequality in 
the UK became increasingly similar to that in the U.S. (Gosling and Lemieux, 
2004). Wage differentials in Italy, like some other European countries (e.g. 
Germany and France), show an overall u-shaped evolution which contrasts with 
the steady increase of inequality in the UK and the U.S. Wage dispersion in Italy 
fell between the late 1970s and the mid-1980s and rose thereafter. The dispersion 
of log hourly wages remained moderately flat between 1993 and 2002, and 
decreased during the last years of the sample for men, whilst it decreased between 
1993 and 2000 for women. 
The existing literature on wage inequality does not reach any consensus on 
what caused this secular rise in wage dispersion across countries and in particular 
what has been driving the divergence between the upper and lower tails of the 
wage distribution. Researchers agree that the causes seem to lie with a variety of 
components, rather than one exclusive factor, that jointly affect the wage 
structure.  
In particular, the leading explanations regarding rising wage inequality 
such as declining unionization, the falling real value of the minimum wage, 
increased trade and skill-biased technological change do not seem to help explain 
recent trends in wage inequality since they have less to say regarding the 
dominant trends of the 1990s and 2000s, namely increasing upper-tail inequality 
and declining lower tail inequality (Autor, Katz and Kearney 2005). These factors 
23 
 
also fail to explain that residual, wage dispersion among workers with the same 
education and experience, “…is generally believed to account for most of the 
growth in overall wage inequality” (Lemieux 2006 page 461). As pointed out by 
Lemieux (2006), the standard human capital variables like education and 
experience only explain about one third of the variance of wages. Intuitively, 
years of schooling and experience, do not capture returns to other skills. By 
contrast, regression-based residuals include unmeasured aspects of human capital 
such as school quality, ability, effort or innate skills.  An earlier study by Blau and 
Kahn (1996) claims that wage inequality as measured  by overall wage variation 
or by the wage gap between workers at different parts of the distribution is 
affected by the distribution of skills, both measured and unmeasured and by the 
prices determined for those skills in the labour market.  
  The pioneering study of Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) (JMP 
hereafter), documents that two-thirds of the overall increase in U.S. wage 
inequality can be attributed to the residual with the bulk of these increases 
occurring between 1970 and 1988. Similarly, Acemoglu (2002), Lemieux (2006) 
and Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005, 2008) (AKK hereafter), confirm that changes 
in the residual do account for most of the overall increase in wage dispersion even 
over the longer sample period used by these authors. 
A number of researchers comparing the trends of between-group and 
within-group effects, (that is the residual) provide contrasting results. For 
example, AKK (2008) analyse changes in overall male wage inequality and show 
that both the between group wage differentials, based on the college-high school 
wage premium, and the residual rose together only during 1979-1987. During the 
1990s, the between-group inequality continued to rise while the male 90/10 
residual inequality stabilized. JMP (1993) find a substantial difference in the 
timing of the increase in the between and within component of overall wages: the 
between component increased from 1960 through to 1970 and fell significantly 
over the 1970s; by contrast the within component remained stable or fell over the 
1960s and then rose steadily through the end of the 1980s.  The majority of 
evidence documenting the role of the residual in the overall wage evolution is 
based on the U.S. experience; less evidence exists for either Italy ( Naticchioni et 
al. 2008) or the UK (Gosling et al. 2000, Machin and Van Reenen 2008). 
Naticchioni et al. (2008) found that between 1993 and 2004 within group only 
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plays a role in the upper tail (90-50) of the wage distribution; in particular they 
observed that the upper tail of the wage distribution increases, while wage 
compression is observed in the lower tail (50-10). Gosling et al. (2000) show that 
since the late 1970s the increase in within-wage dispersion represents an 
important aspect of rising wage inequality for the UK. 
This chapter seeks to reassess the evolution over time of the two wage 
components (between and within-group) in three different countries by applying 
the same methodology over a similar period using comparable micro data.  
 One factor that has been recently offered as a potential explanation of 
increasing residual wage inequality is the changing age and educational 
composition of the labour force. Over the last 25 years, the education and 
experience of the U.S. labour force rose substantially; AKK (2005) show that in 
the U.S. the full-time equivalent employment share of male workers with a 
college degree rose from 18 to 32% between 1973 and 2003, while the 
employment share of workers with lower education fell from 62 to 41%. Gains in 
potential experience were similarly pronounced.  
  The existing literature that analyses the effects of changes in the 
education and experience composition of the labour force on the evolution of the 
residual, gives relatively mixed results. JMP claim that changes in observable 
characteristics (education and experience) for the labour force appear “relatively 
unimportant”; AKK attribute only a “secondary role” to those changes in the 
evolution of the residual.  Lemieux (2006) argues that a large fraction of the 1973-
2003 growth in the residual wage inequality is a “spurious” consequence of the 
composition effects, in other words he shows that secular changes in the education 
and age structure may mechanically increase the residual wage inequality.  
The second aim of this study is to test the validity of the composition 
effect hypothesis in countries other than the U.S. by applying the same 
methodology developed by Lemieux (2006) that requires taking the actual 
residual variance of the log hourly wage OLS regressions and re-weighting it 
holding the characteristics of the labour force constant at a base year.  By using 
this technique to examine data for the UK and Italy, this chapter seeks to evaluate 
whether changes in the education and experience of the work force that occurred 
during the last decades are equally responsible for the increase in wage dispersion 
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in the UK and Italy, and whether they can help account for the increase in 
residual, as appears to be the case in the U.S.   
This raises the question as to how educational and experience 
characteristics of the labour force evolved through time. Table 2.2 shows that 
there are differences in the evolution and changes of the educational level of the 
work force across countries. In 2003, the U.S. had the smallest share of male 
workers with a low level of education1, around 10 %, while in the same year 
General Household Survey (GHS) data for the UK and Survey of Household’s 
Income and Wealth (SHIW) in 2004 for Italy provides evidence that the share of 
male workers who only attended compulsory schooling is respectively around 56 
and 45 %. The same data also show that in 2003 the share of male workers with a 
high level of education is greatest in the U.S., around 30%, followed by 22% in 
Britain and around 11 % in Italy.                          
As explained in part 2.2, these cross-country differences in the educational 
and experience levels of workers suggest that we should expect composition 
effects to affect with different magnitude the changes in wage inequality, however 
those  different effects could be mitigated or exacerbated by the characteristics of 
the labour market institutions. 
The existing literature (Blau and Kahn 1996; Lucifora 2001; Gosling and 
Lemieux, 2004) documents how different institutional pay settings may alter wage 
dispersion through various channels. Several studies show that falling 
unionization contributed to the steep increase in wage inequality in both the UK 
and the U.S. that occurred in the 1980s (Card, Lemieux, and Riddell, 2003).  
Generally centralised wage-settings and institutional constraints might 
have a significant role in shaping the distribution of earnings across countries. 
Heavily regulated labour markets and highly centralized wage setting mechanisms 
are characterised by more rigid wage structures and lower levels of wage 
inequality, while less centralised wage institutions also experience the higher 
levels of wage inequality. This is the case for the UK and the U.S., the most 
                                                 
1 Part 2.5.2 explains in detail the definition of education group used in this work. The category 
“low level of education” corresponds to the dropouts i.e. the workers who only completed the 
compulsory years of schooling; because of differences in the educational systems, especially 
between Italy and the U.S./UK, “low level of education” for both the U.S. and the UK corresponds 
to 11 years of schooling, while for the same category in Italy corresponds to 8 years of compulsory 
schooling (elementary and middle).     
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deregulated and decentralized labour markets, that historically experienced  the 
largest increases in inequalities. 
Comparing male wage inequality in the U.S. to nine other OECD 
countries, primarily in the mid 1980s, providing evidence that overall wage 
inequality is higher in the US than elsewhere, Blau and Kahn (1996) pointed out 
the role of institutions in affecting wage inequality.  Their main finding suggests 
that the centralised wage-setting institutions are an important determinant of 
international differences in wage distributions; particularly the centralised systems 
of collective bargaining in other industrialised nations that increase the relative 
wages of workers at the bottom, i.e. reduce wage inequality compared to the U.S.  
Card et al. (1999)  have argued that the existence of the minimum wage, 
union settings, and more regulated labour markets, particularly in Western 
Europe, not only prevented a rise in wage inequality but also severely limited job 
growth. In a similar vein, Dell’Aringa and Lucifora (2001) show that wage 
inequality appears to be lower in countries where employment protection is 
stricter. The Italian experience can be quite informative on this point:  Italy is 
characterised by a strong employment regulation and a rigid system of wage 
determination2 and exhibits one of the highest degrees of wage compression in 
Europe. Manacorda (2004) proves that the abolition of the wage indexation 
system (scale mobile) in 1993 were one of the main factors determining the 
relatively recent u-shaped evolution of earnings inequality in Italy.  
The divergent experience of Italy, the UK and the U.S. in terms of wage 
institutional pay settings3 and inequality makes the comparison particularly 
fruitful. Italy differs from both the UK and the U.S. in the more centralized wage 
structure. In Italy collective bargaining agreements, generally at the industry level, 
set minimum rates for the lowest pay group in a collective agreement. Moreover, 
in Italy, master industry wide agreements negotiated at the national level between 
unions and employer associations have traditionally been the norm. In the late 
1980s in Italy, bargaining shifted in some cases from the industry to the plant 
level.  
                                                 
2 For example the “Charter of Workers” (Statuto dei Lavoratori) established various employment 
restrictions for firms with more than 15 employees on individual hiring and firing procedures as 
well as on temporary labour contracts (Lucifora, 2001). 
3 See Blau and Kahn (1996) for an extensive overview of international differences in labour 
market institutions.  
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Wage setting is more decentralised in both union and non union sectors in 
the U.S., though deunionisation proceeded quite rapidly. Collective bargaining in 
Britain is less centralised than in other countries but more centralised than in the 
U.S. The UK, like the U.S, had a mixture of single-firm and multiemployer 
agreements in the 1970s and bargaining appeared to be more centralised in the 
UK. For example in 1977-78, 25% of manufactured contract covered more than 
one firm, whereas for the U.S. the figure in 1975 was only 13%.  Both countries 
remain less centralised institutions while the Italian system of collective 
bargaining remains more centralised.  
The analysis of wage inequality in Italy also complements the existing 
literature by providing insights into a country characterised by a more regulated 
labour market and a more rigid wage structure. Italy could provide an image of 
whether and how much changes in the composition of the labour force contribute 
to variations in residual inequality in countries in which the level of wage 
inequality is lower, albeit rising slowly over the sample period.  This chapter also 
contributes to the existing Italian literature by analysing the effect of 
compositional changes in variations in within-group inequality in a cross-country 
analysis, going back to the earliest year possible and by applying a different 
methodology to the relevant contributions.  
     This chapter adheres to the methodology and data design used by 
Lemieux (2006), focusing on the cross-country trends and timing of residual wage 
inequality to investigate if and how much changes in the composition of the 
labour force contributed to the increasing dispersion of residual wage inequality in 
countries characterised by different institutional settings. This research illustrates 
and analyses the evolution of the upper and lower tails of the distribution, 
controlling for composition effects and evaluating the price of unobservable skills. 
The previous literature analysing residual wage inequality (JMP 1993, AKK 2005, 
2008) in part because of different methodologies, provides (different) results that 
are relatively difficult to compare. The methodology used by Lemieux that is 
implemented in this study is based on a simple approach (variance decomposition) 
that facilitates decomposition of changes in the distribution of wages over time 
into the different components that can be economically interpretable using the 
standard tools of the human capital model. In addition, the technique controls for 
changes over time in the distributions of observed characteristics of workers by 
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computing empirically a counterfactual distribution that emphasises the effect of 
compositional changes in within-group inequality. 
The chapter is organised as follows: part two provides the main empirical 
evidence related to the residual wage inequality and composition effects; part 
three recalls the theoretical model behind the research; part four describes the 
three different datasets; part five explains the econometric methodology and the 
re-weighting approach originally applied by Lemieux; part six presents and 
compares the empirical results for Italy, the UK and the U.S.; and part seven 
concludes. 
 
2.2 Wage Inequality, Residual and Composition Effects: Evidence and Issues 
Between the end of the 1960s and the end of the 1980s, the variance of log 
real weekly wages for full time male workers in the U.S. increased by about 72% 
(JMP 1993). Over the last three decades, the secular increase in overall wage 
inequality observed mainly in the U.S. (but also in the UK) largely demonstrated 
two main patterns: a persistent rising wage dispersion within narrowly defined 
education-experience groups and a divergence in the trends of upper and lower 
path inequality.  
Evidence from the U.S. (Autor and Katz, 1999;  Katz and Murphy, 1992; 
Levy and Murnane,1992) shows that residual wage inequality started increasing in 
the 1970s and continued to rise considerably in the 1980s, reaching a level in 
1987 that was 30% greater than the 1970 level, and then rose at a slower pace in 
the 1990s; the residual log weekly wage inequality for full time, full year workers 
increased by 27 log points for men and 25 log points for women from 1963 to 
1995. More recently, Lemieux (2006) outlines the main patterns observed in the 
United States using Current Population Survey (CPS) data: the residual variance 
for full time, full year male workers from 1973 to 2003 grew by about 0.04 log 
points; most of that growth was concentrated in the 1980s. Levels remained 
essentially unchanged during the 1990s but grew again between 1999 and 2003. 
Important findings also suggest that the increase in wage dispersion has 
been higher for the highest paid workers, while workers at the bottom of the wage 
distribution experienced less variation.  Katz and Murphy (1992) show that in the 
U.S. the log wage gap between the ninetieth and tenth percentile within 
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experience-education groups increased by approximately 0.26 for men and 0.21 
for women from 1963 to 1987. The change in the standard deviation and the 90-
10 log wage gap is three times larger between the 1970s and 1980s than between 
the 1990s and 2000s (Lemieux 2006). The earlier influential work of JMP (1993) 
provides evidence that the diverging pattern between less and more skilled male 
workers in the U.S. goes back to the beginning of the 1960s.  AKK (2005 and 
2008) support these findings and re-evaluate the traditional explanation for 
changes in the U.S. wage inequality by documenting that the growth of overall 
wage inequality during the 1990s hides divergent patterns of inequality between 
the upper and lower segments. There has been a persistent rise in upper tail 
inequality and a decline of inequality in the lower tail since the second half of the 
1980s4. By using MARCH CPS data from 1963 to 2005, they show that the 90th 
percentile rose by approximately 45 log points relative to the 10th percentile for 
both men and women.  
They show that upper and lower tail wage inequality expanded rapidly in 
the first half of the 1980s for both men and women5. The 50-10 wage gap for the 
most part stopped growing after 1987. Male 50/10 residual wage inequality rose 
by 5.7 log points between 1973 and 1989, and then fell by 1.3 log points between 
1989 and 2005. By contrast, the U.S. 90-50 gap for both men and women in 2003 
was 40% larger than in 1973. The 90-50 wage gap continued to grow smoothly 
from 1979 to 2005; from 1973 to 1989 the male 90-50 residual wage inequality 
rose by 4.4 log points and by 4.0 log points from 1989 to 2005. Machin and Van 
Reenen (2008) explain that the increase in the 90-50 wage differential since the 
late 1970s occurs not only in the U.S. but also in the UK; whereas in the UK the 
50-10 is broadly stable, increasing a little in the 1990s and shrinking a little in the 
2000s. According to Gosling and Lemieux (2004), UK wage evolution between 
1979 and 1998 was almost entirely driven by changes in within-group inequality 
which increased more for men (0.073) than women (0.056). Similar to the US, the 
bulk of this increase occurred during the 1980s. Gosling et al. (2000) demonstrate 
                                                 
4They illustrate that a falling minimum wage contributed to raising lower tail (50-10) wage 
inequality in the 1980s. 
 
5 In a recent contribution, Dustmann, Ludsteck and Schonberg (2009) revisited the changes in the 
wage structure in West Germany and demonstrated that wage inequality has increased in the 80s, 
but only at the bottom part of the distribution; they also find that it is important to account for 
changes in education and experience of the labour force and this is true especially for the top half 
of the wage distribution. 
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that like the US, since the 1970s an important aspect of rising wage inequality in 
the UK is increased within-group wage dispersion.  
The recent evidence for Italy shows that residual wage inequality has been 
increasing over time. For example, Lilla and Staffolani6 (2007) demonstrate that 
within-group inequality increased for daily wages from 1985 to 1999.  Devicienti 
(2003), using administrative data from 1985 to 1996, examines how much of the 
increase in earnings inequality can be attributed to changes in individual 
characteristics, the price attached by the labour market, and the effect of 
unobservables. He finds that inequality is mainly explained by its within-group 
component. Lilla (2005) carried out a within-between analysis of wage inequality 
in Italy, using the SHIW data he claims that both between and within components 
slightly increased between 1998 and 2002. By contrast, Naticchioni, Ricci and 
Rustichella (2008) using SHIW data from 1993 to 2004 found that within group 
only plays a role in the upper tail of the wage distribution; in particular they 
observed that the upper tail (90-50) of the wage distribution increases, while wage 
compression is observed in the lower tail (50-10).   
This paper contributes to the existing Italian literature by controlling for 
characteristics of the labour force and by comparing them to the more striking  
experience of the U.S. and the UK with regard to rising wage inequality.  
Several researchers document that much of the increase in wage inequality 
since the 1970s is due to a dramatic increase in the demand for more educated 
workers and “more skilled” workers (Katz and Murphy 1992). This confirms the 
prediction of human capital models that wage inequality can increase because the 
returns to education and experience increase or because the demand for 
unobserved skills increases.  Becker (1964) and Card (2001) argue that there is no 
single “return to education” but rather distributions of returns across 
heterogeneous individuals. In recent work, Lemieux (2006a) confirms the findings 
of Mincer (1997) and Deschènes (2002) that the return to post-secondary 
education increased sharply while returns to lower levels of education remained 
unchanged. In particular, using a quantile regression approach, he shows that the 
return to post-secondary education has increased more in the upper quartile of the 
wage distribution. 
                                                 
6 Lilla and Staffoloni (2007) analyse the evolution of inequality in yearly and daily wages between 
and within groups of blue and white collar, using the INPS-ISFOL database. 
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 Martins and Pereira (2004), using a quantile regression, analysed the 
dispersion of the returns to education for 14 western countries during the mid- 
1990s, addressing the link between and within-levels inequality. They found that 
the earnings increment associated to schooling is higher for those individuals 
whose unobservable characteristics place them at the top of the conditional wage 
distribution, implying that schooling may have a positive impact upon within-
group wage inequality, as the spread of the returns increases for higher 
educational levels.  
     During the 1990s, numerous researchers strongly supported the idea 
that Skill Biased Technological Change (SBTC) was one of the leading 
explanations for the increase in wage inequality. As explained by Acemoglu 
(2002), technological change complements the demand for more skilled workers, 
and substitutes tasks performed by the unskilled, thus raising inequality. Katz and 
Autor (1999) propose a similar conclusion, demonstrating that SBTC was one of 
the driving forces behind the increase in the relative demand for skills7.  They 
argue that the utilization of more skilled workers is positively correlated with 
capital intensity and the implementation of new technologies, both across 
industries and across plants within detailed industries. These patterns indicate that 
physical capital and new technologies complement more skilled workers; 
therefore secular increases in the capital/labour ratio can be considered as a source 
of secular growth in the relative demand for skilled labour. Another indicator of 
the SBTC as a demand for skill driving force can be seen in the strong correlation 
between industry-level indicators of technological change (computer investments, 
the growth of employee computer use, research and development (R&D) 
expenditures, utilization of scientists and engineers) and the within-industry 
growth in the relative employment and labour cost share of more skilled workers.  
Bound and Johnson (1992)  and Katz and Murphy (1992) argue that because of 
SBTC, there has been an increase in the demand for more educated workers 
exceeding the relative supply and causing the wage of college educated workers to 
increase. Machin and Van Reneen (2008) claim that SBTC, together with 
institutional changes, better explain the increase in the upper tail of the 
                                                 
7 Katz and Autor also explain how computers may influence relative labour demand in several 
ways. Computer business system often involves the routinization of many white collar tasks. 
Simple repetitive tasks have proved more amenable to computerization than more complex tasks. 
Direct substitution of computers for human judgement and labour is likely to have been more 
important in clerical and production jobs than in managerial and professional jobs. 
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distribution for the UK and the U.S. since the late 1970s. In the 1980s the 90-10 
percentile tail expanded by 1.9 percentage points a year in both countries. The 
opposite conclusion related to the SBTC hypothesis is reached by Card and 
DiNardo (2002) who document that the timing of the growth in the wage 
inequality is difficult to reconcile with the SBTC hypothesis because the rate of 
technological innovation was stronger in the 90s when wage inequality grew less.  
 These leading existing explanations on wage inequality such as declining 
unionization, the falling real minimum wage and the SBTC8 do not then seem to 
help explain the main recent trends in wage inequality, since they find it harder to 
predict increasing upper-tail inequality and compressing lower tail inequality 
(AKK,2005). These explanations also fail to explain the fact that “residual […] is 
generally believed to account for most of the growth in overall wage inequality” 
(Lemieux 2006 page 461). As documented by Lemieux, there are two main 
reasons affecting the increase in residual wage inequality over the last decade:  
i) The “price” or return to unobserved skills may be 
increasing over time because of the increase in the demand for skills;  
ii) Dispersion could be increasing because of composition 
effects.  
In an earlier contribution, Levy and Murnane (1992) present a set of 
hypotheses for explaining not only within-group inequality but also the growth of 
within-group variation over time. Their hypotheses include both supply and 
demand shifts for workers characteristics; the former consists of the changing 
characteristics of the labour force (including aptitude test scores, measures of 
ability to work with other people); as well as increasing returns to skill; the latter 
includes plant-specific wage differentials within industry as well as changes in 
wage-setting institutions.   
Green and Zhu (2010) provide evidence that dispersion of the returns to 
graduate education in the UK substantially increased for both men and women 
over the 1994 to 2006. They argue that the rising dispersion in the returns to 
                                                 
8 Similarly, Lemieux (2008) discusses why the SBTC explanation presents several limitations; one 
reason is that it could not help to explain some diverging pattern of inequality across advanced 
countries; the SBTC was dependent on the weak fact that the residual inequality was increasing 
since the 1970s. The failure of the SBTC for other developed countries can be explained by the 
fact that because those countries are subject to the same technological change, they did not 
experience an increase in inequality, as we should instead expect. They did not vary in a similar 
way over time. 
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graduate education is associated with the increasing incidence and cost of 
overqualification of graduates, that is normally found to be associated with a 
notable pay penalty relative to those who are matched to a job at their own level.  
If the rising dispersion that appeared in the recent years is associated with rising 
overqualification, then as long as graduates are being matched with graduate jobs, 
one should expect to find that the difference between the estimated effects of 
graduate education at the top and bottom end of the residual pay distribution 
remains constant. Green and Zhu (2019 also explains that one plausible 
implication of rising overqualification and increasing dispersion in the returns is 
that current and future cohorts of school leavers may perceive an increased risk of 
investing in higher education. Risk is also derived from uncertain course 
completion rates, but it is likely that the increased earnings dispersion will raise 
the perceived financial risks. If so, some downward pressure on enrolments would  
be expected.  
Changes in characteristics9 affect both the demand and supply of observed  
and unobserved skills and can alter wage and employment outcomes (Autor and 
Katz, 1999). Movements in within-group inequality may reflect market forces 
changing the returns to (unmeasured) skills. Therefore, the rise in within group 
inequality can be interpreted as reflecting a rise in the returns to unobserved skills. 
Holding market prices constant and changes in labour force composition can 
mechanically raise or lower overall earnings dispersion by increasing or reducing 
heterogeneity in observed skills (education and experience).  
An increase in the proportion of the workers with more education and 
experience can mechanically raise residual wage inequality also because earnings 
variation is higher for those with college education relative to high school 
education (Machin and Van Reenen, 2008).  
The link between composition effects and the residual can be explained by 
the fact that when the level of education of the labour force increases, there are 
more and more “marginal“ workers added to the high-education workers group, 
creating more unobserved heterogeneity in that group and increasing within-group 
inequality. Education and  unobserved skills are imperfectly related: there are 
skilled and less skilled workers within the same education group. Therefore, an 
                                                 
9 Acemoglu (2002) explains that composition effects cannot by themselves explain the recent 
changes in wage dispersion; but it suggests that inequality amongst more educated and less 
educated workers should move in opposite directions. 
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increase in the supply of more educated workers will immediately benefit workers 
with more unobserved skills, and will also depress returns to schooling whilst 
raising within-group inequality. In a similar vein, Martins and Pereira (2004) 
explain that one reason behind the positive effect of education on within-group 
inequality is the complementarities between schooling and unobserved ability, in 
which the most able can benefit more from their schooling; in general, education 
interacts with a set of factors that are heterogeneously distributed across workers 
within the same education level.  Based on the same line of argument Green and 
Zhu (2010) point out  that graduate education is complementary with unobserved 
ability, implying that those graduates at the lower end of the unobserved ability 
distribution are less able than their counterparts in earlier cohort, and hence gained 
fewer benefits from graduate education.  In similar vein Brunello et al. (2009) 
confirm that unobserved ability and the labour market luck are substitutes to 
education in the production of human capital and earnings.  
In a single index model, in which there is only one type of skill which is 
imperfectly approximated by education/experience, observed and unobserved 
skills are imperfect substitutes. An increase in the returns to observed skills (such 
as education) will also be associated with an increase in the returns to unobserved 
skills. This means that between and within-group inequality should move together 
(Acemoglu, 2002). In a two-index model where observed and unobserved skills 
are imperfect substitutes (Acemoglu 2002), skills are multidimensional; assuming 
that more skilled workers within each education group also benefit from skill-
biased technical progress, technical change spurred by the increase in the supply 
of educated workers will immediately benefit workers with more unobserved 
skills, raising within-group inequality. Therefore, an increase in the supply of 
educated workers will depress the returns to schooling, while increasing within-
group inequality10. 
Evidence of this is given in tables  2.1 and 3.3a-3.3f  which report changes 
in the share of workers by education/experience and the corresponding changes in 
within-group inequality. This confirms, only in part, one of the main findings of 
Lemieux. The results show that an increase in the supply of more educated 
                                                 
10 Mincer (1997) applies a human capital analysis to intra-group wage inequality, measured by 
variances in log-wages, and their changes over time reveal to the U.S. wage structure changes 
from 1970-1990. In a similar vein to Acemoglu, he provides evidence that within-group inequality 
is not directly or closely related to between group variances, therefore we can expect difference in 
movements in the two components of inequality. 
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workers does not always generate an increase in within-group inequality and a 
decrease of the supply of less educated workers does not always correspond to a 
decrease in within-group dispersion. This appears to be particularly evident for 
Italy. 
A number of recent influential studies focus on this interplay between 
changes in educational and experience characteristics of the labour force and the 
evolution of the residual to evaluate how much of the overall increase in wage 
inequality can be attributed to wage dispersion among workers with the same 
education and experience; and how much of the increase in residual wage 
inequality is due to changes in the composition of the work force.  
Although the main contributions in this (AKK 2005 and 2008; JMP, 1993 
and Lemieux 2006 ) use the same date source (Current Population Survey (CPS), 
United States) the conclusions they offer are relatively mixed.11   
JMP  (1993) use CPS weekly and hourly wages for males from 1963 to 
1989 to analyse how much of the rise in residual wage inequality is due to related 
increases in the market return to skill, given that the rise in skill premia applies to 
both observable (education, experience and occupation) and unobservable 
dimensions of skill (the residual). They show that unobserved components affect 
with different magnitude the wages of workers at the top and at the bottom of the 
distribution. Over the period 1964-1988, changes in unobservable quantities 
accounted for 65 % of the increase in inequality for workers below the median but 
less than half of the increase in inequality for those above the median. JMP 
analyse the composition effects on the level of wage dispersion, concluding that 
changes in observable characteristics of the labour force appear “relatively 
unimportant”12. Another striking finding of JMP relates to the timing of the 
increase between and within groups. The authors prove that not only the rise in 
inequality and the rise in education premia are distinct phenomena, but they are 
also characterized by a difference in timing of the increase in wage inequality 
within and between groups. From 1960 to 1970 wage differentials by education 
increased and then fell over the 1970s. In contrast, inequality within education and 
                                                 
11 In a recent paper, Lemieux (2008) highlights that difference in results might be due to 
differences in data; which means they are not only due to measurement errors. 
12 Acemoglu (2002) documents that on one side composition effects could provide an explanation 
to the recent pattern in wage inequality; on the other side he claims that the returns to education 
and residual inequality are not simply due to composition effect. 
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experience categories remained stable or fell over the 1960s and then rose steadily 
through the end of the 1980s.  
 Using the techniques outlined in JMP, Lemieux (2006) uses CPS data 
from 1973 to 2003, on the hourly wages of men and women, to evaluate to what 
extent the increase in wage dispersion in the U.S. can be attributed to the increase 
in residual wage inequality and how much of the increase is related to changing 
labour force characteristics.  
Lemieux proves that the increase in residual wage inequality does not only 
depend on the rise in the demand for skill; but that the increase in the returns to 
unobserved skills account for no more than 25% of the total wage change between 
1973 and 2003. 
He concludes that a large fraction of the 1973-2003 growth in residual 
wage inequality in the United States is due to composition effects, affecting both 
the upper and lower tails of the distribution. In particular he demonstrates that the 
increase in within wage inequality appears to be a spurious consequence of the 
fact that workforces became older and more educated over time; in other words 
the increases in educational level and experience act as a mechanical force on the 
residual such that the increase in the variance of the residual follows the same sign 
of the change in composition of the work force. This means that changes in 
education and experience characteristics of the work force determine more 
variation in wages due to unmeasured aspects of human capital. 
   AKK (2005) use a quantile decomposition technique proposed by 
Machado and Mata (2005) to reconsider Lemieux’s composition hypothesis, i.e. 
the role of changing labour force composition (education and experience) and 
changing labour market prices to the expansion and divergence of upper and 
lower tail inequality. This methodology partitions the observed distribution of 
earnings into “price” components (wage coefficient) and “quantity” components 
(labour force composition) and calculates, through simulation, the impact of each 
change in overall wage dispersion. In doing so, AKK simulate the counterfactual 
distribution of wages that would have prevailed if labour force composition were 
as in time period t and labour market prices were as in time period r. This 
simulation captures the effects of composition on both between-group and 
residual inequality, analysing the contribution to changes in wage inequality both 
above and below the median of the distribution. They show that even though 
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changes in labour force composition exerted an upward force on residual wage 
dispersion, they do not contribute by themselves to an explanation for the 
diverging path of upper and lower tail inequality.  In the U.S., composition 
changes of the labour force only affect the lower tail wage distribution; upper tail 
inequality grows steadily, accounting for over three-quarters of total male 
inequality growth from 1975 to 2003. 
AKK show that the 90/50 residual wage gap inequality rose by 8.4 log 
points from 1973 to 2005. Holding labour force composition constant at its 1973, 
1989 or 2005 levels does not change the basic message: the composition constant 
rise in residual 90/50 inequality is at least 65% as large as the actual residual.  In a 
similar vein to JMP, they demonstrate that education and experience 
characteristics of workers affect with different magnitude skilled and unskilled 
workers. The steady growth of upper-tail inequality during the last two decades is 
not due to mechanical effects of composition, but to changing labour market 
prices. By contrast, composition can fully explain the overall trend in residual 
inequality during the 1990s but only plays a secondary role when considering the 
upper and lower tails separately.  
The methodology applied by AKK (2005) allows deriving counterfactual 
wage distributions such that the changes over time of the wage distribution are 
decomposed into price, quantities and residual.  Similarly, the methodology 
applied by Lemieux and that this paper uses, not only allows a decomposition of  
the total change of wages over a period into price, quantities and residual but also 
accounts for changes in observed characteristics by emphasising the effect of 
compositional changes on variations in within-group inequality.   
  In fact, the key insight of Lemieux (2006) is that the approach controls 
for changing education and age characteristics of the labour force by holding them 
constant at a base year in order to untangle their effects on the evolution of the 
residual13 and therefore on the overall wage dispersion. The technique, that 
requires taking actual residual variance and re-weighting it according to the 
observed characteristics of workers in the base year, helps to detect differences in 
residual variance attributable to changes in observed characteristics (education 
and experience) in different countries. 
                                                 
13 Details of this methodology are given in part 2.4. 
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This can be done by constructing a weight expressed as the ratio of the 
probability that a worker observed at the actual year is observed at a base year 
(conditional on the observed characteristics) to the probability that the same 
worker is observed at the actual year (conditional on observed characteristics). 
 
 
2.3  Theoretical Framework 
The human capital earnings model of Mincer (1974) provides an   
explanation for the dispersion in wages. Based on the model of investment in 
human capital, it expresses the natural logarithm of earnings as a function of years 
of education and years of labour market experience. 
The standard wage equation takes the following form: 
1)   logw = c+   rS  + b1E+b2E2 + ε 
Where c is a constant, S is years of schooling; E is years of potential 
labour market experience and ε is the standard regression residual.  An additional 
contribution of the Mincer model is the introduction of potential labour market 
experience (derived as the difference between the age and years of schooling 
minus the age at which children generally start schooling) as a regressor in the 
earnings equation.  
Almost all studies (Mincer, 1974, Deschenês, 2002; Levy and Murnane, 
1992, Welsh 1979; Borjas 2007) show that schooling has a positive and 
significant effect on earnings (r>0) and that earnings are a concave function of 
labour market experience (b1>0 and b2<0). In his earlier work Mincer (1958)  
pointed out that the “age-earnings profile” was steeper for more educated workers 
than for less educated workers. In other words, log earnings are not a strictly 
separable function of education and age; meaning that there are different rates of 
return for each age group, rather than a single rate of return to education.  
The equation (1) can be interpreted as the outcome of a process by which 
individuals invest in two types of human capital: education and on-the-job 
training (OJT). Education is directly measured by years of schooling, while years 
of labour market experience is a proxy for on-the-job training. 
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According to this model, we would expect the “age-earnings profile” to be 
steeper for more educated workers than for less educated workers. Individuals 
who invest more in education have higher marginal returns to education than 
others, therefore the log wage-schooling relationship would be convex, and the 
labour market “price” of schooling will be higher at higher levels of education.  
Given equation (1), the error component model for the residuals ε can be 
expressed as the product of some unobserved skills e with associated returns p: 
(2) ε  = pe. 
From equation (2) it is possible to measure inequality in the residual ε, by 
using standard measures of dispersion such as the variance or percentile 
differences. In a standard human capital model, wage inequality can increase 
either because the returns to education and experience increase, or because 
residual inequality increases. 
 
 
2.4 Econometric Methodology and Reweighted Approach à la Lemieux 
Since this work seeks to test Lemieux’s findings, the methodology and the 
identification strategy largely adhere to his original work, although some 
modifications and adjustments of data sets have been necessary. To assess the 
contribution of observable and unobservable components of wage dispersion to 
changes in overall wage inequality, this work follows part of the existing literature 
(Autor and Katz, 1999; JMP 1993,   and Lemieux 2006) which applies the 
standard variance decomposition. 
The econometric methodology of this work is based on two simple steps: 
the analysis of inequality in the residuals and a reweighting approach to control 
for compositional changes. 
The residuals are obtained from a standard OLS regression, having the 
following specification: 
(3) yit= XitBt +εit 
Where yit is the log hourly wage of individual I in year t,  Xit is a vector of 
observed individual characteristics (education, age and a set of interaction terms 
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between education and age), Bt   is a vector of estimated returns to observable 
characteristics in t, and εit  is the log wage residual depending on unmeasurable 
skills. 
Given the orthogonality of the predicted values and the residuals in an 
OLS regression, the variance of  yit   can be written as:  
(4)  Var(yit )= Var(XitBt)+ Var(εit ). 
In other words, the change in the variance of log wages can be 
decomposed into the change in the variance in the predicted values (between-
group inequality), reflecting the contribution of observable prices and quantities; 
and the change in the residual variance (within-group inequality) measuring the 
role of unobserved skills. 
Changes in the residual variance can be attributed to changes in prices for 
unobserved skills (pt
2) and changes in unobservable skills (var eit )  if εit  = pteit    
then  
   (5)                                   var(εit) = pt2 var(eit ) .   
This dispersion can be disaggregated across time and across education and 
experience groups. Because the information and structure of the data sets  used in 
this work  (ORG/CPS, GHS and SHIW) are somewhat comparable, it is possible 
to divide workers into 12 education and experience cells based on a group of  3 
(similar) education categories (lower, intermediate and high) and 4 potential 
experience categories  1-10, 11-20, 21-30 and 31+ years. 
To control for composition effects, i.e. to assess if and how much changes 
in the educational level and experience of the labour force account for the increase 
of wage inequality, the variance of the residual is recomputed, assigning  workers 
observed  at the actual year the same characteristics of workers observed at a 
given  base year;  in other words the technique holds the skill composition of the 
work force (θjt) constant over time in order to reflect the distribution of 
characteristics of the labour force at a given year. 
Assuming14 that observed skills, xjt, can be divided into a finite number of 
education-experience groups j,  then the (unconditional) variance of the residual 
                                                 
14 This part follows Lemieux (2006). 
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Var(eit) is directly affected by changes in θjt (share of workers in experience-
education group j at time t) and is linked to the conditional variance σ2jt    by the 
following: 
 (6)                                                var(eit) = Σ θjt σ2jt 
where σ2jt   represents the conditional variance (Var (eit|xit)) so changes in 
the education-experience cell shares  will correspond to changes in the residual 
variance. Since the conditional variance in wages Vit is linked to the conditional 
variance of unobserved skills by the following:  
(7)                                                 Vit = pt2 σ2jt 
where pt captures the returns to unobserved skills (eit) it follows that σ2jt    
also increases as a function of experience and education. Only when the variance 
of unobserved skills remains constant over time, can changes in residual variance 
be interpreted as evidence of changing skill prices pt.  
Holding the characteristics of the labour force constant at a base year can 
be done by constructing a counterfactual weight, expressed as (1-ωi)/ ωi, where ωi 
is the predicted probability for each worker observed at time t to be in the base 
year s. This probability is obtained by applying a logit model conditioning on the 
characteristics (education and age) of the workers. The magnitude of the weight 
depends therefore on the characteristics of workers observed at the year t 
compared to the characteristics of workers observed at a given base year s. For 
example, the  predicted probability of lower educated workers observed in a year 
characterized by a higher level of education of the workforce will be small,  
therefore the counterfactual weight  (1-ωi)/ ωi  will give more to lower educated 
workers in the later years. Similarly, the weight would give less weight to 
observations of higher educated individuals in the later sample years.  
In this way, by holding the distribution of skills constant over time, it is 
possible to compute a counterfactual variance i.e. the variance of the residual that 
would prevail if the distribution of skills of workers remained constant at their 
base year value. The difference between the counterfactual variance and the actual 
variance shows how much the composition of the labour force accounts for the 
evolution of the observed residual. 
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Formally the residual variance needs to be written as a function of the 
variance of wages, Vjt within each skill group j:  
 (8)                     Var(εit) = Σθjt Vjt 
Holding constant the skill distribution of workers (θ*jt ), the counterfactual 
residual variance can be written as: 
(9)                       Vt* = Σθ*j Vjt     
Working in this way will help to understand whether the composition 
effect is driving changes in the residual variance; in particular when the 
composition of the work force is held constant, any increase in the residual 
variance can be interpreted as an increase in skill prices pt. 
 
 
2.5 Data 
2. 5.1   Description of the Samples 
The data used in this study comes from individual-level micro datasets for 
the U.S., the UK and Italy, from 1987 to 2004. The U.S. analysis uses the 
May/ORG Current Population Surveys15 (CPS); for the UK the empirical analysis 
is based on the time series of cross-section files from the General Household 
Survey (GHS); for Italy the data sources are from the Bank of Italy and the 
Survey of Household’s Income and Wealth (SHIW).    
Even though alternative datasets are available for both the UK and Italy16, 
the choice of the GHS and SHIW, together with the primary data MAY/ORG 
CPS, is motivated by the fact that they contain similar information on individual 
wages, employment status and educational qualifications covering the period of 
interest. This makes the surveys, and the results, fairly consistent and comparable 
over time.  Including Italian data in the analysis has been quite challenging, 
because of some significant differences from the other datasets. In order to ensure 
comparability, it has been necessary to impose some constraints on the other 
datasets, therefore limiting the analysis over time for both the UK and the U.S. 
The wage measure used is the real hourly wage rate. The GHS and SHIW do not 
                                                 
15 I am grateful to Thomas Lemieux for providing me with the dataset for the U.S. 
16 Appendix provides further details of data issues. 
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contain a point-in-time hourly wage measure and the Bank of Italy only records 
information on hours worked per week since 1987.  
The CPS is a monthly household survey conducted by the Bureau of 
Labour Statistics to measure labour force participation and employment. The 
survey provides individual data for approximately 30,000 individuals each month. 
Every household that enters the CPS is interviewed each month for 4 months, then 
ignored for 8 months, then interviewed again for 4 more months. Usual weekly 
hours/earning questions are asked only of households in their 4th and 8th 
interview. These outgoing interviews are the only ones included in the extracts. 
New households enter each month, so one quarter of households are in an 
outgoing rotation each month. MAY/ORG CPS provides point-in-time measures 
of usual hourly wage for 60% of the sample. The remaining non hourly wage has 
been calculated by Lemieux as the ratio of annual earnings to hours worked. 
Hourly wage ranges between $1 and $100, at 2003 Dollars value. Another issue 
addressed by Lemieux relates to topcoded wages in the CPS. 
 The CPS generally reports earnings information at two intervals: on an 
hourly basis, for "hourly workers";  and, on a annual basis, for all other, generally 
non-hourly, workers. The first difficulty facing efforts to make a consistent hourly 
earnings series is that, while hourly workers wages are generally topcoded at 
$99.99 per hour (a threshold rarely crossed), annual earnings are topcoded at 
much lower thresholds, with an important share of workers above the threshold in 
some years. In the release of data available to the public, the Census Bureau 
restricts the top of the non-hourly earnings distribution to $99,999 a year. This 
means that all earnings above that level appear in the CPS public use as $99,999 
whatever their actual earnings are.  
This artificial ceiling can lead to bias in the measurement of trends in 
inequality analysis because they censor the range of incomes that are observed. As 
pointed out by Burkhauser et al. (2007) this problem would be less of an issue 
when one is looking at inequality trends over time if the nature and extend of top 
coding were constant. However, CPS top codes have changed over time, leading 
to a potentially serious time inconsistency problem for inequality analysis. Based 
on the ORG CPS data used in chapter 3, between 1994 and 2008 the proportion of 
earners affected by the top coding ranges from 1.63 to 6.47 percent a year. Other 
things equal, any analysis of inequality is likely to underestimate any trend toward 
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increased earnings inequality that might have taken place at the top of the 
earnings distribution. In a single cross-section, topcoding will lower the mean and 
the variance of the wage data relative to the true mean and variance. Over time, 
with a fixed nominal topcode and wage inflation, the size of this bias will 
generally increase, lowering estimates of the change in the mean and variance of 
wages. With no change in the underlying mean and variance, for example, the 
measured mean and variance of real wages would generally fall. Irregular and 
large adjustments to the topcode create further problems by causing sudden jumps 
in the mean and variance of wages that are not related to actual changes in the true 
wage distribution (Schmitt, 2003).  
Depending in the purpose of a specific analysis, researchers have 
addressed the topcoding issue in different ways. Some researchers just ignore the 
topcoding issue. One strategy is to attempt to estimate the mean above the topcode 
and assign this to mean to all topcoded observations. In principle, if all 
observations above the topcode are assigned the true mean above the topcode, the 
mean of the resulting distribution would equal the mean of the true distribution. 
As clarified by Schmitt (2003) this method doesn't generate the correct variance, 
but, in general would push the variance of the observed distribution closer to the 
true variance, reducing the downward bias both within a given cross-section and 
over time. Similarly to other researchers (Katz and Autor, 1999; Katz and 
Murphy, 1992; AKK, 2005, 2008) Lemieux adjusted for topcoding by multiplying 
topcoded wages by a factor of 1.4 which is believed to provide estimates of the 
mean and the variance that are closer to their true values.   
In Italy, the survey is carried out every two years and 8,000 families are 
covered in each survey. Hourly wages have been constructed by dividing annual 
earnings by the product of weeks worked last year and weekly hours worked last 
week. One of the main and considerable features (limitations) for Italy is that the 
Bank of Italy only records net wage i.e. wages net of taxes17 and social security 
contributions. Although this may limit the comparison across countries, requiring 
some caution when interpreting and extending the results for Italy; because tax is 
proportional to income, having net wages for Italy should not affect the trends but 
only the level of the results. In the SHIW, wage values that are between 1 and 50 
Euros (at 2004 Euros value) are used. 
                                                 
17  Italian payroll tax is a progressive system. 
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 The GHS is a multi purpose continuous survey that collects information 
on a range of topics from people living in private households in Great Britain. 
Face-to-face interviews take place continuously throughout the year and a sample 
of approximately 13,000 addresses is selected each year from the Postcode 
Address File. The GHS contains information on weekly wages; therefore the 
hourly wage rate has been computed by dividing the weekly wage by the hours 
worked last week. Following the existing literature (Manacorda, Manning and 
Wadsworth (2007), wages less than £1 per hour and more than £100 per hour (at 
2003 Pounds value) have been excluded. 
Another discrepancy between the three data sources relates to their sample 
sizes; the MAY/ORG CPS sample size is more than double that of the UK GHS, 
and is almost four times bigger than the Italian one. The CPS set is composed of 
about 200,000 observations over sixteen years; the GHS of 80,000 and the SHIW 
47,000 observations. This difference in size is important because it will be 
reflected in the size of the education and experience groups, and this could affect 
the accuracy of the results.  Increases in sample size should improve the accuracy 
of the estimation, as well as possibly leading to smaller values of the residual 
variance.  The samples are based on individuals who are full time employees18 
and main job workers, working the whole year with positive potential labour 
market experience. 
  
2.5.2 Generating Comparable Education Groups 
All results derive from separate regressions for men and women of the log 
hourly wage on a set of dummies for age, a quadratic in age, education and 
interactions between education and age. 
Construction of a consistent variable recording the education level of 
workers across countries is complicated because of differences in schooling 
systems across the countries. In addition, the three surveys record information 
about schooling in a different manner and sometimes not consistently through 
time. The CPS contains information about years of schooling completed. The 
SHIW only displays information about the highest earned qualification. The GHS 
                                                 
18 The use of full time workers only is meant to eliminate variation associated with hours per week 
or weeks per year, as well as maximize the comparability through time (Katz and Murphy, 1992; 
Lemieux and Card, 2001). 
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contains information on both earned qualifications and on ages at which 
individuals left school. 
The Italian schooling system differs greatly from that of the United States 
and the United Kingdom. Children start school at the age of 6, complete 
compulsory school after 8 years of study, high school after 13 years and get a 
university degree after 4 more years19. In contrast to the U.S. and the UK, there 
are no intermediate colleges between high school and university. The UK and 
U.S. schooling systems are more similar: children start school at the age of 5, and 
complete compulsory schooling after 11 years; in both cases there are 
intermediate educational levels between high school and college. 
In order to keep the analysis as consistent as possible, the classification 
criterion applied is the highest educational qualification which is common to all 
countries and whose information is available in all datasets.  
Therefore the three educational groups are defined as follows: 
1) Lower; 
2) Intermediate; 
3) High.  
The lower education group includes workers who have completed 
compulsory qualifications i.e. less than a lower secondary education; this 
corresponds to 8 years of completed education in Italy (which also includes 
individuals with no education at all); for the U.S. the same group corresponds to 0 
to 11 years of schooling and for the UK this aggregates individuals from 0 to11 
years of schooling. The intermediate category gathers workers with qualifications 
that are between high school dropout and the degree (both excluded). In Italy, this 
corresponds to workers with a high school “diploma” (13 years of schooling); in 
the UK and the U.S. this corresponds to any qualification with years of schooling 
equal or greater than 12 and less or equal to 15 years of schooling.  The 
educational group “high”, in all cases, refers either to graduate or postgraduate 
earned qualifications.  
                                                 
19 The actual university system is more similar to the English and American ones; university is 
composed of two steps:  three year courses plus 2 year courses which are not compulsory. Data 
contained in the Bank of Italy all refers to the pre-reform system i.e. 4 year courses. 
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The variable years of potential labour market experience are 
conventionally derived as Age – Years of completed Education- the age at which 
children start school in the three countries. Workers are aggregated into four-year 
experience intervals (1 –10; 11-20; 21-30, 31+). Based on the three education 
categories (lower, intermediate and high) and the four experience categories, 
workers can be classified into one of 12 skill groups20. 
In doing so, this study uses a lower number of dummies for years of 
completed education than Lemiuex does, but this has the advantage of being 
consistent through data sets21.  Lemieux uses CPS earnings weights together with 
the number of hours worked per week as weight in the overall analysis. However 
since weighting makes very little difference to the US data, all results are based 
on unweighted data. The data appendix provides additional details of three 
datasets used and in particular discusses the issues regarding education variables. 
The residual distribution measures (captures) the distribution and the effects of 
unobservable skill components that are related to the specific educational group to 
which workers have been assigned to. 
Considering a simple wage equation such as (1), the wage equation residual εit can 
be conceptualizes as having two components: an individual’s percentile in the 
wage distribution ηit and the distribution function of the residuals Ft ( ). By the 
definition of the cumulative distribution function, we can write the residual as:  
 (1a)      εit = Ft-1  (ηit| xit), 
Where the Ft-1  (. | xit) is the inverse cumulative residual distribution for workers 
with characteristics xit (education and experience) in year t. The equation (1a) 
allows to captures the changes in the distribution of the residuals, that are linked 
to the different educational attainments of workers, to the total changes in 
inequality.  
The residual distribution depends on the (xit) characteristics of the workers, e.g. 
depends on the educational attainments of workers, therefore the residual 
inequality analysis might be sensitive to the educational groups to which workers 
have been assigned to as well as to the criterion adopted to define the groups. 
                                                 
20 In the original data, Lemieux defines 20 education and experience groups based on 5 education 
groups and 4 experience groups. The education groups are high school dropouts; college; some 
college; post graduate and high school college. These 5 groups have been clustered into 3 to 
generate 3 educational groups consistent through the three countries. 
21 The categories used for years of schooling completed are: 8, 13, 17 for Italy; 11, 13, 15 and 17 
both for the U.S. and the UK. 
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Because the empirical analysis of this chapter uses data from countries 
characterized by different educational systems, in order to make the analysis 
comparable the educational criterion adopted is the highest level of education. 
However, this criterion might of course involve measurement errors in the 
estimates depending on how workers have been classified into the three levels of 
education in the three different countries. For example the “lower” level of 
education classifies workers with 11 years of schooling in the UK and the U.S. 
while this corresponds to 8 years of schooling for Italy, meaning the lower level 
of education criterion compares workers that have different years of schooling and 
this would possibly reflect on the observed trends and levels of residual 
inequality. 
For example one of the common educational criterion used for the UK literature is 
age left full time education; the lower level of education would correspond to the 
group  of workers who have left school at 16 and under, that will include those 
with GCSEs as well as those who had 2 years of post compulsory education for 
the older cohorts. As a consequence the educational group might not fully reflect 
changes in the dispersion of the residual, and also for those workers with more 
education in the same group, cohort and age effects are, if anything, mitigating the 
increase in residual wage dispersion. 
As pointed out by Gosling et al. (2000) there are few sources of increasing 
heterogeneity within each education group; one is the set of qualifications 
received within each of the groups based on the years of education measure; 
another is the possible changes in the distribution of other skills across cohorts 
and the last is changes in the composition of ability in each group solely driven by 
the fact that the process determining educational choices may have changed. They 
provide evidence that the within group wage dispersion grows more or less the 
same rate across education groups when  these are defined by years of schooling; 
the overall increase in within group inequality is smaller when defined by 
educational qualification. More interestingly they show that using years of 
education rather than qualifications obscures the fact that there has been no 
increase in within group inequality amongst the group of workers with a degree. 
Similarly the lower educational group displays a higher increase in within group 
inequality when using the years of education measure. 
This has to be borne in mind when interpreting the results and comparing the 
trends cross countries.  
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2.6. Results  
2.6.1  Descriptive Results 
Figures 2.1a to 2.2.b present the trends in log hourly wage inequality from 
1987 to 2004 using the CPS MAY/ORG, GHS and SHIW samples. Following the 
main approaches of literature (JMP 1993; Katz and Autor 1999, Lemieux 2006), 
the summary measures of wage dispersion used are the standard deviation of and 
the 90-10, 90-50 and 50-10 percentile differences in log hourly wages.  
Figures 2.1a and 2.1b plot the standard deviations for men and women in 
Italy, the UK and the U.S. The figures display some remarkable differences 
among the three countries both in levels and occasionally in the direction of the 
trends. The level of wage inequality in the U.S. remains the highest of the three 
countries considered for the whole period. CPS data shows that overall inequality 
for male wages, on this measure, in the U.S. remained relatively flat through the 
sample years compared to the other countries, but rose among women, with the 
main increase occurring at the end of the 1990s. Although the level of wage 
dispersion is pronounced for both men and women, wage dispersion for male 
workers is slightly higher than for women. In 2003 the standard deviation of 
hourly wage was 0.582 for men and 0.541 for women.  More variation 
characterises the trend over time for women compared to men, with the bulk of 
the increase occurring during the 1990s. Female workers also exhibit a higher 
increase in wage dispersion: the change of standard deviation from 1987 to 2003 
was about 0.012 for males and 0.032 for females; this change appears to be 
smaller if compared to the variation which occurred during the 1980s; from 1980 
to 1990 the change in standard deviation was 0.0724 for males and 0.102 for 
female workers. 
Some interesting features characterize the trends in hourly wage inequality 
in the UK. First of all, the level of inequality is quite high and, for men but not 
women, closer to that of the U.S. than to Italy. Similarly to the U.S., the UK 
gender gap in inequality appears to be an important element of the inequality story 
since the standard deviation of log wages is higher for men than for women in the 
US and the UK but not in Italy. During the 1990s, there is no obvious trend in 
inequality for men; wage inequality increases both for men and women until 
1991; and then slows down, particularly for women, after 1991; rises in the 
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middle of the 1990s and then falls after 2000. The decrease is more evident for 
women. 
The main message of Figures 2.1a and 2.1b is that the evolution of wage 
inequality in the UK differs from the other two countries, with the UK being the 
only country to experience an overall decrease in wage inequality over the sample 
period, especially for women. In fact between 1987 and 2003, the standard 
deviation of log hourly wage decreases by 0.011 for male workers and 0.055 for  
female workers. 
The fall in wage inequality in the UK at the end of the 1990s may be 
explained, in part, by the introduction of the minimum wage. Empirical evidence 
provided, amongst others, by Gosling and Lemieux (2004) documents that the 
decline in wage dispersion during the same period is due to changes in labour 
market in particular to the decline of unionization and  to the introduction of the 
minimum wage22 in the UK at the end of the 1990s.  
Moving to Italy, the figure displays two clear features: wage inequality 
affects women more than men and the large rise in wage inequality occurring in 
the early ’90s is not seen elsewhere in any other period or any other country. From 
1989 to 1993 wage dispersion increased by 7 percentage points for men, and 12 
percentage points for women. Italian women also experienced the highest change 
over the whole sample period, with the standard deviation increasing by 0.041. 
Comparing male workers in the U.S. and in Italy, more similarity in the trend 
arises from 1993 to 2001 when, in both countries, wage dispersion remains 
relatively flat, though levels remain different. 
Figures 2.2a and 2.2b contrast the evolution in log hourly wage percentiles 
both for men and women from 1987 to 2004. The graphs plot the trends of the 90-
10 percentile gap as well as the trends in the upper and lower tails of the wage 
distribution. The results broadly confirm the well documented story about changes 
in wage structure between workers located in different parts of the wage 
distribution (Katz and Autor, 1999; Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2008; JMP 1993; 
Lemieux 2008).  
                                                 
22 Gosling and Lemieux analyse the relationship between the minimum wage and wage inequality; 
and show that the fall of the real value   of the minimum wage contributed to the rapid increase of 
wage inequality in the U.S. during the 1980s. 
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Workers in the upper percentile (90) of the wage distribution gain 
consistently on workers in the lower percentile (10), with resulting increasing 
inequality; this pattern is particularly evident for both men and women in the U.S. 
while the gain is much less pronounced for both Italian men and women workers. 
More fluctuation characterizes the 90-10 gap trend for the UK, especially for male 
workers.   
The 50-10 wage gap stopped rising after the mid-1990s in Italy and the 
UK and this phenomenon was greater for men. Between 1997 and 2003 in the UK 
the 50-10 gap for men and women decreased respectively by 0.089 and 0.031 log 
points.  For female workers in the U.S., the lower tail gap gradually fell by 0.036 
log points with the decrease being larger for men (0.171). For Italy, there is more 
compression in the lower tail inequality, moreover  between 1987 and 2004  there 
is almost 0 change for women  and an increase of 0.033 log points for men.  
By contrast, upper tail (90-50 gap) wage inequality increased steadily in 
both the US and the UK over the sample period and was more pronounced after 
1995; whereas in Italy the upper-tail wage inequality decreased, particularly after 
1995.   
These log hourly wage differentials plot to some extent similar patterns of 
inequality for men and women in all countries. The divergence in the upper tail 
inequality is remarkable in Italy and even greater for female workers in Italy and 
the U.S. Again, fluctuations in trends characterise inequality in wages for English 
male workers. 
The diverging path between the 90-10 log wage differential and the 50-10 
and 90-50 ratios for both men and women is most marked for the U.S., while for 
Italy the divergence between the earnings of more skilled and less skilled workers 
is less evident. The rise in the upper tail earning inequality accounts for most of 
the inequality in all countries, both for male and female.  
One of the aims of this analysis is to explain how changing age and 
educational composition of the labour force affects wage inequality.  Table 2.1 
provides comparisons of educational level and experience of workers. The trends 
in the share of the educational level of the work force are relevant in this analysis 
to compare later with the composition effects. In particular, if the composition 
hypothesis stated by Lemieux holds, we should expect composition effects to be 
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more marked in the period in which the educational achievement of the work 
force changes.  
The first row of each panel reports the share of workers, separated by 
gender, with respect to earned educational qualifications. The striking aspect is 
the difference in the shares of lower educated workers between the U.S. and the 
other two countries. In all cases, the share of less educated workers decreased 
through the years. The percentage of workers with low education in the U.S. is 
small compared to the UK and Italy; in 1987 only 18 % of the male workers in the 
CPS data had a low education (14 % for women); the highest percentages of lower 
educated workers were in the UK GHS sample (63 % of male workers and 69 % 
female in 1987). The Italian experience of the lower educated workers is similar 
to the UK. At the beginning of the sample period, 58 % of male workers (41% for 
women) in the SHIW data only had a low level of education.  
The educational performance of Italian workers is between that of the U.S 
and the UK. The full time employment share of workers with a degree is around 
30% in 2003 in the CPS. Almost no change occurs in the degree level for Italian 
male workers, while the high level of education for Italian female workers in the 
SHIW is nearly double that of men in all years. In the UK, the variation in the 
share of higher educated workers is characterized by the fact that in the last 16 
years, female educational attainment overtakes that of men. The share of higher 
educated workers increases over time; in 2003 the share of male high educated 
workers is 22% compared to the 13% of the 1987; for the female workers the 
increase is even more striking: from 1987 to 2003 the share of women in the 
labour force with a graduate or postgraduate degree, increases by 17 percentage 
points. These differences in the educational level of the workers in the samples 
could therefore influence residual inequality.  
      Differences also arise with respect to the level of experience. The U.S. 
had the highest share of low experience workers in 1987 and the lowest share of 
workers (16%) with more than 30 years of experience. Italy had the lowest share 
of younger cohorts of workers in 1987 and the highest share of more experienced 
(older) workers, about 30% for men. Differences arise when comparing male and 
female workers, particularly in the UK and Italy. In 1987, 47% of English female 
workers belonged to the new entry cohorts. In Italy this was 25%, 10 percent more 
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than the equivalent estimate for men, suggesting an increase in labour force 
participation of women in both countries.    
The analysis of trends and levels in wage inequality for the UK, U.S. and 
Italy cannot exclude an analysis of levels and trends in employment rates. These 
are plotted in Figure 2.3a for men and Figure 2.3b for women. The existence of 
the dichotomy between the U.S. (and the UK)  experiencing robust employment 
growth and widening inequality, and Europe (Italy) where the index of wage 
inequality showed little or no change and employment was stagnant, is well 
known in the economic literature and discussed by  Krugman (1994).  
Both figures are based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) data from 1987 to 2004 and document the existence of an 
employment gap between the UK, the U.S and Italy. In both the UK and the U.S., 
for male workers, the employment rates during the sample period analysed, 
subject to cyclical variation, were around 80% and were very similar between the 
two countries, with the U.S. displaying a higher employment rate between 1991 
and 2001. Italian male workers experienced a lower employment rate ranging 
from 67% to 70% during the same time period analysed.  
The employment gap between the U.S, the UK and Italy is striking for 
women, in fact while the employment rate for women ranges from 58% to 67% 
for the UK and 62% to 68% for the U.S., Italian women faced a much lower 
employment rate (35%) at the beginning of the time period analysed. Although 
this had increased by the end of the 1990s, reaching 45% in 2004, and converged 
toward that of the US and the UK, Italy remains one of the EU countries with the 
lowest female employment rate.  
 
2.6.2 Residual Wage Inequality: Convergence or Divergence Patterns? 
The next results provide evidence of trends in residual wage inequality for 
the U.S., the UK and Italy, starting with a description and comparison of trends 
and levels of between and within variance. 
Figures 2.4a and 2.4b plot the trends for the (actual) residual (within-
group) variance and the between group variance respectively for men and women 
from 1987 to 2003 for the U.S. and the UK and from 1987 to 2004 for Italy, based 
on a decomposition of equation 6. 
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The figures help investigate to what extent log hourly wage components 
(within-group and between) affected the overall increase in wage dispersion in the 
U.S., Italy and the UK during the last 16 years.  Comparing the patterns for the 
three countries, consistent with the descriptive analysis of part one, the U.S. has 
the highest level of within-group (residual) variance for both men and women. 
Most of the increase occurs during the 1990s, decreases slightly at the end of the 
1990s and rises again between 1999 and 2003. The change in prices of 
observables, represented in the graph by the between variance, remains relatively 
flat during the period analysed. More variation occurs for observable skill prices 
for both Italy and the UK which do not correspond to a similar pattern for the 
unobservable skill variance.  For Italy, from 1993 the between variance decreased 
while the within increased, this appears to be true for both men and women. The 
between group variance also decreases for both men and women in the UK. 
These findings validate the results initially suggested by Lemieux for the 
US: residual inequality appears to have an increasing role in explaining the overall 
increase in wage inequality, and this holds for all cases. Some similarity can be 
noticed with respect to the evolution of the between variance: the role of the 
observable components, in this context education and age, appears to lose power 
in explaining wage inequality particularly after the middle of the 1990s mainly for 
Italy and UK.  
Figure 2.4b shows that for women in the UK between 1987 and 2003 the 
between-group variance decreases (-0.051) more than the within-group (-0.001). 
For Italian male workers, the between group and actual residual variances 
move simultaneously during the initial period; but after 1993 the variance of 
unobserved skill increases steadily and decreases just after 2002, while the 
between goes in the opposite direction.  
Different patterns and timing in the changes of the unobserved and 
observed skill variances for the U.S., the UK and Italy suggest that the returns to 
observed and unobserved skills may differ. When the residual variance grows 
more than the between group variance this suggests that unobserved skills play a 
more important role than observed skills in shaping the overall wage dispersion. 
In other words, similar to the U.S. within-group is majority of total variance, 
unlike the U.S., in both the UK and Italy the between group level (and share) is 
falling.   
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To complement this result, tables 2.2a and 2.2b report the R2   of the yearly 
OLS regression, which represents the contribution of the between components in 
explaining the changes in log hourly wages based on the above model (3).  The 
values range on average between 0.32 and 0.39; differences arise for the U.S. 
between men and women, in fact the values of the R2  of the OLS regressions for 
women are on average 0.05 lower than that for men. For the UK, there is not 
much difference between men and women and similarly the values of the R2 
decrease over the sample period. For Italy, the R2 explains a little bit more for 
women (0.39) than for men (0.36) and similarly to the UK the between 
component looses part of the explanatory power over the sample period. 
Tables 2.3a, 2.3b and 2.3c summarize the growth in the residual variance 
relative to the growth in the total variance for the U.S., the UK and Italy, 
separately for men and women. Table 2.3a shows that for the U.S. from 1987 to 
2003, changes in the residual for men accounted for 86 percent of the overall 
change in the total variance (53 percent for women), suggesting that more than 
half of the growth in wage variance is due to the residual component. This table 
also documents that  holding the distribution of skills at its 1987 level, the 
remaining growth in the residual variance accounts for a small negative 
percentage (-0.01 for men and -0.16 for women). The results do not qualitatively 
change when holding characteristics of workers at the 2003 level; again, only 18 
and 13 percent respectively for men and women, is explained by residual 
variance; this suggests that had the level of education remained constant at its 
1987 level, the residual variance would account for only a small fraction of the 
overall rise in wage inequality i.e. the great part of the variation in the actual 
variance is due to the fact that the workforce is more educated and more 
experienced than it was in 1987.  
Table 2.3b reports the changes in residual variance with respect to changes 
to overall wage variance for the UK from 1987 to 2003, separately for men and 
women. The main feature for the UK is that, in contrast to both the US and Italy, 
the total variance in the period analysed decreases both for men and particularly 
for women (0.011 for men and 0.053 for women); the decrease starts at the 
beginning of the 1990s. The main divergent pattern between men and women is 
that despite the fact that women experience a decrease in both total variance and 
residual wage, although with different magnitude, for the English male the 
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decrease of total wage variance contrasts with a higher increases of the residual 
variance. Holding the skills distribution at its 1987 level, only 17 % of the total 
wage variance is explained by the residual variance for men and 12 % contribute 
to increase the variance of wage. The larger decrease in wage variance occurs 
during the 1990s.  
Table 2.3c summarises the same results for Italy from 1987 to 2004; in the 
overall period the variance of wage increases both for men and women, with a 
more pronounced increase for men; in this case the within-group variance 
accounts for almost all the variation, and even when controlling for distribution of 
skills, both in 1987 and in 2004, the residual variance still explains the bulk of the 
increase suggesting a very marginal role for the composition effects. For the 
female Italian workers, the increase of the residual variance is even larger than the 
increase of the overall wage variance itself. 
To better understand the link between changes in shares of unobservable 
skills and changes in the education and experience characteristics of the labour 
force and therefore to separate the effect of skill prices from that of composition,  
tables 2.4a-2.4f explore the role of the work force composition. The tables report 
the value of the within variance for 12 education and experience groups23. To 
obtain larger cells and therefore to improve the precision of the estimates, two 
years at the beginning of the period (1987 and 1989)24 and two years of the end of 
the period (respectively 2002 and 2003 for the U.S. and the UK; 2002 and 2004 
for Italy) have been merged together. 
Tables 2.4a and 2.4b illustrate the evolution of the residual variance for the 
U.S. The results in column 3 show that the change in the residual variance is 
always negative for all lower educated groups, for both men and women. For men, 
the variance declines over the two periods considered for the younger cohort of 
the intermediate group, while remains relatively unchanged for more experienced 
workers of the same educational group. Similarly, in the same group for women, 
within variance decreases for the two younger groups and increases for the older 
intermediate groups. In all cases considered, the decrease of the variance 
corresponds to a decrease in the corresponding work force share, as shown in 
                                                 
23 Lemieux’s original work derives 20 groups; the data appendix motivates in detail this decision. 
24 The choice of these years is based on the availability of the point in time years of Italy, as better 
explained in the data appendix. 
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columns 3 and 6. This finding is consistent in part with one of the main findings 
of Lemieux for the U.S.  
High educated workers instead experience a positive variance change, 
which is confirmed for men and women, though the level of the residual variance 
for men is larger than the residual variance for women. 
Tables 2.4c and 2.4d report trends in residual inequality by education and 
experience group for the UK for men and women respectively. No systematic or 
uniform pattern emerges from the GHS dataset. The increase (decrease) in 
residual variance is not always associated with an increase (decrease) in the 
corresponding share of group workers. Only for higher educated male workers 
there is a clearer pattern: the positive change in the share of more educated 
workers corresponds to an increase in the within variance.  More uniform trends 
appear for the shares of education and experience group in the workforce 
presented in column 6. Trends are similar across groups and between men and 
women; the share of the intermediate group always increases except for the 
younger group; at the same time the share of higher educated workers increases. 
The changes in the trends are quite similar for female workers, although the 
increase in intermediate and higher educated group share is more rapid. 
Tables 2.4e and 2.4f give the results for Italy. Column 3 of table 2.4e 
displays changes in the within-group variance for male workers. The clear pattern 
emerging from the analysis of male Italian workers is that, unlike the U.S., the 
residual variance increases for all education and experience groups. The highest 
value occurs for the youngest, more educated workers in the sample; changes in 
the workforce share are decreasing for the lower educated, and increasing for each 
and every experience group for the intermediate. Changes for high educated are 
diverging, in fact there is a decline in the share of younger higher educated 
workers and a slight increase for the two older groups.   
 The results for women are qualitatively similar, with the exception of one 
old intermediate group experiencing a small decrease in within variance. The 
trend for the change in share of work force is the same for lower educated female 
groups, similar for the intermediate, with the exception of the younger group that 
declines; and the share of higher educated women increases more than that of 
men.  
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To summarise, Italy differs from the U.S.; despite similarity in the 
decrease in low educated share, residual variance has increased, while the UK lies 
in between. There are two main reasons which may explain the differences in the 
role and trend of residual with respect to the overall wage inequality in the three 
countries. One reason that may explain cross-country differences in the residual 
variance trends can be linked to the differences in the institutional labour market 
structures. Autor and Katz (1999) explain that the same underlying demand and 
supply stocks may have differential effects on wages and related components, 
depending on differences in wage-setting and other labour market institutions. 
The stronger the role of labour market  institutions and the less responsive the 
institutions are to changes in market forces, the greater the impact is likely to be 
on employment rather than on wages. This may be the case with Italy, where the 
existence of the collective bargaining agreement, as well as the agreement 
negotiated at national level between unions and employer associations, makes the 
labour market less responsive to changes in composition of the labour force and 
therefore prevents the reward of both observable and unobservable skills. In fact, 
as shown above in the paper, the return to observable (education) in Italy is lower 
than the return to education in the U.S. and the UK. 
The other reason is that changes in supply characteristics are less dramatic 
in Italy compared to the U.S. and the UK; for example in Italy, the share of higher 
educated workers is lower compared to both the U.S. and the UK. As pointed out 
by Natticchioni, Ricci and Rustichelli (2008), in Italy the share of individuals who 
had achieved a degree in 2002 was 10%, highlighting a lower educational 
attainment than other European countries. The striking result for Italy, therefore, 
is that even though the share of the lower educated work force decreases over the 
years, as in the U.S., residual inequality of less educated workers increases rather 
than decreases.  
This suggests that in the Italian context, Lemieux’s composition effects do 
not exert the same mechanical force with respect to changes of the residual: the 
increase of residual variance does not appear to be driven by changes in the 
composition of the work force. This result, confirmed by the findings displayed in 
table 2.1c, may also depend on the fact that changes in educational level of the 
labour force have been more modest compared to the other two countries, as 
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shown in table 2.1, particularly when considering the share of workers with a high 
educational level. 
A clearer picture of the evolution of the residual variance by educational 
composition of the work force is provided in figures 2.5a and 2.5b. 
The figures plot the within variance year-by-year, calculated as an average 
across experience groups for each educational group, separately for men and 
women. The trends are different for each country and across different decades. 
For the U.S., the trends in within variance for the three different 
educational groups are divergent for both men and particularly for women.  In 
both cases, the level of the variance for more educated workers is the highest and 
is steadily increasing over time. Less change occurs for the intermediate group, 
while for the less educated, the residual variance declines over time. 
Although the trends in variance by education groups in Italy are lower than 
in the UK and the U.S., some similarities with U.S. wage inequality timing can be 
observed. The SHIW data displays the higher and increasing level for the residual 
of the higher educated group; less variation appears for the intermediate group 
but, differently from the US, the variance for the lower educated group grows in 
tandem with that of the higher educated group, both for males and females, 
particularly after 1990. 
For women, the trend for more educated follows that of men. However, 
what is particularly interesting for the Italian women is that in contrast to men, 
starting from 1997 the lower educated group variance fell. 
The results for the UK are difficult to interpret because there is no uniform 
pattern dominating the whole trend for either male or female workers. The clearer 
pattern is displayed for the within variance of less educated workers; the level is 
always lower than the other two educational groups. The UK trends go somewhat 
against the SBTC hypothesis since the SBTC would predict a continuing and 
steep growth in wage inequality throughout the 1990s.  
Figures 2.6a and 2.6b present the results of the counterfactual reweighting 
approach proposed by Lemieux that helps to account for the role of composition 
effects on changes in residual wage inequality. The figures compare for each 
country, separately for men and women, the actual residual variance from 1987 to 
2004, to the counterfactual variance that would have existed if the distribution of 
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skills had remained at the same level of the initial or the final year. The 
composition effect is represented in the figures by the distance between the actual 
and the counterfactual variance. 
Comparing the role of changes in the characteristics of the labour force in 
the three countries, the composition effects are different across the three countries, 
suggesting that changes in the shares and levels of education and experience of 
the work force had a different impact on the evolution of wage inequality and 
particularly on the evolution (rise) of residual wage inequality.  
When the distribution of skills is held at its 1987 level, the composition 
effect appears to play a central role for the U.S. for which the great part of the 
growth in residual can be explained by the changes in education and experience 
composition. For Italy, changes in the composition of the labour force do not 
seem to be important to the increase in residual inequality, having a small, 
negligible role since 1995. The results are similar for women, except that the 
composition effects play a small role during the last years of the samples both for 
Italy and the UK. The effects for US women are more alike in terms of timing to 
that of men. The results are consistent with Lemieux, confirming that as the US 
labour force has become more educated and older, this also increases the role of 
unobservable skills of workers. If the workforce had 1987 characteristics, the 
level of the residual would have been lower, suggesting that composition effects 
exerted an upward force on residual inequality. This is less evident for the UK, 
except when considering the upper and lower residual gap trends. 
 
 
2.6.3 Residual Inequality: Alternative Measures 
The remaining figures (2.7a-2.9b) look at alternative measures of wage 
inequality, specifically the 90-10, 90-50 and 50-10 residual gaps, comparing the 
actual residual and the residual computed holding distribution of skills at their 
1987 characteristics, to understand how much change in residual, as well as 
composition, affects workers at the different tails of the distribution. 
The 90-10 gap, plotted in figures 2.7a and 2.7b for men and women 
respectively, has been increasing steadily through time for men in the U.S. For 
women, the 90-10 gap increases until 1995, decreases during the latter part of the 
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1990s and increases faster thereafter.  Holding the characteristics of workers at 
their 1987 level, a clear effect of composition changes is displayed for the U.S. 
Minor composition effects can be noted for Italy, both for men and women; and 
for the UK, the trend is similar to that for men, the composition effect starts to 
become evident to some extent after 1995; the pattern reverses and becomes 
unclear for English women.  
 One interesting result arises in the graphs of the evolution of the 50-10 
gap (2.8a and 2.8b); the patterns for the three countries are quite different. For the 
U.S., when the characteristics of education and experience of the labour force are 
held constant, the effect of changes in labour force is clear and more striking for 
women. For Italy, contrary to the results for AKK (2005) in the U.S., changes in 
education and experience composition have no effect for workers located in the 
bottom half of the distribution, for which changes in wage inequality appear to be 
due to reasons other than the changes in work force characteristics. Again, no 
clear or uniform pattern can be observed over time for the less skilled UK 
workers. 
For the U.S. the trend is qualitatively similar between men and women, in 
fact the 50-10 gap declines more consistently through time, and slightly increases 
after 2001. The decrease during the 1990s is more pronounced.  In both cases, 
when holding distribution of skills of workers at their 1987 level, the level of the 
50-10 residual variance gap is lower, suggesting the existence of composition 
effect on workers located at the lower part of the wage distribution. 
The 50-10 residual gap for the UK displays more variation both for men 
and women, with a level of residual gap lower, starting from 1997. Composition 
effects appear to keep the level of residual lower between 1989 and 1998 for 
women, with no remarkable effect during the last years. By contrast, no effects 
can be noted for men, except a small effect since the middle of the 1990s. 
More similarity can be noticed when analysing the trend and timing of the 
residual upper tail (90-50) distribution plotted in figures 2.9a and 2.9b. In the 
United States, the residual inequality of the 90-50 gap increases over time and is 
affected by changes in the work force, both for men and women, even though a 
stronger effect is displayed for women. The Italian trend of the 90-50 residual gap 
is more similar to the U.S. than it is to the UK. For Italy, composition effect can 
indeed explain part of the increase in the 90-50 residual gap, both for men and 
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women. The fact that composition effects affect differently the residual of the 
lower and upper tail of the wage distribution, recalls the importance of how the 
rising skill prices reflect differently on high and less skilled workers. 
These results confirm one of the main stylised facts about wage 
dispersion: the increase in the 90-50 gap; and this holds for all countries. 
More variation occurs for the UK, and for all countries holding 
distribution of skills at their 1987 level can help to explain the increase in the 
upper tail of the residual. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter presents a comparative analysis of the evolution in residual 
hourly wage inequality for men and women in the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Italy between 1987 and 2004, using microdata from the Current 
Population Survey for the U.S., the General Household Survey for the UK and the 
Survey of Household and Income Wealth for Italy. 
 The analysis shows some remarkable differences among the three 
countries both in the level and sometimes in the direction of the trends of wage 
inequality over the sample period, as measured by the standard deviation of log 
hourly wage. The level of wage inequality in the U.S. is the highest amongst all 
the countries and throughout the years, even though it remains relatively flat 
through the period compared to the other countries. The level of inequality in the 
UK is quite high and also higher than that of both the UK and Italy. The UK 
experience, in terms of wage inequality, differs in this context from Italy and the 
U.S. since it has been the only one to face an overall decrease in wage inequality; 
from 1987 to 2003 standard deviation of log hourly wage decreases by 0.001 for 
male workers and 0.053 for female workers. Two features characterize wage 
dispersion in Italy: the highest change of wage inequality that occurs in the early 
’90s is not seen elsewhere in any other period; Italian female workers are more 
affected than males, from 1989 to 1993 wage dispersion increases by 7 percentage 
points for men, and by 12 percentage points for women.  
The results provide some support for conclusions concerning residual 
inequality trends proposed by the main empirical literature (Juhn, Murphy, Pierce 
1993, Autor, Katz and Kearney 2005, 2007; Acemoglu 2002, Lemieux 2006): the 
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residual accounts for most of the wage inequality variation in all three countries 
(though of course this in part reflects the amount of disaggregation in the 
observed model covariates). In the U.S. from 1987 to 2003, changes in the 
residual for men account for 86% of the overall change in the total variance, and 
53% for woman. In the UK, despite the decrease in overall variance of wage both 
for men (0.033) and women (0.034), the residual variance increased by 0.014 log 
points. More strikingly, the within-group variance in Italy corresponds to the 
wage variation, explaining almost all the change in wage inequality, with the bulk 
of the increase occurring during the 1990s, confirming the main results of existing 
literature in Italy. 
Comparing the role of changes in characteristics of the workforce in the 
three countries, composition effects are different among the three countries, 
suggesting that changes in the share and level of education and experience of the 
workforce had a different impact on the evolution of wage inequality and 
particularly on the evolution (rise) of residual wage inequality reflecting the fact 
that the education/experience shares grew differently across countries, therefore 
shaping differently demand and supply of observable and unobservable skills. The 
composition effects hypothesis appears to hold only for the U.S.; in the UK and 
Italy, when controlling for distribution of skills, both at 1987 and at 2004, the 
residual variance still explains the bulk of the increase, suggesting a very marginal 
role for the composition effects.  
In partial contrast with AAK (2005) who show that composition effect was 
concentrated in the lower tail of the earnings distribution, results for Italy show 
that compositional changes  only affect the upper tail (90-50 gap) earnings 
distribution. 
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Appendix A2.1: Data 
United States: 
Since Lemieux provided data for MAY/ORG CPS, the log of hourly 
wages has already been defined. As Lemieux explains, for 60 percent of the work 
force in the sample, information about the hourly wage has been directly collected 
from workers; for the rest of the U.S. sample, log wage has been computed25.  
In the whole analysis, Lemieux uses as weight hours worked per week, 
together with CPS’s weight; after several iterations consisting in weighting and 
unweighting the analysis, using, for example, the weight defined as: “hours 
worked per week/10”. Because of negligible differences in the estimates, weights 
have not been used in any data country. This decision has also been supported by 
the fact that the GHS and the SHIW do not contain any earning weights which 
may be compared to those available in the CPS. 
The only weight used is the counterfactual one defined as follows: 
                           Weight= (1-ω)/ω 
where  ω is computed as in Lemieux’s by using the logistic regression. 
The original work defines twenty education and experience groups, which 
are based on four experience categories (0-10, 11-20, 21-30 and over 31 years of 
experience) and on five education categories (dropout, high school graduate, some 
college, college graduates, college post graduates). The regressions use 9 
education categories (0-4, 5-8, 10, 11, 12, 13-15, 16 and 17+).  
 
United Kingdom: 
Part of the empirical work on wage inequality in the UK uses an 
alternative data set: the Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS, like the GHS, 
contains information on individual wages and employment status, and is a larger 
sample, but data on wages are only available from 1993. 
The main advantage in using the GHS is that it contains information in all 
periods considered. The main disadvantages lie in the sample size, in particular, 
                                                 
25 For details see Appendix A in Lemieux 2006. 
65 
 
because the educational level is not recorded consistently through time. The GHS 
contains information on the highest level of qualifications as well as on the age 
left school. The main limitation, which is reflected on the other datasets, is that 
from 1975 to 1996 there is no separate information between post-graduate and 
degree; in the last years of the sample, education categories are nearly 40. Real 
wages are obtained by deflating nominal wages with the Retail Price Index (RPI) 
based at the 2003 level. 
Italy: 
 The SHIW covers the years from 1977 to 2004. Since information on the 
hours worked per week is only recorded starting from 1987, it has been necessary 
to start all periods from 1987. The survey is run every two years, therefore for 
Italy the mid-points of the time intervals available from the Bank of Italy and used 
in this research are: 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004. 
Moreover, for the years before 1984, information on age is only available in class 
and is not continuous. 
Information about hours of work also includes the overtime hours (paid). 
In the SHIW there is separate information about hours worked per week and 
overtime with corresponding wages. Because all data sets include overtime in 
hours worked, observations with overtime worked have been used in the SHIW 
data. 
 Part of the existing literature on earnings inequality in Italy uses an 
alternative data set available, the Italian Institute for National Social Security 
(INPS). The INPS is an administrative data set that, based on firms’ declarations, 
collects data on all Italian workers employed in the private sector with respect to 
the period from 1985 to 1999. For each calendar year, the Social Security forms of 
employees born on the 10th of March, June, September and December were 
selected to form random samples of population of employees.  
The main advantages of using INPS data are that it contains annual gross 
wages and that the sample size is larger than the SHIW one. In fact, each yearly 
sample includes approximately 100,000 workers of Italian private firms, 
excluding agriculture and central state administration. 
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Unfortunately, the INPS does not contain any information on hours of 
work per week, on workers in the public sector or on the educational 
qualifications of the workers; information which is indeed crucial in this context. 
For the SHIW dataset, wage values that are between 1 and 50 Euros (at 
2004 Euro value) are used, observations deleted in this way are very few (9 for 
hourly wages greater than   €50, and 78 for hourly wages less than  €1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67 
 
Figure 2.1a: Standard  Deviation of Log Hourly Wage, Men 
 
Notes: Based on CPS, GHS and SHIW. Samples include male workers in labour force, employed 
only, working full time, considering main job with positive potential experience. 
   
 
 
Figure 2.1b: Standard  Deviation of Log Hourly Wage, Women 
 
Notes: Based on CPS, GHS and SHIW. Samples include female workers in labour force, 
employed only, working full time, considering main job with positive potential experience 
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Figure 2.2a: Percentile of Log Hourly Wage Distribution, Men 
 
Notes: Based on CPS, GHS and SHIW. Samples include men in labour force, employed only, 
working full time, considering main job with positive potential experience. 
 
 
Figure 2.2b: Percentile of Log Hourly Wage Distribution, Women 
 
Notes: Based on CPS, GHS and SHIW. Samples include women in labour force, employed only, 
working full time, considering main job with positive potential experience.  
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Figure 2.3a: Employment Rate for Men, Italy, UK and U.S., 1987-2004 
 
Notes: Based on the OECD data, employment refers to both part time and full time workers. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3b: Employment Rate of Women, Italy, UK and U.S., 1987-2004 
 
Notes: Based on the OECD data, employment refers to both part time and full time workers 
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Table 2.1: Percentage Distribution of Workers by Education and Experience 
Groups 
 Men Women  
  1987 2003 1987 2003 
Panel A- US 
A. Education     
Lower 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.08 
Intermediate 0.59 0.59 0.65 0.61 
High 0.23 0.29 0.21 0.30 
B. Experience     
1-10 0.36 0.28 0.38 0.28 
11-20 0.30 0.26 0.28 0.24 
21-30 0.18 0.26 0.19 0.27 
31+ 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.21 
Panel B- United Kingdom 
A. Education     
Lower 0.63 0.57 0.69 0.51 
Intermediate 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.24 
High  0.13 0.22 0.09 0.26 
B. Experience     
1-10 0.30 0.20 0.47 0.25 
11-20 0.23 0.24 0.18 0.25 
21-30 0.21 0.28 0.17 0.26 
31+ 0.26 0.27 0.19 0.24 
Panel C-Italy 
A. Education     
Lower 0.58 0.45 0.41 0.28 
Intermediate 0.31 0.44 0.42 0.54 
High 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.18 
B. Experience      
1-10 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.18 
11-20 0.26 0.23 0.32 0.25 
21-30 0.26 0.29 0.23 0.32 
31+ 0.33 0.32 0.20 0.26 
Notes: The table shows the educational characteristics of full time workers, employed only. The 
lower education group includes workers who have completed compulsory education; the 
intermediate category includes workers with qualifications that exceed those of compulsory 
schooling but do not reach those of a college-degree holder26. The higher education group refers 
either to individuals with graduate or postgraduate education. 
                                                 
26 The statistics of this educational attainments comparison show that Italy stands out as a  peculiar 
case with the level of higher education being lower than the UK and US and experiencing  no 
changes over the time period analysed; moreover the table also presents a very low share of 
younger workers entering the labour market, reflected by the lower employment rate of the 
country.  These surprising and disappointing figures are well documented by the OECD according 
to which the educational attainments in Italy are among the lowest in Europe  and over the last few 
years these gaps have been growing.  As pointed out by Naticchioni et al. (2008) this would 
suggest that the skilled workers are scarce in Italy.  
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Figure 2.4a: Within and Between-group Variance Men, 1987-2004 
 
Notes: Based on a standard Mincer equation fit separately by year. 
 
Figure 2.4b: Within and Between-group Variance Women, 1987-2004 
 
Notes: Based on a standard Mincer equation fit separately by year. 
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Table 2.2a:  R 2 of the OLS regressions 
  United States  United Kingdom  Italy  
 Men       Women Men Women Men Women 
Year R2 
1987 0.38 0.30 0.38 0.39 0.37 0.44 
1988 0.38 0.29 0.36 0.34 - - 
1989 0.37 0.31 0.36 0.37 0.30 0.28 
1990 0.38 0.31 0.38 0.38 - - 
1991 0.38 0.31 0.34 0.30 0.36 0.42 
1992 0.38 0.31 0.30 0.33 - - 
1993 0.38 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.42 0.49 
1994 - - 0.28 0.34 - - 
1995 0.38 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.42 0.47 
1996 0.38 0.33 0.32 0.35 - - 
1997 0.38 0.33 0.37 0.33 - - 
1998 0.37 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.35 0.34 
1999 0.38 0.33 0.28 0.36 - - 
2000 0.37 0.33 0.28 0.24 0.37 0.39 
2001 0.37 0.33 0.27 0.24 - - 
2002 0.36 0.33 0.26 0.26 0.30 0.32 
2003 0.37 0.32 0.27 0.26  - 
2004     0.31 0.33 
Mean  0.37 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.36 0.39 
Notes: Based on a standard Mincer equation fit separately by year. 
 
 
 
Table 2.2b: R2  of the OLS Regression for Pooled Years, UK 
Year Men Women 
   
1987 0.38 0.38 
1988-1989 0.36 0.35 
1990-1991 0.35 0.39 
1992-1993 0.31 0.34 
1994-1995 0.30 0.33 
1996-1997 0.34 0.32 
1998-1999 0.29 0.29 
2000-2001 0.27 0.24 
2002-2003 0.26 0.26 
Mean  0.32 0.32 
Notes: Based on a standard Mincer equation fit separately by year 
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Table 2.3a: Composition Effects and Changes in the Residual Variance of 
Log Hourly Wages, U.S. 
 1987-1991 1991-1998 1998-2003 1987-2003 
Men      
Actual Residual Variance   0.007 0.003 0.009 0.019 
[86] 
Residual Variance  of 
1987 skills distribution 
0.003 -0.006 0.002 -0.002 
[-0.01] 
Residual Variance  of   
2003 skills distribution 
0.007 -0.004 0.001 0.004 
[0.18] 
Total variance: 
 
0.010 -0.001 0.013 0.022 
[100] 
Women     
Actual Residual Variance   0.007 0.002 0.009 0.019 
[53] 
Residual Variance  of  
1987 skills distribution 
0.002 -0.010 0.002 -0.006 
[-0.16] 
Residual Variance  of  
2003 skills distribution 
0.005 -0.003 0.002 0.005 
[0.13] 
Total variance: 
 
0.013 0.010 0.011 0.035 
[100] 
Notes: Based on CPS. The table shows changes between 1987 and 2003 in wage decomposition. 
Residual variance is based on a standard Mincer equation. Numbers in squared brackets represent 
the percentage of the 1987-2003 change in the total variance of wages (both within and between-
group components) that is attributable to this variance component.  
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Table 2.3b: Composition Effects and Changes in the Residual Variance of 
Log Hourly Wages, UK 
 1987-1991 1991-1998 1998-2003 1987-2003 
Men      
Actual Residual Variance   0.021 -0.009 0.011 0.023 
 
Residual Variance  of 1987 
skills distribution 
0.018 -0.019 0.005 0.003 
[ 0.27 ] 
 
Residual Variance  of  2003 
skills distribution 
0.022 -0.019 0.014 0.016 
 
 
Total variance: 
 
0.015 -0.036 0.007 -0.011 
[100] 
Women     
Actual Residual Variance   0.013 -0.002 -0.012 -0.001 
[20] 
Residual Variance  of 1987 
skills distribution 
0.010 -0.007 -0.013 -0.008 
[17] 
 
Residual Variance  of  2003 
skills distribution 
0.007 0.001 -0.018 -0.010 
[ 19 ] 
 
Total variance: 
 
-0.010 -0.012 -0.028 -0.053 
[100] 
Notes: Based on GHS. The table shows changes between 1987 and 2003 in wage decomposition. 
Residual variance is based on a standard Mincer equation. Numbers in squared brackets represent 
the percentage of the 1987-2003 change in the total variance of wages (both within and between-
group components) that is attributable to this variance component.  
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Table 2.3c: Composition Effects and Changes in the Residual Variance of 
Log Hourly Wages, Italy 
 
 1987-1991 1991-1998 1998-2004 1987-2004 
Men      
Actual Residual Variance   -0.008 0.033 -0.001 0.024 
[100] 
Residual Variance of 
1987 skills distribution 
-0.008 0.030 -0.002 0.020 
[83] 
 
Residual Variance of  
2003 skills distribution 
-0.009 0.029 -0.001 0.019 
[78] 
 
Total variance: 
 
-0.015 0.048 -0.009 0.024 
[100] 
Women     
Actual Residual Variance   -0.003 0.036 -0.014 0.019 
 
Residual Variance of 
1987 skills distribution 
-0.005 0.039 -0.018 0.015 
 
 
Residual Variance of 
2003 skills distribution 
-0.003 0.028 -0.013 0.013 
Total variance: 
 
-0.012 0.036 -0.022 0.003 
[100] 
Notes: Based on SHIW. The table shows changes between 1987 and 2004 in wage decomposition. 
Residual variance is based on a standard Mincer equation. Numbers in squared brackets represent 
the percentage of the 1987-2003 change in the total variance of wages (both within and between-
group components) that is attributable to this variance component.  
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Table 2.4a: Within-group Variance of Wages by Experience-Education Cell 
for Men, U.S. 
  Within-group variance Work force share 
 1987-1989 2002-2003 Change 1987-1989 2002-2003 Change 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. By education and experience 
Lower 
1-10 0.097 0.074 -0.023 0.062 0.045 -0.017 
11-20 0.177 0.125 -0.053 0.034 0.023 -0.01 
21-30 0.219 0.174 -0.044 0.026 0.023 -0.004 
31+ 0.233 0.185 -0.048 0.055 0.026 -0.028 
Tot. 0.726 0.558 -0.168 0.177 0.117 -0.059 
Intermediate 
1-10 0.166 0.143 -0.024 0.21 0.158 -0.051 
11-20 0.191 0.196 0.005 0.181 0.148 -0.033 
21-30 0.208 0.214 0.006 0.11 0.156 0.045 
31+ 0.242 0.247 0.006 0.085 0.126 0.042 
Tot. 0.807 0.8 -0.007 0.586 0.588 0.003  
 
High 
1-10 0.233 0.248 0.015 0.084 0.074 -0.01 
11-20 0.254 0.297 0.043 0.087 0.089 0.002 
21-30 0.299 0.322 0.022 0.043 0.082 0.039 
31+ 0.363 0.379 0.016 0.023 0.05 0.027 
Tot. 1.149 1.246 0.096 0.237 0.295 0.058 
        1 1   
Notes:  Based on CPS, the table shows the within-group level and changes based on a standard 
Mincer equation by level of education and experience. The lower education group includes 
workers who have completed compulsory education; the intermediate category includes workers 
with qualifications that exceed those of compulsory schooling but do not reach those of a college-
degree holder. The higher education group refers either to individuals with graduate or 
postgraduate education. 
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Table 2.4b: Within-group Variance of Wages by Experience-Education Cell 
for Women, U.S. 
  Within-group variance Work force share 
  1987-1989 2002-2003 Change 1987-1989 2002-2003 Change 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. By education and experience 
Lower 
1-10 0.081 0.054 -0.027 0.049 0.037 -0.012 
11-20 0.143 0.104 -0.039 0.023 0.013 -0.010 
21-30 0.148 0.106 -0.042 0.024 0.015 -0.009 
31+ 0.153 0.14 -0.014 0.042 0.020 -0.022 
Tot. 0.525 0.404 -0.122 0.138 0.085 -0.053 
 
Intermediate 
1-10 0.152 0.135 -0.016 0.225 0.155 -0.070 
11-20 0.201 0.185 -0.017 0.188 0.143 -0.045 
21-30 0.196 0.2 0.004 0.134 0.172 0.038 
31+ 0.201 0.204 0.003 0.105 0.145 0.040 
Tot. 0.75 0.724 -0.026 0.652 0.615 -0.033 
 
High 
1-10 0.201 0.212 0.011 0.09 0.090 0.000 
11-20 0.232 0.283 0.051 0.073 0.085 0.012 
21-30 0.237 0.28 0.043 0.032 0.086 0.052 
31+ 0.259 0.271 0.012 0.015 0.039 0.024 
Tot 0.929 1.046 0.117 0.210 0.300 0.088 
    1 1  
Notes: Based on CPS, the table shows the within-group level and changes based on a standard 
Mincer equation by level of education and experience. The lower education group includes 
workers who have completed compulsory education; the intermediate category includes workers 
with qualifications that exceed those of compulsory schooling but do not reach those of a college-
degree holder. The higher education group refers either to individuals with graduate or 
postgraduate education. 
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Table 2.4c: Within-group Variance of Wages by Experience-Education Cell 
for Men, UK 
Notes:  Based on GHS, the table shows the within-group level and changes based on a standard 
Mincer equation by level of education and experience. The lower education group includes 
workers who have completed compulsory education; the intermediate category includes workers 
with qualifications that exceed those of compulsory schooling but do not reach those of a college-
degree holder. The higher education group refers either to individuals with graduate or 
postgraduate education. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Within-group variance Work force share 
  1987-1989 2002-2003 Change 1987-1989 2002-2003 Change 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. By education and experience 
Lower 
1-10 0.173 0.176 0.003 0.161 0.089 -0.072 
11-20 0.156 0.171 0.015 0.114 0.134 0.02 
21-30 0.185 0.181 -0.004 0.132 0.149 0.017 
31+ 0.161 0.191 0.03 0.205 0.209 0.005 
Tot. 0.675 0.719 0.044 0.612 0.581 -0.03 
 
Intermediate 
1-10 0.133 0.145 0.012 0.084 0.047 -0.037 
11-20 0.123 0.232 0.109 0.082 0.059 -0.023 
21-30 0.186 0.2 0.014 0.056 0.049 -0.005 
31+ 0.184 0.241 0.057 0.041 0.04 -0.001 
Tot. 0.626 0.818 0.192 0.263 0.195 -0.066 
 
High 
1-10 0.153 0.204 0.051 0.046 0.069 0.024 
11-20 0.134 0.187 0.053 0.038 0.057 0.02 
21-30 0.213 0.247 0.034 0.024 0.064 0.04 
31+ 0.23 0.222 -0.008 0.017 0.034 0.016 
Tot. 0.73 0.86 0.13 0.125 0.224 0.1 
    1 1  
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Table 2.4d: Within-group Variance of Wages by Experience-Education Cell 
for Women, UK 
Notes: Based on GHS, the table shows the within-group level and changes based on a standard 
Mincer equation by level of education and experience. The lower education group includes 
workers who have completed compulsory education; the intermediate category includes workers 
with qualifications that exceed those of compulsory schooling but do not reach those of a college-
degree holder. The higher education group refers either to individuals with graduate or 
postgraduate education. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Within-group variance Work force share 
  1987-1989 2002-2003 Change 1987-1989 2002-2003 Change 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. By education and experience 
Lower 
1-10 0.146 0.114 -0.032 0.287 0.087 -0.2 
11-20 0.166 0.15 -0.016 0.109 0.104 -0.005 
21-30 0.177 0.19 0.013 0.137 0.122 -0.016 
31+ 0.14 0.145 0.005 0.161 0.168 0.006 
Tot. 0.629 0.599 -0.03 0.694 0.481 -0.215 
 
Intermediate 
1-10 0.113 0.104 -0.009 0.113 0.077 -0.036 
11-20 0.159 0.171 0.012 0.054 0.068 0.015 
21-30 0.156 0.169 0.013 0.033 0.067 0.034 
31+ 0.195 0.154 -0.041 0.019 0.049 0.03 
Tot. 0.623 0.598 -0.025 0.219 0.261 0.043 
 
High 
1-10 0.133 0.097 -0.036 0.052 0.105 0.053 
11-20 0.154 0.19 0.036 0.023 0.063 0.041 
21-30 0.155 0.256 0.101 0.008 0.065 0.058 
31+ 0.221 0.176 -0.045 0.004 0.025 0.02 
Tot. 0.663 0.719 0.056 0.087 0.258 0.172 
    1 1  
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Table 2.4e: Within-group Variance of Wages by Experience-Education Cell 
for Men, Italy 
Notes: Based on SHIW, the table shows the within-group level and changes based on a standard 
Mincer equation by level of education and experience. The lower education group includes 
workers who have completed compulsory education; the intermediate category includes workers 
with qualifications that exceed those of compulsory schooling but do not reach those of a college-
degree holder. The higher education group refers either to individuals with graduate or 
postgraduate education. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Within-group variance Work force share 
  1987-1989   2002-2004   Change  1987-1989 2002-2004 Change 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. By education and experience 
Lower 
1-10 0.082 0.191   0.108 0.055 0.033 -0.022 
11-20 0.069 0.093 0.023 0.117 0.091 -0.027 
21-30 0.07 0.105 0.035 0.137 0.133 -0.004 
31+ 0.077 0.108 0.031 0.253 0.203 -0.05 
Tot. 0.298 0.497 0.197 0.562 0.46 -0.103 
 
Intermediate 
1-10 0.075 0.087 0.013 0.09 0.099 0.009 
11-20 0.074 0.096 0.022 0.103 0.116 0.013 
21-30 0.108 0.12 0.012 0.09 0.129 0.039 
31+ 0.116 0.141 0.025 0.051 0.093 0.041 
Tot. 0.373 0.444 0.072 0.334 0.437 0.102 
 
High 
1-10 0.103 0.139 0.036 0.023 0.021 -0.002 
11-20 0.106 0.111 0.005 0.039 0.027 -0.012 
21-30 0.137 0.236 0.1 0.027 0.031 0.004 
31+ 0.149 0.167 0.019 0.015 0.024 0.009 
Tot. 0.495 0.653 0.16 0.104 0.103 -0.001 
    1 1  
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Table 2.4f: Within-group Variance of Wages by Experience-Education Cell 
for Women, Italy 
 Within-group variance  Work force share 
 
  1987-1989 
(1) 
2002-2004 
(2) 
Change 
(3) 
1987-1989 
(4) 
2002-2004 
(5) 
A. By education and experience 
Lower 
1-10 0.087 0.128 0.041 0.076 0.021 
11-20 0.070 0.089 0.019 0.089 0.052 
21-30 0.068 0.088 0.020 0.100 0.078 
31+ 0.072 0.083 0.011 0.139 0.130 
Tot. 0.297 0.388 0.091 0.404 0.281 
 
Intermediate 
1-10 0.086 0.108 0.022 0.157 0.119 
11-20 0.082 0.122 0.04 0.15 0.152 
21-30 0.103 0.095 -0.008 0.087 0.178 
31+ 0.096 0.148 0.052 0.042 0.089 
Tot. 0.367 0.473 0.106 0.436 0.538 
 
High 
1-10 0.102 0.21 0.109 0.044 0.045 
11-20 0.121 0.191 0.07 0.078 0.055 
21-30 0.105 0.159 0.054 0.031 0.061 
31+ 0.109 0.179 0.07 0.007 0.020 
Tot. 0.437 0.739 0.303 0.16 0.181 
    1 1 
Notes: Based on SHIW; the table shows the within-group level and changes based on a standard 
Mincer equation by level of education and experience. The lower education group includes 
workers who have completed compulsory education; the intermediate category includes workers 
with qualifications that exceed those of compulsory schooling but do not reach those of a college-
degree holder. The higher education group refers either to individuals with graduate or 
postgraduate education. 
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Figure 2.5a: Within-group Variance by Education, Men 
(Average of the experience group) 
 
 
Figure 2.5b: Within-group Variance by Education, Women 
(Average of the experience group) 
 
Notes: The table shows the within-group variance based on a standard Mincer equation; for each 
education group the within-group variance is the average of four experience groups (1-10, 11-20, 
21-30, 31+). The lower education group includes workers who have completed compulsory 
education; the intermediate category includes workers with qualifications that exceed those of 
compulsory schooling but do not reach those of a college-degree holder. The higher education 
group refers either to individuals with graduate or postgraduate education. 
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Figure 2.6a: Actual and Counterfactual Residual Variance of Log Hourly 
Wages, Men 
 
 Notes: Based on CPS, GHS and SHIW. Samples include men of labour force age, employed only, 
with positive potential experience, working full time and full year in their main job.  
 
Figure 2.6b: Actual and Counterfactual Residual Variance of Log Hourly 
Wages, Women 
 
Notes: Based on CPS, GHS and SHIW. Samples include women of labour force age, employed 
only, with positive potential experience, working full time and full year in their main job.  
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Figure 2.7a: 90-10 Residual Wage Gap, Men 
(Holding distribution of skills at their 1987 level) 
 
Notes: Based on CPS, GHS and SHIW. Samples include men of labour force age, employed only, 
with positive potential experience, working full time and full year in their main job. 
 
Figure 2.7b: 90-10 Residual Wage Gap, Women 
(Holding distribution of skills at their 1987 level) 
 
      Notes: Based on CPS, GHS and SHIW. Samples include women of labour force age, employed 
only, with positive potential experience, working full time and full year in their main job. 
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Figure 2.8a: 50-10 Residual Wage Gap, Men 
(Holding distribution of skills at their 1987 level) 
 
Notes: Based on CPS, GHS and SHIW. Samples include men of labour force age, employed only, 
with positive potential experience, working full time and full year in their main job. 
 
 Figure 2.8b: 50-10 Residual Wage Gap, Women  
(Holding distribution of skills at their 1987 level) 
 
Notes: Based on CPS, GHS and SHIW. Samples include women of labour force age, employed 
only, with positive potential experience, working full time and full year in their main job. 
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Figure 2.9a: 90-50 Residual Wage Gap, Men 
(Holding distribution of skills at their 1987 level) 
  
 
Notes: Based on CPS, GHS and SHIW. Samples include men of labour force age, employed only, 
with positive potential experience, working full time and full year in their main job.  
 
Figure 2.9b: 90-50 Residual Wage Gap, Women 
(Holding distribution of skills at their 1987 level) 
 
Notes: Based on CPS, GHS and SHIW. Samples include women of labour force age, employed 
only, with positive potential experience, working full time and full year in their main job.  
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Chapter 3: Residual Wage Inequality and Immigration in the UK 
and the U.S.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Over the last few decades, immigration has increased significantly in both 
the US and the UK; both countries have also experienced notable increases in the 
degree of wage inequality. According to Current Population Survey (CPS) and 
Labour Force (LFS) data, respectively, in 2008 nearly 14 percent of the US and 12 
percent of the UK labour force27 were born abroad. The same data also document 
that from 1994 to 2008, wage inequality, measured by the standard deviation of 
the natural logarithm of hourly wage for male workers, increased by 2.2 
percentage points in the US and by 1.4 percentage points in the UK.   
Overall, the increase in wage inequality has been stronger in the upper tail 
than the lower tail of the wage distribution (Machin and Van Reenen, 2008). 
Since the 1980s, both countries have experienced an increase in the upper-tail 
inequality (90-50), whereas the lower tail (50-10) has shrunk. Autor et al. (2008) 
document that for the US, between 1979 and 1987, the male 90/50 log hourly 
earnings rose by 8.5 log points; between 1987 and 1995, it rose by an additional 
5.2; and it rose by 9.7 log points between 1995 and 2003. In contrast, between 
1979 and 1987, the 50-10 gap increased by 13.0 log points, while the gap 
narrowed between 1987 and 2003 4.7 log points. 
     There is a huge empirical debate on the social and economic 
consequences of international migration, one of the core concerns relates to the 
impact of immigration on the wages of native workers. Despite the common-sense 
intuition behind the simple theoretical model of the laws of supply and demand, 
the international migration literature has found it difficult to arrive at a consensus 
on the impact of immigration on the wages of workers in the receiving countries.  
Abdurrahman and Borjas (2007), for example, investigate the effect of the 
immigration-induced supply shifts on the cross-country evolution of relative 
wages earned in Canada, Mexico and the US. They find that the impact of 
migration on the wage structure differs significantly across the three countries. 
International migration reduced wage inequality in Canada, while it contributed to 
                                                 
27 The sample includes full-time workers, who are not self-employed, have only a single job, have 
positive potential work experience, and receive an hourly wage less than 100 pounds for the UK 
and 100 dollars for the US 
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increased wage inequality in the US. International migration in Mexico increased 
the relative wages of workers in the middle of the skill distribution but lowered 
the wages of workers at the bottom of the distribution. Assuming that similarly 
educated workers with different experiences are not perfect substitutes, (but that 
immigrants and natives within each groups are), Borjas (2006) confirms the main 
predictions of the simplest theoretical model of a competitive labour market, 
reporting that in the US, a 10 percent increase in immigrant flow in the skill 
reduces weekly earnings by about 4 percent. In contrast, Card (2005) and 
Dustmann et al. (2005) give evidence that the effect of immigration on US and 
UK native wages is almost negligible. 
 A consensus emerging from a recent stream of the empirical literature is 
that immigration not only has little impact on natives’ wages, but also, on average, 
exerts a positive rather than negative effect on natives’ wages (Ottaviano and Peri 
2006; Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth 2007 (MMW hereafter); Dustmann, 
Frattini, Preston 2008 (DFP hereafter)). As proven by Ottaviano and Peri (2006) 
for the US and by MMW (2007) for the UK, natives’ wage loss from immigration 
is mitigated by the incomplete substitutability of immigrants and natives within 
age and education groups. Ottaviano and Peri (2006) claim that imperfect 
substitutability may arise, among other aspects, from the different abilities or 
unobserved characteristics of workers. Recently, Borjas et al.(2008), re-examining 
the Ottaviano-Peri empirical exercise, show that their finding of imperfect 
substitutability is sensitive to the construction of the two key variables of relative 
wages and relative supplies—but particularly to the inclusion of young students in 
the sample. Under conventional classifications of workers by education and 
experience, the data fail to reject the hypothesis that immigrants and natives are 
perfect substitutes. Even allowing for long-run adjustments in the capital stock, 
immigration appears likely to lower the wages of those natives most affected by 
immigration-induced supply shifts. 
The existing literature investigating the effect of immigration on native-
born workers’ wages has only addressed the role of observable characteristics 
(education and experience) of workers, while less attention has been devoted to 
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their unobservable skills28. Lemieux (2006) shows that residual (within-group) 
wage dispersion among workers with the same education and experience “…is 
generally believed to account for most of the growth in overall wage inequality”.  
Consistent with the existing literature, Chapter 2 shows that the residual 
component accounts for most of the wage inequality variation in the U.S:, the UK 
and Italy. In the U.S. from 1987 to 2003, changes in the residual for men account 
for 86% of the overall change in the total variance, and 53% for woman. In the 
UK, despite the decrease in overall variance of wage both for men (0.033) and 
women (0.034), the residual variance increased by 0.014 of a per cent. More 
strikingly, the within-group variance in Italy explains almost all the change in 
wage inequality.   During the past 20 years the UK and the U.S. experienced an 
increase in immigration. One may be tempted to think that the increase in 
immigrants over time in the U.S. and the UK might somehow be connected to the 
increase in residual wage inequality observed. Based on the Outgoing Rotation 
Group (ORG) for the US and the LFS data for the UK the correlation between 
changes in the residual and changes in the share of immigrants in the labour force 
between 1994 and 2008 is quite high; in the US, it is equal to 0.76 and 0.93, 
respectively, for men and women; in the UK, the correlation of changes is 0.88 for 
men and 0.96 for women, suggesting a possible positive relationship between the 
increased number of immigrants in the labour force and the increase in residual 
wage inequality. 
Observed and unobserved distribution of skills are possibly larger for 
immigrants, therefore it is worth examining any link between residual wage 
inequality and immigration. This hypothesis is what this chapter attempts to test.   
There is little existing research on the overall impact of immigration on 
native workers’ within-group inequality. The only contribution has recently been 
provided by Card (2009), who shows that the relative level of residual wage 
inequality for natives in different skill groups is uncorrelated with the relative 
fraction of immigrants, suggesting that immigration has a relatively small causal 
effect even when studying the effect of immigration on within-group variation. 
                                                 
28 Gould and Moav (2008), for example, empirically investigate how the emigration rate of Israeli 
workers in the US depends on their unobservable skills measured by residual wages from a 
standard Mincer equation. 
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Recently, Card (2009) offered an overview of the present understanding of 
the relationship between immigration and inequality, focusing on evidence from 
cross-city comparisons in the US. 
Based on the fact that within-group wage inequality has risen 
substantially, he shows that across major cities, the level of residual wage 
inequality is strongly correlated with immigrants’ local population share. In 
particular, a 10 percentage point increase in the immigrant share is associated with 
a 0.025-point increase in the residual variance of high school equivalent men’s 
wages and a 0.027-point increase in the residual variance of college equivalent 
men’s wages. However, the effects of immigration on within-group inequality are 
small: immigrants account only for 5% of the increase in US wage inequality 
between 1980 and 2000, although immigrants tend to have higher residual 
inequality than natives. 
There are many reasons to believe that immigrants and natives with 
similar observable skills may report differences in wages because of differences in 
unobservable skills that are relevant in the labour market. Immigrants constitute a 
particular subgroup of their original population with motivations and tastes that 
may distinguish them from natives (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006). In manual and 
intellectual work, they have culture-specific skills as well as limits (language) that 
might translate into advantages or disadvantages (Peri and Sparber 2008); foreign-
born workers have different abilities pertaining to language, quantitative skills, 
and relational skills, so they choose occupations differently from natives, even 
within the same education and experience group.   
 Using LFS data, Clark and Lindley (2006) document the impact of 
economic conditions of year of arrival and assimilation on the labour market 
outcomes of immigrants to the UK from 1993 to 2002. They find positive 
earnings assimilation for all immigrant groups and strong employment 
assimilation for those who completed their education in the UK. They explain that 
after arrival in the host country, immigrant labour market outcomes will adjust 
toward those of non-immigrants or native workers. Assimilation is thought to take 
place through human capital enhancement: immigrants acquire skills that are 
specific to the destination country, including knowledge of the labour market and 
language proficiency. Preliminary findings by Chiswick (1978) for the US found 
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that while immigrants earned significantly less than natives upon arrival, they 
caught up with natives in terms of earnings as they integrated in the host country.  
     Another key fact that contributed to the debate on both wage inequality 
and immigration is the changes in the characteristics of workers. The labour force 
has been growing older and more educated (Autor et al., 2005; Lemieux 2006, 
2008); Lemieux (2006) argues that these secular changes in the education and age 
structure may mechanically increase residual wage inequality; he shows that a 
large fraction of the 1973-2003 growth in the residual wage inequality in the US  
is a “spurious” consequence of composition effects. The methodology requires 
taking the actual residual variance of the log hourly wage OLS regressions and re-
weight it, holding the characteristics of the labour force constant at a base year. 
However, this influential contribution does not account for the fact that in 
recent decades, not only has the share of immigrants in the labour force been 
increasing, but there have also been changes in the characteristics (education and 
experience) of immigrants. An extensive literature (Dustmann, Fabbri, Preston 
2005; DFP 2008; MMW 2007; Schmitt and Wadsworth 2007; Wadsworth 2010) 
shows that compared to people born in the UK, immigrants are, on average, better 
educated. Similarly, for Canada, Boudarbat and Lemieux (2008) explain that in 
terms of years of completed education, immigrants are more educated than the 
Canadian born, and the education gap is growing with time. Immigrants are also 
typically younger than the native-born workforce, on average. 
This chapter aims to adapt one of the main challenges of the 1990s wage 
literature to the immigration context: wage dispersion is not fully explained by 
variables linked to the standard human capital model, like education and 
experience. The residual or within-group wage inequality29 – wage dispersion 
among workers with the same education and experience - accounts for most of the 
growth in overall wage inequality (Juhn et al. 1993; Acemoglu 2002; Autor et al. 
2005, 2008; Lemieux 2006).   
Unlike previous studies, this paper focuses on the effects of immigration 
on residual wage inequality in the UK and US between 1994 and 2008. It seeks to 
assess whether and to what degree immigration contributed, along with 
                                                 
29 Intuitively, years of schooling and experience do not capture returns to other skills. In contrast, 
regression-based residuals include unmeasured aspects of human capital such as school quality, 
ability, effort and innate skills. 
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technology, institutions and traditional explanations, to widening inequality. To 
do so, this work reassesses Lemieux’s hypothesis (i.e. that composition effects 
exert an upward mechanical force on the residual wage inequality) by adding the 
immigration dimension to the original analysis.  This work differs from that of 
Card (2009) in different ways: first, it differs in the methodology adopted; second 
it differs in the sample period analysed in fact while Card considers 1980, 1990, 
2000 Census and 2005/2006 American Community Survey this work proposes a 
time series analysis from 1994 to 2008; finally it also presents a comparison with 
the UK that similarly to the US experienced high increase in wage inequality and 
immigration.  
     The methodology used by Lemieux (2006) and implemented in this and 
the previous chapter is based on a simple approach that can analyse changes in the 
distribution of wages that are economically interpretable using the standard tools 
of human capital theory. Unlike other methodologies (Juhn et al. 1993; Autor  et 
al.2005- 2008; Melly 2005), the procedure controls for changes in the 
distributions of observables and the share of immigrants in the labour force by 
holding the skill distribution of the workforce and the supply of foreign-born 
workers constant at a base year; this method requires re-weighting the actual 
residual variance of the log hourly wage OLS regressions according to a weight 
that holds the characteristics of the labour force constant at a base year. In 
addition to the original methodology and extending the work of Chapter 2, this 
chapter controls for an increasing supply of immigrants by constructing another 
weight that fixes the share of immigrants at a base year. 
 The chapter also illustrates the evolution of the upper- and lower-tail 
distributions when controlling for both composition effects and the increasing 
supply of immigrants. To account for the fact that immigrants perform 
differently30 according to the amount of time they have already spent in the 
receiving country (DFP 2008; Schmitt and Wadsworth 2007) and to account for 
any cohort effects, the analysis is run separately for recent and other immigrants, 
                                                 
30DFP (2008) demonstrate that immigrants downgrade considerably within educational categories 
upon arrival,  particularly because of their lack of complementary skills like language. Recent 
immigrants may not be able to make use of their educational background to its full potential.  
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defined, respectively, as those who have spent five years or less in the US or UK 
and those who have been in the US or UK for more than five years31. 
The structure of this Chapter is as follows. The next section provides an 
explanation of why unobservable components might be crucial in analysing the 
impact of immigrants on natives’ wage inequality and what the plausible link is 
between the increased educational attainment of the labour force and the increase 
of the residual; part three presents the econometric methodology; part four 
describes the two datasets used in this paper; part five discusses the results; and 
the final section concludes. 
 
 
3.2 Immigrants and Natives: Imperfect Substitutability, Unobserved 
Skills and Composition Effect 
The textbook model of a competitive labour market has unambiguous 
implications for migration-induced supply shift effects on natives’ wages and 
employment opportunities. Labour inflow should lower the wages of competing 
workers. However, a key determinant of the positive or negative effect of 
immigration inflow on natives’ wages is the degree of substitution between 
immigrant and native workers. Holding capital constant and assuming constant 
returns to scale production technology, an increase in the labour supply due to an 
immigrant inflow will lower wages if immigrants and natives are substitutes. In 
contrast, if immigrants and natives are imperfect substitutes in production, then 
the increase in the labour supply due to immigration can boost natives’ wages 
(Borjas 2008). 
      The lack of any negative effect of immigration on wages of natives in 
the US and the UK reported by Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and MMW (2007) is 
based on the evidence that immigrants do not fully compete and substitute with 
natives, even within a given education-experience group. 
                                                 
31 The existing literature defines earlier and new immigrants in different ways; DFP (2008) define 
earlier and recent immigrants in the UK, respectively, as those who have been in the UK two 
years or more and those who arrived within the last two years. Chiquiar and Hanson (2006) define 
recent Mexican immigrants in the US as those who migrated in the last ten years. Schmitt and 
Wadsworth (2007) consider recent immigrants as those who have spent up to five years in the US 
or UK.  
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As highlighted by Ottaviano and Peri (2006), the imperfect substitution 
between immigrants and natives may be due, among other reasons, to their 
differences in unobservable skills that are relevant in the labour market. 
Immigrants are a particular group of their native country’s original population 
with motivation and tastes that may differentiate them from natives of the host 
country. In manual and intellectual work, their culture-specific skills and 
limitations (e.g., language) might translate into advantages or disadvantages; 
foreign-born workers have different abilities pertaining to language, quantitative 
skills, and relational skills, so they choose occupations differently from natives, 
even within the same education and experience group. 
Not dissimilar to the spirit of Ottaviano and Peri (2006); Gould and 
Moav32 (2008) argue that unobservable skills are a mixture of “general” skills 
(like education) that can be easily transported to another country and other 
“country-specific” skills that cannot be easily transported to another country; 
“country-specific” skills include personal connections, knowledge of the local 
labour market, language-specific communication skills, and success in the labour 
market. A significant proportion of an individual’s total human capital is likely to 
be country specific for several reasons; language and cultural barriers may prevent 
an individual from transferring his or her skills to a country where he/she lacks a 
commanding knowledge of the local languages, consumer tastes and so on. The 
idea that there might be a crucial unobservable skills component in the 
immigration process is consistent with a recent consensus of the wage inequality 
literature: unobservable skills, measured by the residual of a Mincer equation, 
explain most of the variation in the observed increasing wage inequality 
(Acemoglu 2002; Juhn et al.1993; Autor and Katz 1999; Autor et al., 2005, 
2008;Lemieux 2006). 
    Evidence from the US (Autor and Katz 1999) shows that residual wage 
inequality started increasing in the 1970s and continued rising considerably in the 
1980s and then at a slower pace in the 1990s; the residual log weekly wage 
inequality for full-time, full-year workers increased by 27 log points for men and 
                                                 
32 They show that a higher ratio of individuals with a higher transferability rate of unobservable 
skills exists in the middle of the distribution of total unobservable skills. They argue that those at 
the bottom of the unobservable skills distribution have little of both types of skills, while those at 
the top have high levels of both. Individuals are more likely to have high levels of unobservable 
general skills versus country-specific skills if they are in the middle of the distribution rather than 
on the tails. 
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25 log points for women from 1963 to 1995. For the US, Juhn et al. (1993) show 
that unobserved components affect the wages of workers at the top and at the 
bottom of the distribution to different extents. Over the period of 1964-1988, 
changes in unobservable quantities accounted for 65 percent of the increase in 
inequality for workers below the median but for less than half of the increase in 
inequality for those above the median.  
More recently, Lemieux (2006) outlines the main patterns observed in the 
United States using CPS data: the residual variance for full-time, full-year male 
workers from 1973 to 2003 grew by about 0.04 log points; most of that growth 
was concentrated in the 1980s, remained essentially unchanged during the 1990s 
and grew again between 1999 and 2003 Chapter 2 of this thesis confirms this 
basic finding for the UK, the US and Italy. 
The leading explanations of wage inequality, such as declining 
unionisation, the falling real minimum wage and the SBTC33, thus do not seem to 
help explain the main recent trends in wage inequality because they do not readily 
predict increasing upper-tail inequality and compressing lower tail inequality 
(Autor et al.2005). As documented by Lemieux, there are two main factors 
affecting the increase in residual wage inequality over the last few decades:  
i) The “price” or return to unobserved skills may be increasing over time because 
of the increase in the demand for skills;  
ii) Dispersion in the residual could be increasing because of composition effects. 
Changes in characteristics34 affect both the demand and supply of 
observed and unobserved skills and can alter wage and employment outcomes 
(Autor and Katz, 1999). Changes in within-group inequality may reflect market 
forces changing the returns to (unmeasured) skills. Therefore, the increase in 
within-group inequality can be interpreted as reflecting an increase in the returns 
                                                 
 
33 Similarly, Lemieux (2006) discusses why the SBTC explanation presents several limitations; 
first, it could not help to explain some diverging patterns of inequality across advanced 
countries; SBTC depended on the weak fact that the residual inequality had been increasing 
since the 1970s. The failure of the SBTC for developing countries can be explained by the fact 
that because those countries are subject to the same technological change, they did not 
experience an increase in inequality as we should expect. They did not vary in a similar way 
over time. 
34 Acemoglu (2002) explains that composition effects cannot by themselves explain the recent 
changes in wage dispersion, but suggests that inequality among more educated and less 
educated workers should move in opposite directions. 
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to unobserved skills. Holding market prices constant, changes in labour force 
composition can mechanically raise or lower overall earnings dispersion by 
increasing or reducing heterogeneity in observed skills (education and 
experience).  
The link between composition effects and the residual can be explained by 
the fact that when the level of education of the labour force increases, more and 
more “marginal“ workers are added to the group of highly educated workers, 
creating more unobserved heterogeneity in that group and increasing within-group 
inequality. Therefore, an increase in the supply of more educated workers will 
immediately benefit those workers with more unobserved skills and will also 
depress returns to schooling while increasing within-group inequality. The more 
skilled workers within each education group also benefit from skill-based 
technical progress. Technical change spurred by the increase in the supply of 
educated workers will immediately benefit workers with more unobserved skills, 
raising within-group inequality. Therefore, an increase in the supply of educated 
workers will depress the returns to schooling while increasing within-group 
inequality35. 
 An increase in the proportion of the workers with more education and 
experience can also mechanically raise residual wage inequality because earnings 
variation is higher for college-educated relative to high school-educated workers 
(Machin and Van Reenen 2008).  
A number of influential studies (see, for example, Juhn et al.(1993) Autor 
et al.(2005)) focus on this interplay between changes in educational and 
experience characteristics of the labour force and the evolution of the residual to 
evaluate how much of the overall increase in wage inequality can be attributed to 
wage dispersion among workers with the same education and experience and how 
much is due to changes in the composition of the workforce. The evidence 
provided is sometimes contradictory, presumably due to the different 
methodologies applied. 
                                                 
35 Mincer (1998) applies a human capital analysis to intra-group wage inequality, measured by 
variances in log wages, and their changes over time reveal the US wage structure changes from 
1970-1990. In a similar vein to Acemoglu, he provides evidence that within-group inequality is not 
directly or closely related to between-group variances; therefore, we can expect differences in the 
fluctuations of the two components of inequality. 
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Lemieux (2006) concludes that a large fraction of the 1973-2003 growth in 
residual wage inequality in the US is due to composition effects, affecting both 
the upper and lower tails of the distribution. In particular, he demonstrates that the 
increase in within-wage inequality appears to be a spurious consequence of the 
fact that workforces became older and more educated over time; in other words, 
the increases in educational level and experience act as a mechanical force on the 
residual such that the increase in the variance of the residual carries the same sign 
as the change in the composition of the workforce. This phenomenon means that 
changes in the education and experience characteristics of the workforce 
determine more variation in wages due to unmeasured aspects of human capital. 
      There is no theoretical model explaining how the increasing supply of 
immigration could affect changes in the residual wage inequality of the labour 
force. However, because immigrants and natives differ in their unobservable skills 
if they are imperfect substitutes within education and experience group, we might 
expect immigrants to have more heterogeneous unobservable skills than natives 
even within the same education group; when the share of immigrants in the labour 
force increases, we could expect this to create even more variation in the overall 
residual wage inequality. 
 
3.3 Econometric methodology  
This chapter seeks to test Lemieux’s findings discussed in chapter 2 by 
adding the immigration context specifically  it aims to measure how much of the 
increase in the residual wage inequality observed in the UK and US between 1994 
and 2008 is due to the increasing share of immigrants in the labour force; in 
similar vein to chapter 2, the econometric methodology of this chapter is based on 
two simple steps: the analysis of inequality in the residuals and a reweighting 
approach to control for both composition effects and increasing supply of 
immigration in both the US and the UK.  
Because the analysis of this chapter adds the immigration dimension, the 
methodology adopted displays some differences with the one adopted in the 
previous chapter.  
 First of all the variance decomposition is carried out separately for the whole 
labour force (natives and immigrants together); for natives only, for immigrants 
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only, and by gender. The analysis of inequality in the residual by immigration 
status depicts the differences in the levels and trends of wage inequality 
experienced by natives and immigrants in both the UK and the US, moreover it 
also  allows to measure how much of the observed wage inequality in the whole 
labour force is due to immigrants. The second substantial difference between the 
methodology adopted in this chapter and the one adopted in chapter 2, is the 
extension of the reweighting approach to the immigration status, in other words 
the reweighting approach is used to control for the increasing supply of 
immigrants helping therefore to disentangle the effect of immigrants on the 
increasing residual wage inequality. 
Defining δm as the fraction of immigrants in the labour force, the residual 
variance defined in (6)  of Chapter 2 can be re-written as:  
(1)       Var(εit) = Σδmt Vjt 
where the residual variance is now a function of the variances of wages 
accounting not only for the skill characteristics of the labour force but also for the 
share of immigrants in the labour force. 
In a similar vein to (9) in Chapter 2, by holding fixed the share of 
immigrants in the labour force (δ*mt), the counterfactual residual variance can be 
written as: 
(2)       Vt* = Σ δ*mt Vjt     
Working in this way will investigate whether the increasing share of 
immigrants in the labour force can help to account for the increasing residual 
wage inequality observed. 
Controlling for the increasing supply of immigration can be done by 
following the same rewighting methodology followed in chapter 2,but now 
constructing another weight that, in the spirit of DiNardo  et al. (1996), in addition 
to the usual  education-experience variables adds a dummy variable for the state 
of immigration as well as some interaction terms between education and the area 
of origin of immigrants to make the logit flexible enough.  The magnitude of the 
weight therefore depends on the share of immigrants in the labour force observed 
in year t compared to the share of immigrants observed in a given base year s. 
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Working in this way would allow the construction of the immigration 
counterfactual: “what would have happened to the residual wage inequality of the 
labour force had the share of immigrants remained constant at a base year”. 
 
3.4 Data  
The analysis is based on two pooled time series cross-sectional micro data 
sets: the Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG CPS) for the US and the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) for the UK. Both data sets cover the same period (1994 to 2008), 
contain similar information relevant to labour market characteristics, wages and 
immigration, and are sufficiently large to analyse minority populations. The 
analysis starts from 1994  because the main dataset for the U.S. (ORG CPS)  do 
not contain  information on the immigration status  of individual in the previous 
years The CPS is a monthly household survey conducted by the Bureau of Labour 
Statistics to measure labour force participation and employment. The survey 
provides individual data for about 30,000 individuals per month. Every household 
that enters the CPS is interviewed each month for four months, then ignored for 
eight months, then interviewed again for four more months. Standard weekly 
hours/earnings questions are asked only during a household’s fourth and eighth 
interviews. These outgoing interviews are the only ones included in the extracts. 
New households enter each month, so one fourth of the households are in an 
outgoing rotation each month. 
One of the main advantages of the ORG CPS is that it provides point-in-
time measures of usual hourly wage for 60 percent of the sample; the remaining 
non-hourly wage can easily be calculated as the ratio of earnings to hours. We 
kept real hourly wage between $1 and $100. One of the main issues encountered 
when working with the ORG CPS dataset relates to the top-coded earnings. In the 
data released to the public, the Census Bureau restricts the top of the earnings 
distribution to $99,999 a year. This restriction means that all earnings above that 
level appear in the CPS public dataset as $99,999, whatever the actual earnings 
are. This artificial ceiling can lead to bias in the measurement of trends in 
earnings inequality if the proportion of earnings so affected changes over time; in 
particular, it will lower the mean and the variance of the wage data relative to the 
true mean and variance. We adjust for the top-coding issue by using the log-
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normal approach recommended by Schmitt (2003). In contrast36 to the procedure 
that is usually applied, the log-normal procedure models the entire distribution, 
not just the top portion of interest, under the assumption that the entire distribution 
of earnings is log-normally distributed. The properties of the log-normal 
distribution allow for the straightforward estimation of the mean and variance of 
the “true” distribution, even though the estimates of the mean above the top-code 
are consistently below those generated by these versions of the pareto approach.37 
The LFS is very similar to the US Current Population Survey in terms of 
its purpose (measuring labour market activity and unemployment in a timely 
fashion), sample size and because, similar to CPS, LFS provides point-in-time 
hourly wages for a large fraction (around 40%) of each sample. 
The  (LFS) is the largest survey of households living at private addresses 
and in NHS accommodations in the UK and is conducted by the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS). Information is recorded in four quarters; each quarter’s 
LFS sample of 53,000 UK households consists of five “waves”, each of 
approximately 11,000 private households. Each wave is interviewed in five 
successive quarters, and earnings information is only recorded in waves 1 and 5. 
A single-stage sample of addresses with a random start and constant interval is 
drawn from the Postcode Address File (PAF) sorted by postcode. To limit the 
effects of outliers, following the existing literature in the UK (MMW 2007), only 
observations with an hourly wage between 1 and 100 pounds in 2008 pounds are 
kept. In the same manner as for the CPS, for individuals whose wage is only 
recorded weekly, hourly wage is derived by dividing weekly wage by the usual 
amount of paid hours worked per week. 
Real wages for the UK are obtained by deflating nominal wages by the 
Retail Price Index. For the sake of comparability with the UK, wages measures 
for the US are deflated using the Consumer Price Index.  
The samples used for the estimations consist of men and women in the 
labour force, considered separately, meaning men and women aged 16-64 for the 
                                                 
   36A large part of the existing literature on wage inequality (Lemieux 2006, Katz and Autor 
1999, Autor et al.2005,2008) addresses the top-coding issue by multiplying top-coded wages by a 
factor of 1.3 or 1.4, which is believed to provide estimates of the mean and the variance that are 
closer to their true values.  
37 For details, see John Schmitt (2003): “Creating a consistent hourly wage series from the 
Current Population Survey’s Outgoing Rotation Group, 1979-2002”.  
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US and aged 16-64 and 16-59  respectively, for the UK. We limit the analysis to 
workers who are full-time employees,38 considering only their main job. We 
define as an immigrant someone who was born outside of the US and UK 
irrespective of the time of age on arrival. 
All results are derived from separate regressions for men and women, 
respectively, for all workers, natives, and immigrants by applying the log hourly 
wage to a set of dummies for age, education and interactions between education 
and age squared.  
The similarity between the US and UK schooling systems allowed us to 
create three educational categories that are broadly comparable. The lower 
education group includes workers who have completed compulsory education, 
i.e., less than a lower secondary education; for both the US and the UK, this group 
corresponds to 0 to 11 years of schooling. The intermediate category includes 
workers with qualifications that exceed those of a high-school dropout but do not 
reach those of a college-degree holder (both excluded). In both countries analysed, 
this corresponds to any individual with years of schooling at least 12 and at most 
15 years of schooling. The high education group refers either to individuals with 
graduate or postgraduate education, corresponding to 16 or more years of 
schooling.  One of the main issues arising when aggregating immigrants and 
natives based on level of education is that, due to the heterogeneity of educational 
systems, there is not a one-to-one correspondence in years of schooling. In the 
ORG/CPS data, education is reported in years for all workers, meaning that 
immigrants report their level of education in terms of years of schooling. One 
problem arising for LFS is that foreign educational qualifications are classified in 
the “other” category. As explained by MMW (2007), there is good reason to 
believe that many immigrants in the “other” category actually have quite high 
levels of education. The LFS employs an alternative definition of educational 
level, namely, the age at which the individual left full-time education. To create 
comparable educational categories for the UK data, we combined information on 
“age left school” and “other”. In particular for immigrants reporting the “other 
“category of education, we defined immigrants to have higher level of education if 
they left school at age 21 or more; immigrants to have intermediate level of 
                                                 
38 The use of only full-time workers is meant to eliminate variation in hours worked per week or 
weeks worked per year (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Card and Lemieux 2001). 
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education if they left school between the age of 17 and 20 and finally we define 
immigrants to have lower level of education if they left school before the age of 
16.  
The years of potential labour market experience variable is conventionally 
derived as age – years of completed education- the age at which children start 
school. Workers are aggregated into four-year experience intervals (0-10; 11-20; 
21-30; 31+). Based on the three education categories (lower, intermediate and 
high) and the four experience categories, workers can be classified into one of 
twelve skill groups39. 
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Characteristics of Immigrants and Natives 
Tables 3.1 to 3.3 outline the composition of and changes in the workforce 
over time in the UK and U.S. As documented in Table 3.1, during the period 
analysed in both countries, the number of immigrants increased; in the UK, the 
share of immigrants in the labour force more than doubled between 1994 and 
2008; for example, the presence of immigrants in the UK male labour force 
increased from 6% in 1994 to 12% in 2008; similarly, for females, the share of 
immigrants increased by 7 percentage points. In the US, the corresponding 
increases in labour force share were from 10% to 15% for male workers and 4% 
for females. One of the reasons for the resurgence of interest in immigration, in 
addition to its volume, is the composition of the immigrant population. Table 3.2 
documents changes in the areas of origin of immigrants, demonstrating that rising 
immigration is also associated with a change in the mix of immigrants’ origins. In 
the US, the trend is for more immigrants from the Americas at the expense of 
Europe; for the UK, the reverse is true, with almost half of immigrants coming 
from Europe while the share of Americans decreased over the sample period. The 
increase of Europeans in the UK in 2008 largely reflects the arrival of A8 
accession countries that were given free movement of labour after 2004. 
                                                 
39 In the original data, Lemieux defines 20 education and experience groups based on 5 
education groups and 4 experience groups. The education groups are dropout; high school 
graduates; ; some college;  college graduates; postgraduate. These 5 groups have been clustered 
into 3 to generate 3 educational groups consistent through the three countries. The substantial 
results do not change: the residual increases for more-educated workers and decreases for less-
educated ones. 
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Table 3.3 compares the educational characteristics of natives and 
immigrants in the labour force for men and women in the US and UK. A couple 
of findings immediately emerge from the table: compared to the UK, the US 
labour force is on average characterised by having a small share of low-educated 
workers. Considering natives in 2008, only 5% and 4% for men and women, 
respectively, were classified in the low-education group; while for the UK 
counterparts, these shares increase to 27% (men) and 31% (women). More 
differences arise in the US when comparing less educated natives with equivalent 
immigrants: as the existing literature documents, most immigrants to the US are 
relatively less educated. In 2008, 29% of male immigrants in the US had a lower 
level of education; this share is 13% points higher than the share of male 
immigrants in the UK. The situation is better for female immigrants in the US; in 
fact, 18% of them have a low level of education. This result is very similar for 
female immigrants in the UK (0.16). 
In contrast, the mix of immigrants to the UK has become much more 
educated over time compared not only to immigrants in the US, but also to natives  
UK. In 2008, almost half of the immigrants, both men and women, to the UK 
were highly educated, compared to 25 and 32 percent for male and female natives, 
respectively. This gap is less evident when comparing higher educated natives and 
immigrants in the US, where 33% of native males have a degree or postgraduate 
degree compared to 29% of immigrants; there is even less of a difference between 
native and immigrant women. 
 
 
3.5.2 Wage Dispersion for Immigrants and Natives 
The pattern and the evolution of wage dispersion in the two countries over 
the same period are shown in Figures 3.1a  to 3.2d, together with Tables 3.4a and 
3.4b; the results are displayed for all workers as well as immigrants and natives 
separately. 
 Figures 3.1a and 3.1b use as a measure of the dispersion of wage 
inequality the standard deviation of the log hourly real wage of workers. The first 
remarkable fact is that for all workers, represented by the solid line in the graphs, 
the levels of wage inequality in the US and the UK are fairly similar, though 
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slightly higher for men in the US40 For women, at the beginning of the sample 
year, wage dispersion was higher in the UK than it was in the US, but in 2008 the 
situation was reversed, with an increase for women in the US and a decrease for 
women in the UK. 
Comparing immigrants to natives, both figures show that, on average, the 
former experience higher levels of wage dispersion. In particular, immigrants in 
the UK experience greater dispersion than their counterparts in the US. The 
reverse is true for women, where, except for the years 1996 and 1997, female 
immigrants to the UK experienced less inequality than their counterparts in the 
US. 
These results are confirmed by Tables 3.4a and 3.4b summarising different 
measures of wage dispersion and their main trends over time. Table  3.4a 
compares the standard deviation and 90-50 and 50-10 gaps between the US and 
UK, considering men, women, all workers, natives and immigrants separately.  
The top panel reports wage dispersion for men in both countries. In 1994, wage 
inequality for all male workers was 0.547, and this value increased to 0.569 in 
2008. Similarly, in the UK, standard deviation increased from 0.547 to 0.559; the 
standard deviation of wages was higher for immigrants in the UK in 1994 (0.612) 
than for those in the US (0.600). However, at the end of the sample period, 
immigrants in the UK experienced a decrease to 0.608 while, following the trend 
for all workers, wage dispersion for immigrants in the US increased. The trends 
go in opposite directions for females in the two countries; in the US, wage 
inequality increased for all female workers (from 0.509 to 0.525) and immigrants 
(0.552 to 0.580), while it decreased for both all workers (from 0.542 to 0.504) and 
immigrants (0.578 to 0.531) in the UK. 
The same table also reports a measure of dispersion by looking at workers 
located in the upper and lower tails of the wage distribution. In general, wage 
                                                 
40 However the similar measure of dispersion used in chapter 2 documented a slightly different 
picture when comparing the UK and the U.S, namely the level of wage inequality in the US was 
higher than that of the UK. This difference may be first of all related to the different time period 
analysed (between 1987 and 2004) and to the different data used, (MAY/ORG CPS for the U.S. 
and the  GHS for the UK). Lemieux (2006) and Autor et al. (2008) pointed out how the 
measurement error of data could lead to different levels of wage inequality.  In addition the 
different in sample size could also affect the precision of the estimates; for example the  number of 
observations for men in the GHS data ranges between 1,650 and  4,400 while for the same group 
in the LFS data they range between 12,000 and 32,000. Finally the different levels in the wage 
dispersion could be also due to the different approaches used in this work and in that of Lemieux 
(2002) to address the top-coding issue  fot the US data. 
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dispersion for workers located in the upper tail of the wage distribution increased 
over time for all natives and immigrants, both male and female, with the 
exception of females in the UK: in this case, dispersion of workers in the upper 
tail of the wage distribution decreased for both natives and immigrants, though the 
latter suffer from more inequality. Considering the 90-50 and 50-10 wage gaps for 
male workers in the US, the 90-50 log hourly wage gap increases over the sample 
period for all workers and for both men and women; similarly, for workers located 
on the lower tail of the wage distribution, wage dispersion decreased from 1994 to 
2008, but immigrants experienced the largest decrease. Female workers located on 
the lower tail of the wage distribution did not display a decrease in wage 
dispersion; in fact, there was a slight increase, which was higher for female 
immigrants. For the UK, the 90-50 log hourly wage gap has a different sign for 
men versus women; the former experience an increase in wage dispersion, which 
is larger for immigrants; the latter are instead affected by an overall decrease in 
wage inequality, except for the increase for female immigrants. More similarities 
are displayed for workers located in the lower tail of the wage distribution: in all 
cases, wage dispersion decreases, and the largest decrease is found for male 
immigrants.  A more uniform pattern is observed when considering workers 
located in the lower tail of the wage distribution: in all cases (men and women, 
immigrants and natives in the US and the UK), wage dispersion has decreased 
over time. 
The same table also shows what happens to wage dispersion when foreign-
born workers are not counted in the sample: when considering natives only, in all 
cases, the level of wage inequality is slightly lower, though still increasing. This 
means essentially that the presence of immigrants in the labour force does not 
strongly affect the level of wage inequality experienced by the countries, with the 
trends being the same. 
Table 3.4b summarises changes over the sample period: immigrants located in the 
lower tail of the wage distribution experience the largest decrease in wage 
dispersion; this corresponds to a 0.1 log percentage point decrease for male 
immigrants in the US and 0.147 in the UK. Similar trends of smaller magnitudes 
occur for female immigrants. 
Figure 3.2a to 3.2d plot the kernel distribution of log hourly wages for 
natives and immigrants in both countries for the years 1994 and 2008. The figures 
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clearly show the difference in the wage distributions between natives and 
immigrants. Particularly in the US and for male workers, the density of log hourly 
wage for immigrants is left-shifted compared to natives. The two plots for women 
in the U.S. are qualitatively similar, though the gap in the density distribution is 
smaller in 2008. Results for the UK show a substantial overlap in wage densities 
for women in 2008, while in 1994 the density for women born abroad appears to 
be slightly right-shifted compared to natives. This pattern is similar for male 
workers in the UK in 1994, though the mean log hourly wage for natives is higher 
than for immigrants; in 2008, consistent with the US, the wage density of 
immigrants in the UK is left-shifted compared to their native counterparts.  
Figures 3.4a and 3.4b plot levels and trends using as a measure of 
dispersion the variance of the residual41 hourly wage for men and women in the 
US and the UK. The residual variance has been calculated separately from three 
different regressions, respectively, for the whole labour force, natives and 
immigrants. Confirming previous results, these graphs show that the dispersion in 
the wages of immigrants is higher42 than it is for natives, especially for the UK, 
with the bulk of the increase for foreign-born immigrants working in the UK 
occurring at the end of the 2000s when immigration was rising strongly.  
This is particularly true for males, while there is more of a convergence in 
level and pattern for males in the US: starting in 2002, there is not much 
difference in residual dispersion between immigrants and natives. More variation 
remains for immigrant females in the US, and even more for the UK.  
When treating immigrants and natives as two separate groups, interesting 
differences arise: in all cases, the level of wage dispersion in the residual for 
natives decreases, but the almost unchanged trends suggest that had immigration 
not occurred, the residual wage inequality of natives in both countries would have 
increased anyway, albeit at a slightly lower level. This description implies that 
                                                 
41Wage residuals are obtained from a series of regression models fit separately by gender, 
immigrant status and year. The models include controls for education, experience, and interaction 
terms. When including a control for country of origin, the main results do not change too much. 
On average, the residual obtained when adding the control for area of origin is 0.002 lower than 
the one obtained when controlling for human capital variables only.  
 
42 One concern related to the increase in the share of immigrants is the area of origin; particularly, 
the UK dispersion in residual could also be due to different inflows of immigrants. To address this 
issue, I also control for area of origin both in the original regression and in the logit model; the 
residual variance decreases a bit, mainly for immigrants, while results for all workers and natives 
do not change significantly. Nevertheless, the distance between residual variance of immigrants 
and natives still remains. 
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despite the changing in composition that have characterised immigrants in the past 
decades,  the presence of immigrants cannot be considered to be even partially 
responsible for the increasing level of residual wage inequality in both the US and 
the UK between 1994 and 2008. In a similar vein to the recent interpretation of 
Card (2009), this suggests that the role of immigration on the increase of 
inequality in the workforce is almost negligible showing no effect on the 
inequality of native wages. Figures 3.3a to 3.3d plot the variance and the 90-50 
residual of log wages for all workers (men and women, respectively) together 
with the share of immigrants in the labour force. As depicted in Figure 3.3a, the 
level of residual wage inequality has been increasing a little over the sample 
years, with a somewhat larger increase during the most recent years of the sample. 
On the other hand, both in the US and UK, the share of immigrants has been 
increasing continuously over this period. The rate of increase in immigration is 
larger in the UK, although the share of immigrants remains higher in the US. The 
results are qualitatively similar for women, except that female immigrants in the 
UK are more numerous than males and even more numerous than those in the US. 
Figures 3.3c and 3.3d compare the trends between the 90-50 residual gap and the 
share of immigrants over the sample years. As has been shown in previous studies 
and in Chapter 2, an increase in wage inequality occurred particularly on the 
upper tail of the wage distribution.   
 
3.5.3 Residual Inequality, the Composition Effect and the Increase in 
Immigration 
Table 3.5a presents the decomposition of total wage variation into 
different components (between- and within-variance), analysing all workers, 
natives and immigrants separately.   
Between 1994 and 2008, the change in wage variance was greater in the 
US than it was in the UK, particularly for men. Over the same time period women 
in the UK experienced a decrease in the total wage variance.  In all cases over the 
period analysed, the residual component accounted for most of the variation 
observed in the total wage variance.When looking at natives only, the total 
residual wage change decreases, though for a small amount, with respect to the 
total residual wage change observed when looking at all workers. However the 
actual residual variance for native women in the UK decreases by about one third 
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with respect to the actual residual variance of women in the whole labour force 
(natives and immigrants).             
In a similar vein, Table 3.5b presents the results for natives and all 
workers when holding fixed the characteristics of workers as well as the share of 
immigrants in the labour force. On average, when the characteristics of the labour 
force are held fixed at their 1994 levels, the level of residual wage inequality 
decreases on average for both men and women in the US and UK, confirming the 
main results of Lemieux. However, when the share of immigrants remains fixed at 
the level of the base year (1994) in addition to fixing the characteristics of the 
labour force, an additional decrease in the residual wage inequality occurs 
suggesting a very small effect of the increasing share on immigrants on the 
residual wage inequality.  
Figures 3.5a to 3.10d present the results of the counterfactual reweighting 
approach proposed by Lemieux that helps to account for the roles of composition 
effects and the share of immigrants in changes in residual wage inequality. The 
figures compare, for each country, for men and women separately, for all workers 
and for natives only, the actual residual variance from 1994 to 2008 to the 
counterfactual variance that would have existed if the distribution of skills had 
remained at the same level of the initial (1994) or the final (2008) year. The 
composition effect is represented in the figures by the distance between the actual 
variance and the counterfactual variance (residual holding skills constant at its 
1994 or 2008 level). 
As displayed in Figures 3.5a and 3.5b, when the distribution of skills 
characteristics of the labour force is held fixed at its 1994 level, the remaining 
growth of the residual variance accounts for a very small share. The results hold 
both for men and women in the US and the UK. This evidence confirms the 
findings of Lemieux (2006) but now analysing natives and the whole labour force 
separately. However, the role of the composition component becomes less 
significant once the share of immigrants is also held fixed at its 1994 level.  
On average, between 1994 and 2008 when the level of education and 
experience of the labour force and the share of  immigrants is held fixed at a base 
year, the change in residual variance only accounts for about 1 to 2% of the 
change in total residual variance for the same time period; consistent with Card 
(2009) the effect is very small but not causal. 
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Figures 3.7a to 3.8b show the results when the reweighted approach is 
restricted to natives only; this should yield the counterfactual residual variance for 
natives if the share of immigrants and the level of education and experience  of 
natives remained constant in the base year; the figures prove that the pattern of 
residual wage inequality observed for natives in both the US and UK is mainly 
due to changing characteristics of natives, while the increased supply of 
immigrants does not account for much of the inequality. 
 
 
3.5.4 Residual Wage Inequality: Upper and Lower Wage Gaps 
During the 1990s, wage inequality occurred mainly in the upper tail of the 
wage distribution. This section examines alternative measures of wage inequality, 
specifically the 90-50 and 50-10 residual gaps, comparing the actual residual to 
the computed residual holding distribution of skills and share of immigrants at 
their 1994 levels to understand how much change in the residual and composition 
affect all workers, natives only and immigrants only at each tail of the 
distribution. 
Looking at the evolution of the 90-50 gap, Figures 3.9a to 3.9d show that 
residual wage dispersion for workers located on the upper tail of the wage 
distribution increased for the workforce in both countries for both men and 
women. When, in addition to holding fixed the characteristics of workers in the 
labour force, the share of immigrants is held constant at its 1994 level, the role of 
the residual component in the upper tail of the wage distribution decreases even 
more. However, there is little effect of the share of immigrants when considering 
natives only. Results are qualitatively similar for women.  
Looking at the lower tail of the wage distribution, the evolution of the 
residual variance is similar across groups (all workers, natives) and between the 
two countries; in fact, the 50-10 residual gap is characterised by a general 
decrease over time. Consistent with the results of the previous section, the effects 
of composition appear to be more important: changes in the share of foreign-born 
workers exert almost no effect. This suggests that the presence of immigrants in 
the labour force not only has little effect on the change in and level of residual 
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wage inequality, but it also does not have a large effect on the distribution of 
wages in both the US and UK.  
 
3.6  Conclusion  
This paper addressed empirically the question of whether increasing 
immigration in the US and the UK could have been associated with the rising 
residual wage inequality observed between 1994 and 2008. As far as I am aware, 
except for a recent study by Card (2009), almost no attention has been devoted to 
the role of immigrants’ unobservable skills in the context of wage inequality. By 
applying Lemieux’s methodology (2006), this paper controls for changing 
characteristics of workers and adds the immigration dimension to control for the 
increasing presence of foreign-born workers in the labour force. In line with 
Card’s recent findings, the results show that the presence of immigrants does not 
have a causal relation with the increase in residual inequality. Even when 
removing immigrants from the labour force, the trend of residual variance does 
not differ much from the trend observed when including both natives and 
immigrants in the samples. This suggests that the increasing share of immigrants 
in both the UK and the U.S. labour force occurred between 1994 and 2008 cannot 
help (much) to account for the increasing residual wage observed in both 
countries over the same time period. Therefore changes in composition of the 
labour force account for most of the residual wage inequality.  
However, when the share of immigrants in the labour force is held fixed at 
its value in the base year, the change  of the residual  variance between 1994 and 
2008 ranges from -0.001 to 0.008 log points for all workers (men and women) in 
the U.S. compared to the change of the total residual variance for the same group 
varying between 0.016 and 0.024 log points; the similar figure for all workers 
(men and women) in the UK shows that the change in the residual variance 
obtained by holding fixed at a base year both characteristics all workers and the 
share of immigrants in the labour force, ranges between -0.006 to 0.009 log points 
compared to the change of the total residual variance ranging from -0.015 to 
0.016. Although the composition effect still explains most of the growth in the 
residual for natives and the whole labour force, the results also suggest that the 
presence of immigrants plays a role in explaining the growth in the residual 
variance observed, albeit a very small share. On average, the non-causal effect of 
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immigration on residual variance ranges between 1% and 5% of the observed 
change between 1994 and 2008. 
This finding suggests that the presence of immigrants in the labour force 
not only has little effect on the change  and level of residual wage inequality, but 
it also does not affect the distribution of wages in either the US or the UK. In 
terms of public policy, the results imply that the inflow of workers from abroad 
has no negative effect on natives’ wages in the receiving countries, confirming 
that the effect of immigration on wages  should not be a concern in the public 
policy agenda.  
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Table 3.1: Proportion of Immigrants in the Labour Market     
Notes: The table shows the proportion of immigrants in the US and UK labour force. Samples include people aged 16 to 59 
for women and 16 to 64 for men with positive potential  experience; working full time, full year, employed only s in their 
main job only. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Areas of Origin of Immigrants to the United States and Great 
Britain, 1994-2008 
The table shows the areas of origin of immigrants in the US and UK  labour force. Samples include individuals in the 
labour force with positive potential  experience; working full time, full year, as employees in their main 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Men Women 
US    
1994  0.10 0.08 
2008  0.15 0.12 
UK    
1994  0.06 0.07 
2008  0.12 0.12 
 1994 2008 
U.S.   
Europe  0.13 0.11 
Asia  0.25 0.25 
Africa   0.14 0.031 
Americas  0.46 0.58 
Oceania  0.003 0.005 
Other  0.014 0.028 
   
UK   
Europe  0.39 0.51 
Asia  0.26 0.20 
Africa  0.16 0.17 
Americas  0.13 0.07 
Oceania  0.05 0.03 
Other  0.02 0.02 
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Table 3.3: Educational Attainment of Natives and Immigrants, US and UK  
The table shows the educational characteristics of natives and immigrants in the US and UK  labour force. The lower  
education group includes workers who have completed compulsory education, i.e., less than a lower secondary education 
  (from  0 to 11 years of schooling). The intermediate category includes workers with qualifications that exceed those of a 
high-school dropout but do not reach those of a college-degree holder (both excluded), this corresponds to any individual 
with years of schooling at least 12 and at most 15 years of schooling. The higher education group refers either to 
individuals with graduate or postgraduate education, corresponding to 16 or more years of schooling. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Level of Education Natives Immigrants 
     Men       Women             Men       Women  
A. US      
Lower     
1994 0.08 0.06 0.30 0.22 
2008 0.05 0.04 0.29 0.18 
Intermediate     
1994 0.64 0.67 0.43 0.51 
2008 0.62 0.60 0.42 0.47 
Higher      
1994 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27 
2008 0.33 0.36 0.29 0.35 
 
B.  UK 
Lower 
1994 0.28 0.43 0.21 0.24 
2008 0.27 0.31 0.16 0.16 
 
Intermediate      
1994 0.55 0.30 0.37 0.34 
2008 0.48 0.37 0.24 0.25 
Higher      
1994 0.17 0.17 0.42 0.41 
2008 0.25 0.32 0.56 0.59 
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 Table 3.4a: Wage Dispersion of Log Hourly Wage, US and UK 
 
Notes: The table reports measure of dispersion of the log hourly wage for natives, immigrants male and females in the US 
and the UK. Data are drawn from  ORG/CPS and LFS for the US and UK respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  US 
 
UK 
 Standard 
deviation 
90-50  
  
50-10  Standard 
deviation 
90-50  
  
50-10  
Males 
A. All workers 
1994 0.547 0.684 
 
0.721 
 
0.545 
 
0.706 0.630 
 
2000 0.543 0.724 
 
0.674 
 
0.549 
 
0.738 
 
0.616 
 
2008  0.569 0.765 
 
0.687 
 
0.559 
 
0.751 
 
0.620 
 
B. Natives 
1994 0.537 
 
0.674 
 
0.697 
 
0.541 
 
0.703 
 
0.627 
 
2000 0.529 
 
0.693 
 
0.694 
 
0.544 
 
0.734 
 
0.610 
 
2008 0.556 0.754 
 
0.693 
 
0.552 
 
0.730 
 
0.617 
 
C. Immigrants 
1994 0.600 0.876 
 
0.693 
 
0.612 
 
0.770 
 
0.783 
 
2000 0.581 
 
0.917 
 
0.573 
 
0.602 
 
0.830 
 
0.677 
 
2008 0.613 
 
0.976 
 
0.593 
 
0.608 
 
0.861 
 
0.636 
 
Females  
A. All workers  
1994 
 
0.509 0.693 0.598 0.542 0.689 0.598 
2000 0.498 0.688 0.553 0.502 0.668 0.584 
 
2008 0.525 0.722 0.597 0.504 0.671 0.558 
B. Natives 
1994 0.503 0.683 0.591 0.522 0.681 0.601 
 
2000 0.490 0.664 0.580 0.500 0.666 0.573 
 
2008 0.513 0.701 0.607 0.500 0.667 0.554 
C. Immigrants  
1994 0.552 0.787 0.580 0.578 0.690 0.661 
 
2000 0.543 0.870 0.518 0.514 0.650 0.659 
 
2008 0.580 0.896 0.568 0.531 0.714 0.592 
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Table 3.4b: Changes in Wage Inequality in the US and UK, 1994-2008 
Notes:  The table shows changes in wage dispersion for the log hourly wage of male and natives, natives and immigrants, 
in the US and the UK between  1994 and 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 UK   US   
 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
90-50  
  
50-10  Standard 
Deviation 
90-50  
  
50-10  
Males 
A. All workers 
1994-2008 0.022 0.081 
 
-0.034 
 
0.014 0.043 -0.018 
 
B. Natives 
1994-2008 0.019 
 
0.08 
 
-0.004 
 
0.011 
 
0.026 
 
-0.010 
 
C. Immigrants 
1994-2008 0.013 0.1 
 
-0.1 
 
0.013 
 
0.089 
 
-0.147 
 
Females 
A. All workers 
1994-2008 0.016 0.029 -0.001 -0.015 -0.018 -0.037 
 
B. Natives 
1994-2008 0.008 0.037 -0.011 -0.017 -0.014 -0.044 
 
C. Immigrants 
1994-2008 0.028 0.108 -0.011 0.009 0.027 -0.054 
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Table 3.5a: Wage Decomposition: Natives, Immigrants and all Workers 
  
 1994-2008 
UK 
1994-2008 
US 
 Natives  Immigrants All 
workers 
Natives Immigrants  All 
workers 
A. Men  
Actual 
residual 
0.021 0.025 
  
0.028 0.018 
 
0.005 0.017 
 
Predicted 
value 
-0.012 -0.023 -0.012 
 
0.002 
 
0.011 0.007 
 
Total wage 
variance 
0.012 0.016 0.016 0.020 0.016 0.024 
 
B.Women   
Actual 
residual 
0.003 0.033 0.010 0.008 
 
0.006 
 
0.009 
 
Predicted 
value 
-0.025 -0.031 
 
-0.025 
 
0.004 
 
0.026 
 
0.007 
 
Total wage 
variance 
-0.018 -0.009 -0.015 0.012 0.032 0.016 
Notes:  Residual wage variance is based on standard Mincer wage equation, fit separately by year, gender, and immigration 
status. 
 
Table 3.5b: Wage Decomposition for Natives and all Workers 
(Holding Skills and Share of Immigrants at their 1994 Level) 
 UK 
1994-2008 
US 
1994-2008 
 Natives  All workers Natives  All workers 
A. Men     
Actual Residual 0.021 0.028 0.018 
 
0.017 
 
Skills in 1994 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.009 
 
Skills and Share of Immigrants in 
1994 
0.006 0.009 0.009 0.008 
Predicted Value -0.012 -0.012 
 
0.002 
 
0.007 
 
Total wage variance 0.012 0.016 0.020 0.024 
 
B. Women      
Actual Residual 0.003 0.010 0.008 
 
0.009 
 
Skills in 1994 -0.009 -0.005 -0.002 -0.0003 
 
Skills and share of Immigrants in 
1994 
-0.009 -0.006 0.0002 -0.001 
Predicted value -0.025 -0.025 
 
0.004 
 
0.007 
 
Total wage variance -0.018 -0.015 0.012 0.016 
Notes: Residual wage variance is based on standard Mincer wage equation, fit separately by year, gender, and immigration 
status. 
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Figure 3.1a: Standard Deviation of Log Hourly Wage for Men, 1994-2008 
Notes: The figure plots the standard deviation of log hourly wage for male workers, separately for all workers, natives and 
immigrants   in the US and UK from 1994 to 2008. Samples include  workers in labour force age, working full time, 
employed only, main job with positive potential experience. 
 
Figure 3.1b: Standard Deviation of Log Hourly Wage for Women, 1994-2008 
 
Notes: The figure plots the standard deviation of log hourly wage for female workers, separately for all workers, natives 
and immigrants   in the US and UK from 1994 to 2008. Samples include  workers in labour force age, working full time, 
employed only, main job with positive potential experience. 
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Figure 3.2a: Log Hourly Wage Distribution, Natives and Immigrants 
Men,1994 
Notes: The figure plots the kernel density of the log hourly wage  at 1994 for male natives and immigrants in the US and 
UK. 
Figure 3.2b: Log Hourly Wage Distribution, Natives and Immigrants, Men 
2008 
 
Notes: The figure plots the kernel density of the log hourly wage  at 2008 for male natives and immigrants in the US and 
UK. 
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Figure 3.2c: Log Hourly Wage Distribution, Natives and Immigrants, 
Women1994 
Note: The figure plots the kernel density of the log hourly wage in 1994 for female natives and 
immigrants in the US and UK. 
 
Figure 3.2d: Log Hourly Wage Distribution, Natives and Immigrants, 
Women 2008 
Notes: The figure plots the kernel density of the log hourly wage in 2008 for female natives  
and immigrants in the US and UK 
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Figure 3.3a: Residual Variance and Share of Immigrants, Men 1994-2008
 
Notes: Based on ORG/CPS and LFS.  The Figure plots the actual residual wage  and the share of immigrants in the labour 
force. Hourly wages are reported in 2008 dollars and pounds. Residual wage variance is based on standard Mincer wage 
equation, fit separately by year, gender, immigration status. 
 
Figure 3.3b: Residual Variance and Share of Immigrants, Women 1994-2008  
      
Notes: Based on ORG/CPS and LFS.  The Figure plots the actual residual wage  and the share of immigrants in the labour 
force. Hourly wages are reported in 2008 dollars and pounds. Residual wage variance is based on standard Mincer wage 
equation, fit separately by year, gender, immigration status. 
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Figure 3.3c: Share of Immigrants and 90-50 Residual Gap, Men 1994-2008 
Notes: Based on ORG/CPS and LFS. Samples include men aged 16 to 64 for with  positive potential  experience, working 
full time for the full year in their main job only. The figure plots the share of  female immigrants in the labour force and the 
90-50 residual gap for male all workers. 
 
Figure 3.3d:Share of Immigrants and 90-50 Residual Gap, Women 1994-2008 
 
Notes: Based on ORG/CPS and LFS. Samples include men aged 16 to 64 for with  positive potential  experience, working 
full time for the full year in their main job only. The figure plots the share of  female immigrants in the labour force and the 
90-50 residual gap for female all workers. 
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Figure 3.4a: Actual Residual Variance for all Workers, Natives and 
Immigrants, Men 
     
Notes: Based on ORG/CPS and LFS.  Samples include workers in labour force age  with   positive potential   experience; 
working full time, full year and main job only. Hourly wages are reported in 2008 dollars and pounds.  Residual wage 
variance is based on standard Mincer wage equation, fit separately by year, gender, immigration status. 
 
Figure 3.4b: Actual Residual variance for all Workers, Natives and 
Immigrants Women 
     
Notes: Based on ORG/CPS and LFS.  Samples include workers in labour force age  with   positive potential   experience; 
working full time, full year and main job only. Hourly wages are reported in 2008 dollars and pounds.  Residual wage 
variance is based on standard Mincer wage equation, fit separately by year, gender, immigration status. 
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Figure 3.5a: Actual Residual Variance, Distribution of Skills  and Share of 
Immigrants at 1994 level, Men 
 
Figure 3.5b: Actual Residual Variance, Distribution of Skills  and Share of 
Immigrants at 1994 level, Women 
 
Notes: Based on ORG/CPS and LFS.  Samples include all men in the labour force age with   positive potential   experience; 
working full time, full year and main job only. Hourly wages are reported in 2008 dollars and pounds.  The figure  plots the 
actual residual variance based on standard Mincer wage equation, fit separately by year,the residual holding the skills 
distribution in 1994 and that holding skills and the share of immigrants in 1994 
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Figure 3.6a: Actual Residual Variance, Distribution of Skills  and Share of 
Immigrants at 2008 Level, Men, Men 
 
Notes: Based on ORG/CPS and LFS. Samples include men of labour force age with  positive potential  experience working 
full time for the full year in their main job only.  
 
Figure 3.6b: Actual Residual Variance, Distribution of Skills  and Share of 
Immigrants at  2008 Level, Women 
 
Notes: Based on ORG/CPS and LFS. Samples include men of labour force age with  positive potential  experience working 
full time for the full year in their main job only. 
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Figure 3.7a: Actual Residual Variance, Distribution of Skills  and Share of 
Immigrants at 1994 level, Natives Men 
 
Notes: Based on ORG/CPS and LFS.  Samples include all native men in the labour force age with   positive potential   
experience; working full time, full year and main job only. Hourly wages are reported in 2008 dollars and pounds.  The 
figure  plots the actual residual variance based on standard Mincer wage equation, fit separately by year, the residual 
holding the skills distribution at 1994 and that holding skills and the share of immigrants at 1994.  
Figure 3.7b: Actual Residual Variance, Distribution of Skills  and Share of 
Immigrants at 2008 Level, Natives Men 
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Figure 3.8a: Actual Residual Variance, Distribution of Skills  and Share of 
Immigrants at 2008 Level, Natives Women 
  
Figure 3.8b: Actual Residual Variance, Distribution of Skills  and Share of 
Immigrants at 2008  Level, Natives Women 
 
Notes: Based on ORG/CPS and LFS.  Samples include all native men in the labour force age with   positive potential  
experience; working full time, full year and main job only. Hourly wages are reported in 2008 dollars and pounds.  The 
figure  plots the actual residual variance based on standard Mincer wage equation, fit separately by year, the residual 
holding the skills distribution at 1994 and that holding skills and the share of immigrants at 1994.  
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Figure  3.9a: 90-50 Residual Gap, Men US  
(Holding Distribution of Skills and Share of Immigrants at 1994 Level) 
 
Note: The 90-50 residual gap is based on a standard Mincer wage equation fit separately by year, gender, and immigration 
status. 
Figure 3.9b: 90-50 Residual gap, Men UK 
(Holding Distribution of Skills and Share of Immigrants at 1994 Level) 
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Figure 3.9c: 90-50 Residual gap, Women US 
(Holding Distribution of Skills and Share of Immigrants at 1994 Level) 
Note:. The 90-50 residual gap is based on a standard Mincer wage equation fit separately by year, gender, and immigration 
status. 
 
Figure 3.9d: 90-50 Residual gap, Women UK 
(Holding Distribution of Skills and Share of Immigrants at 1994 Level) 
Note: The 90-50 residual gap is based on a standard Mincer wage equation fit separately by year, gender, and immigration 
status. 
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Figure 3.10a: 50-10 Residual gap, Men US 
(Holding Distribution of Skills and Share of Immigrants at 1994 Level) 
Note:. The 90-50 residual gap is based on a standard Mincer wage equation fit separately by year, gender, and immigration 
status. 
 
Figure 3.10b: 50-10 Residual gap, Men UK 
(Holding Distribution of Skills and Share of Immigrants at 1994 Level) 
Note: The 50-10 residual gap is based on a standard Mincer wage equation fit separately by year, gender, and immigration 
status. 
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Figure 3.10c: 50-10 Residual gap, Women UK 
(Holding Distribution of Skills and Share of Immigrants at 1994 Level) 
 
      
Figure 3.10d: 50-10 Residual gap, Women UK 
(Holding Distribution of Skills and Share of Immigrants at 1994 Level) 
 
 
 
Actual Residual gap
Distribution of skills of 1994Distribution of skills and share of immigrants of 1994
.4
6
.4
8
.5
.5
2
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
All Workers
Actual Residual Gap
.4
6
.4
8
.5
.5
2
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Natives
Actual 50-10 residual gap
.4
6
.4
8
.5
.5
2
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
All Workers
Actual 50-10 residual Gap
.4
6
.4
8
.5
.5
2
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Natives
131 
 
Appendix  A.3.1: Cohort effects 
 
 
One of the aims of this paper is to account for the unmeasured aspects of human 
capital. Due to the difficulties of investigating this by following the limited 
literature (Lemieux 2006, Gould and Moav 2008), this paper uses as a proxy for 
unobservable skills the residual of a standard Mincer equation; in other words, to 
interpret the residual as the unmeasured aspect of human capital, I model the 
specification only on age, educational level (years of schooling) and experience. 
As a sensitivity check of my results, I recomputed the results for all 
workers as well as natives and immigrants separately by adding other controls, 
such as a dummy variable for area of origin and years spent in the receiving 
country by the immigrants. As should be expected, the level of the results 
decreases slightly; nevertheless, the trends do not dramatically change, and more 
importantly, the wage inequality due to residuals between natives and immigrants 
remains.43  
To check whether the trends and levels for immigrants are driven by 
cohort effects, i.e., cohort of arrivals in the receiving country, Tables A3.1a and 
A3.1b present the main results by examining the wage inequalities of male 
immigrants in the US and UK in three different years (1994, 2000 and 2008). 
The main measures used are the standard deviation of log hourly wage and 
the residual variance. However, the analysis does not show any dominant trends 
of the arrival cohort.44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43 Results for the sensitivity check are available on request from the author.  
44 Considering male immigrants in the US, about 30% of them arrived between 1978 and 1989, 
followed by 26% who arrived during the 1990s. Only 8% of immigrants working in the US arrived 
before 1967, and 18% arrived between 1999 and 2008. For the UK, 37% of male immigrants 
arrived before 1967, while about 15% of them arrived, respectively, during the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s. Another 18% of male immigrants in the UK arrived between 1990 and 2008. 
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Table A.3.1a: Analysis by Cohort of Arrival, Male Immigrants, US 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cohort of arrivals 
 
1994 2000 2008 
    
Before 1967    
Standard dev. 0.555 0.592 0.635 
Residual variance 
 
0.224 0.268 0.299 
1968-1977    
Standard dev. 0.565 0.573 0.611 
Residual variance 
 
0.205 0.225 0.227 
1978-1989    
Standard dev. 0.556 0.550 0.579 
Residual variance 
 
0.208 0.209 0.229 
1990-1998    
Standard dev. 0.613 0.562 0.599 
Residual variance 
 
0.243 0.197 0.215 
1999-2008    
Standard dev.  0.571 0.607 
Residual variance  0.195 0.223 
    
Stand. dev. all Immigrants  0.599 0.581 0.613 
Residual Variance Immigrants 0.227 0.218 0.232 
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Table A3.1b: Analysis by Cohort of Arrival, Male Immigrants, UK 
Cohort of arrivals 1994 2000 2008 
Before 1967    
Standard dev. 0.527 0.557 0.544 
Residual variance 
 
0.213 0.244 0.217 
1968-1977    
Standard dev. 0.625 0.561 0.595 
Residual variance 
 
0.270 0.241 0.300 
1978-1989    
Standard dev. 0.631 0.615 0.570 
Residual variance 
 
0.302 0.281 0.281 
1990-1998    
Standard dev. 0.793 0.675 0.611 
Residual variance 
 
0.473 0.353 0.275 
1999-2008    
Standard dev.  0.631 0.594 
Residual variance  0.291 0.281 
    
Stand. dev.   Immigrants   0.611 0.602 0.591 
Residual  Variance  Immigrants   0.292 0.285 0.277 
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Chapter 4: Real Wages, Wage Inequality and the Regional Cost-of-living in 
the UK 
 
4.1: Introduction 
The estimated wage returns to graduates has increased significantly in the UK 
over time (Card and Lemieux, 2001; Machin, 1998; Machin and Van Reenen, 
2008; Schmitt, 1995 and subsequent chapters of this thesis). Beginning in the 
1980s, despite a continued expansion in the relative supply of skilled workers, 
rising relative demand for skilled workers led to widening skills differentials 
(Schmitt, 1995);  Card and Lemieux (2001) claim that the overall increase in the 
college high school wage gap for the US, UK and Canada over the past 30 years is 
attributable to steadily rising relative demand for college-educated labour but in 
different sub-periods the slowdown in graduate returns is related to rising relative 
graduate supply.  
      Machin (2003) documents that over the 1980s the returns to graduate 
education in the UK were rising and in the 1990s were relatively stable. Recent 
studies also demonstrate that the average returns to graduate education remain 
high (Sloane, 2003; Walker and Zhu, 2003). Green and Zhu (2010) also find that 
the dispersion of the returns to graduate education substantially increased for both 
men and women over the period 1994 to 2006.  
In a recent contribution Moretti (2010) questioned the relative real wage increases 
for US graduates by re-examining how wage inequality is measured. He 
demonstrates how existing estimates of wage inequality for the US change when 
accounting for differences in the cost-of-living across locations and the relative 
concentration of graduates in certain high cost locations. To do so he deflates 
nominal wages using a new CPI that allows the cost of housing to vary across 
metropolitan areas. Using data from the US Census between 1980 and 2000, 
Moretti focuses on the difference in the average hourly wage for workers with a 
high school degree and workers with college degree or more. Much of the growth 
in the number of college graduates has occurred in metropolitan areas that have 
both a higher initial cost of housing and which have experienced larger increases 
in the cost of housing over time. This implies that college graduates are 
increasingly exposed to a higher cost-of-living and that the relative increase in 
their real wage may be smaller than the relative increase in their nominal wage. 
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He shows that between 1980 and 2000, the cost of housing, measured as the gross 
monthly rent, for college graduates grew much faster than the cost of housing for 
high school graduates. In 1980 the difference in the average cost of housing 
between college and high school graduates was only 4%. The difference grew to 
14% in 2000. Moreover this implies that the difference between the wages of 
college graduates and high school graduates is smaller in real terms than in 
nominal terms. In fact half of the documented increase in the return to college 
between 1980 and 2000 disappears when using real local CPI to deflate wages.   
This paper attempts to address this issue for the UK where similar trends 
in wage inequality, changes in educational characteristics of workers, and 
concentration of graduate workers in more expensive regions are observed. Card 
and Lemiuex (2001), Gosling and Lemieux (2004), Machin and Van Reenen 
(2008)  highlight the similarities between the UK and the US in both the increase 
in wage inequality and changes in educational characteristics of the labour force. 
The UK, like the US, over the past four decades experienced an increase in both 
the 90-50 and 90-10 wage differential (Bell and Van Reenen, 2010); however, as 
documented in Chapter 3  between 1994 and 2008 the 90-50 log wage gap 
increased in both the UK and the U.S, though in the same time period women in 
the UK experienced a slight decrease. Both countries also experienced increases 
in the proportion of graduate workers in the population. In the US this grew from 
20.8% in 1980 to 34.2% in 2004; for the UK the growth in graduates was from 
5% to 21% over the same time period.  As in the US, graduate workers in the UK 
are also unevenly distributed across the country. Looking at the distribution of 
graduates across the UK, based on the LFS in 2008, nearly 38% of UK graduate 
workers were concentrated in two regions: the London area (21.1%) and the South 
East (16.7%);  those two regions also made up respectively 11.5% and 15% of the 
total UK labour force in 2008. Therefore only London looks to have 
disproportionately more graduates relative to its population share. In London, only 
6.2% of workers have less than a high school level of education and 11.4% have a 
high school degree; in the South East about 16.5% of workers have a high school 
degree and 13.1% less than high school. These are also the British regions where 
households spend more on housing than the UK average, largely due to 
differences between regions in the average amount spent on rent and mortgages 
(Family Spending, ONS 2009). Since the late 1970s, there have been considerable 
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variations in house prices both over time and across UK regions,45 with prices in 
London rising faster than other regions (Holly et al. 2010). Similarly between 
1997 and 2008, graduate workers became more concentrated in London. 
Therefore it is likely that changes in house prices may affect real wage levels of 
graduates more over time; and this is another reason motivating this study. 
The distribution of graduate workers raises the question as to why 
graduate workers tend to concentrate into more expensive areas. Explanations can 
be found in the relative demand and relative supply of skilled workers (Moretti, 
2010). Because firms in more expensive cities experience an increase in the 
relative demand for skilled workers, more educated workers move to those more 
expensive cities. Therefore the increase in their utility level is smaller than their 
increase in their nominal wage. In this scenario the increase in well-being 
inequality is smaller than the increase in nominal wage inequality because of their 
higher cost-of-living.  The other explanations related to the concentration of 
graduate workers in more expensive cities can be found in the increase of relative 
supply due to an increase of local amenities that attract graduate workers; Moretti 
(2010) explains that the increase in the cost-of-living is somehow correlated with 
the increased attractiveness of those cities.    
Moretti (2004) explains that if externalities exist, we should expect that 
plants located in cities with high levels of human capital to produce a higher 
output with the same inputs than otherwise similar plants located in cities with 
low levels of human capital. Specifically he presents a model showing that firms 
are more productive in cities with high overall levels of human capital, because of 
spillovers. In equilibrium, firms are indifferent between cities because wages are 
higher in cities with a higher overall level of human capital, so the unit costs are 
the same elsewhere. Workers are indifferent because housing prices are higher in 
cities with a higher overall level of human capital.  
In the following  model developed by Moretti (2004) there are two cities 
and two types of labor, educated and uneducated workers. There are two types of 
goods, a composite good y-nationally traded- and land h- locally traded. Each 
(city) firm is a competitive economy that produces y using a Cobb-Douglas 
technology: y = AHαHLαLK β   where H and L are the hours worked by educated 
                                                 
45 For example from January 1999 to July 2004 house price in the UK rose by 123% (Nickell, 
2005) 
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and uneducated workers, respectively and K is capital.  To consider how human 
capital spillover enters the model, the productivity of plants in a city depends on 
the aggregate level of human capital in the city: A=f(S), where S can be measured 
as the fraction of college-educated workers in the city, outside the firm. In the 
absence of human capital spillovers from education, δf/δS=0. In this case, 
productivity of a firm increases if more skilled workers are employed in the firm, 
but holding constant the firm’s workers in the city have no effect on productivity. 
If college share in a city generates positive human capital spillovers, a rise in 
college share raises productivity of all plants in the city.  
Because the composite good, y, is traded, its price is the same everywhere. 
Variation in the cost of living depends only on variation in cost of land,p, which is 
the same for all workers in a city. Workers maximise utility subject to a budget 
constraint by choosing quantities of the composite good and residential land. 
Workers and firms are perfectly mobile, and profits are assumed to be 
zero. Equilibrium is obtained when the utilities of workers in all cities are equal 
and firms in different cities have the same unit costs.  
Figure 1 taken from Moretti (2004) presents an example of two cities A 
and B, two education groups (high skilled H and low skilled L) where the indirect 
utilities, respectively VH(wH, p)  and VL(wL, p)  of those two groups are a function 
of nominal wages and cost of land. The indifference curves of the two groups are 
represented in the figure by the upward-sloping lines in each panel.  
The downward-sloping lines show combinations of wages and rents that 
hold constant firms’ unit costs: C (wH, wL, p, r, S)=1; r represents the price of 
capital, represented by r, is assumed to be constant across cities; S enters the cost 
function if human capital externalities exist. Firms can produce the same level of 
output  but using less labour and capital in cities with more  human capital. Point 
1 in the left panel represents the equilirium combination of wage of educated 
workers and cost of land in city A. The same point (1) in the right panel desplays 
the same combination for less educated workers.  Suppose that due to 
technological differences, skilled workers are more productive (and more 
concentrated) and more requested in city B than in city A; city B also  pays higher 
wages to skilled workers, therefore encouraging skilled workers move to B.  
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In the absence of  spillovers the equilibrium in city B is represented by 
point 2; if spillover exists then the isocost curve shifts further to the right with the 
magnitude of the spillover represented by the distance from 2 to 3. 
 
 
Notes: Point 1 is the equilibrium in city A. Point 2 is the equilibrium in city B without externality. 
Point 3 is the equilibrium in city B with externality. The dashed lines in both panels are the isocost 
curves in city B without externality. WH and wL are the nomonal wages of educated and 
uneducated workers, respectively.  
Bertrand et al.(2008) conclude that industries move towards workers more 
readily then workers move towards industries; firms reallocate production of skill-
intensive industries and products toward regions whose relative factor prices best 
match their factor needs.  
In a similar vein to Moretti (2010), Black et al. (2010) question whether 
the return to education is likely to be the same in locations characterised by 
differential price levels.  They demonstrate that in an equilibrium that has local 
variation in prices, not only do wage levels differ across locations, but so too do 
returns to schooling. They examine the returns to college education relative to 
high school education for large cities in the US in 1980, 1990 and 2000 and find 
persistent and substantial heterogeneity in the return to a college degree, 
supporting also the prediction that the local return to schooling is inversely related 
to housing prices.  
The existing literature on wage inequality does not reach any consensus on 
what caused the secular rise in wage dispersion both within and across countries. 
Researchers do agree that the causes seem to lie with a variety of components, 
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rather than one exclusive factor, that jointly affect the wage structure. In 
particular, the leading explanations regarding rising wage inequality such as 
declining unionization, the falling real value of the minimum wage, increased 
trade and skill-biased technological change do not seem to help explain recent 
trends in wage inequality since they have less to say regarding the dominant 
trends of the 1990s and 2000s, namely increasing upper-tail inequality and 
declining lower tail inequality (Autor, Katz and Kearney 2005). These factors also 
fail to explain that residual wage dispersion n among workers with the same 
education and experience accounts for most of the growth in overall wage 
inequality (Lemieux 2006).   
 The existing literature investigating trends and causes of wage inequality 
in the UK usually measures wages in real terms by deflating nominal wages using 
the national Retail Prices Index (RPI). The RPI provided by the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) is a fixed quantity price index: it measures the 
proportional change in the cost of buying some fixed bundle of goods as prices 
change (Blow and Crawford, 2001). However, the RPI does not account for 
differences in regional housing costs. 
Expenditure on housing represents the largest component of total 
household expenditure but this varies considerably across regions in the UK. As 
such, differences in regional housing costs might be expected to play an important 
part in determining cost-of-living differences between regions. For example in 
2008, housing costs accounted for 34% of total expenditures of people renting in 
London compared to 24% for those living in Wales and 18% for inhabitants of 
Northern Ireland (Family Expenditure Survey (FES), 2008). In the same year, in 
London 43% of the labour force population were graduates, compared to 21% in 
Wales and 24% in Northern Ireland (LFS). So depending on where they live, 
workers with the same level of education may face a different cost-of-living. This 
implies that deflating the nominal wage by a regional  RPI might lead to different 
estimates of the observed real wage dispersion than one based on a national index 
that might fail in being fully representative at the regional level. 
During the last two decades a few studies addressed how accounting for 
regional variation of prices in the UK could reflect in different estimates of 
income or inequalities, though none of them investigated how this could affect 
wage dispersion and return to education. 
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For example Crawford (1996) examined the extent and pattern of 
differences in  the cost-of-living for subgroups of the population, specifically 
income group and head of household’s date-of-birth cohort. He pointed out that to 
a large extent the difference in cost-of-living inflation for households in the top 
and bottom 10 per cent of income distribution is driven by variations in housing 
tenure types between the two groups. He demonstrates that adding housing costs 
increases the average difference in inflation rates for poorer households relative to 
richer households from -0.01 to -0.07 percentage points. The same author also 
provides evidence of cohort differences in inflation rates between 1979 and 1992 
for three broad head of household birth cohorts: households in which the head was 
born before 1930, those in which the head was born after 1930 but before 1960, 
and those in which the head was born after 1960. For those born after 1960, their 
cost-of-living at the end of the period had grown 2.68 per cent more than average; 
in contrast to them the eldest households did relatively well, finishing the period 
with a cost-of-living which had grown 0.45 per cent slower than average.  
Borooah et al. (1996) used regional price data provided by the Croner 
Reward Group (CRG) in conjunction with weights derived from the FES to 
construct regional retail price indices. The relative expensiveness of Greater 
London and the South East, over the period 1979-1990, increased when housing 
costs were included; conversely, the inclusion of housing costs meant that 
Northern Ireland changed from being slightly more, to slightly less expensive than 
the UK average. They found that Northern Ireland was above average in the cost 
of: food, housing repairs, fuel and travel, and below average in the cost of leisure 
services. Greater London had relatively high costs for: food, fuel, personal goods 
and services. When housing costs were included in the aggregate index, Greater 
London and the South East increased their mean relative cost index value to 1.052 
and 1.020, from 1.023 and 1.005 respectively. On the other hand, the inclusion of 
housing led Northern Ireland to experience a fall in relative costs of a magnitude 
comparable to London’s increase.   
Acknowledging the high degree of expenditure variation rates amongst 
different households in the UK, Crawford and Smith (2002) calculate a household 
specific cost-of-living indices reflecting that households consume goods and 
services in different proportions. Using data from the UK FES from 1975 to 1999, 
they analyse differences in inflation rates by grouping households according to 
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whether they pay rent for their accommodation, whether they own it outright or 
whether they own it with a mortgage. They use the Laspeyres index to generate 
household specific inflation; the index compares the cost of buying the observed 
set of commodities at two different sets of prices: the contemporaneous and the 
set prevailing in the following period. The differences in the inflation rates for the 
households are generated by differences in their commodity demands.  
Crawford and Smith (2002) claim that the headline average inflation rate 
is not always close to the experience of inflation for “the great majority of 
households”. They provide evidence that on average, from 1976 to 2000, only 
about one third of households at a point in time faced inflation rates within 1 
percentage point of the average rate. Analysing the impact of ignoring differential 
inflation on the measurement of income inequality, they find that not allowing for 
differential inflation could lead to the annual growth rate in inequality being 
overstated or understated by as much as 6 percentage points46. The measures of 
inflation they derive are based on the price data that are in the published section 
indices of the RPI, collected from national sources that do not account for any 
regional variation in prices.   
This paper differs from the contribution of Crawford and Smith (2002) by  
accounting for regional variation in the cost-of-living; furthermore while 
Crawford and Smith (2002) base their analysis on the household disposable 
income, this paper focuses on the individual hourly wage as a point in time 
measure of labour, allowing to understand how different measures of inflation 
used can lead to differences in the cost of labour. 
  Duranton and Monastiritis (2002) investigate regional inequalities in the 
UK from 1982 to 1997 and their evolution by examining labour market earnings. 
They document a convergence of wage equalization across UK regions during the 
time period in both the coefficients on regional fixed effects and in the returns to 
                                                 
46 Crawford and Smith (2002) use a different definition of income than the one used to calculate 
official low-income statistics. They use household disposable incomes, after adjusting for 
household size and composition, as a proxy for material living standards. More precisely, it is a 
proxy for the level of consumption of goods and services that people could attain given the 
disposable income of the household in which they live. In order to allow comparisons of the living 
standards of different types of households, income is adjusted to take into account variations in the 
size and composition of the households in a process known as equivalisation. A key assumption 
made in HBAI is that all individuals in the household benefit equally from the combined income 
of the household. This enables the total equivalised income of the household to be used as a proxy 
for the standard of living of each household member. 
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key labour market characteristics such as experience, education and sex. They 
show that rising inequalities between skilled and unskilled in combination with 
the increasing and uneven spatial distribution of education in the UK, contributed 
to amplify aggregate regional disparities. They also pointed out that the rising 
average educational attainment in London and the South East relative to the rest 
of the country played a role in explaining the aggravation of regional inequalities. 
Their analysis is based on the FES and the General Household Survey (GHS) to 
derive the log of real weekly earnings and they construct two panel-price indexes 
based on the regional prices available from the Croner-Reward Group; however 
they do not construct or use any common price deflator. This paper also aims to 
do construct a regional common price deflator. Hayes (2005) identifies a number 
of problems in using these latter data and interpretation of the results based on the 
construction of the deflator; the main concern being the dominance of house price 
movements; Hayes points out that if CRG indices are taken as proxies for the 
published RPI, the indices are not a fair representation of the cost-of-living for 
households not purchasing or renting a house in each period.   
One problem is due to the fact that in the CRG the expenditure total is a 
measure of a cost-of-living reflecting a lifestyle rather than a collection of prices 
from a given basket (as used in the RPI).  Because of dissimilarity in the 
construction of the CRG prices with respect to the RPI, the combination of the 
two data would not be appropriate. In fact, in constructing the expenditure totals 
in each region, CRG collects price data over 100 localities, as well as at national 
levels, for over 260 specific items. Each year the expenditure items are reviewed 
and changes are made when necessary. The RPI is published monthly using price 
data collected on 500-600 specific types of goods and services based on 180 shops 
throughout the country. Although the methodology to construct the price index in 
CRG is similar to the one followed by the ONS to construct the RPI, few 
differences are found; for example unlike the RPI, the CRG includes the top 4% 
of incomes. Another discrepancy is due to the timing of collection of prices: the 
RPI is based on data collected each month; the CRG only collects data twice a 
year. This makes a time series analysis of the behaviour of regional prices 
problematic. 
To address concerns on whether there is local area economic convergence 
in the UK Henley (2005) uses data on Gross Domestic Product (GDP)/Gross 
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Value Added (GVA) per capita at 128 Nomenclature of Units for Territorial 
Statistics (NUTS level 3) sub-regions across the UK published by the ONS every 
year; a sub-region coincides with single or groups of unitary local government 
authorities. Because local GDP deflators are not available, regional-level analyses 
of GDP convergence typically do not investigate the impact on convergence 
estimates of variation in local prices. Henley shows that the use of  regional price 
deflators may affect rates of convergence estimates; in fact in convergence models 
using country-level data, one finds evidence for positive region-specific 
convergence; however  when accounting for regional differences in the cost-of-
living no evidence can be found for the convergence across the UK.  
Despite its potential importance, the existing literature on UK wage 
inequality has not accounted for differences in the cost-of-living nor analysed 
whether this could possibly affect the level of and changes in observed wage and 
wage inequality.  The decisions about how we compute inflation statistics can 
have a direct impact on policy decisions (Checchetti, 2007). The RPI is in fact 
used by the government for a number of purposes including the calculation of 
various incomes and prices; it is used to set and up-rate the level of wages, tax 
allowances, and to regulate train fares as well as index-linked government bonds. 
The Government used to refer to the  RPI to set welfare benefits and state 
pensions, however very recently it has been  announced to change the inflation 
benchmark used to set benefits and pension from the RPI to the Consumer Prices 
index (CPI)  (Inman, P.,The Guardian, 2010). The regional variation in inflation 
rate is an issue of importance because of the crucial role of the RPI. Because the 
RPI does not reflect any regional variations, all decisions based on that will not 
account for the different “real” cost-of-living faced by individuals living in 
different UK regions. In 2003 the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his budget 
speech stated that “in future we plan regional price indexes showing differences in 
regional inflation rates” (Fenwick and O’Donoghue, 2004).  
Blanchflower and Oswald (2005) advocate the need for UK regionally-
determined wage packages. They argue that because the cost-of-living varies 
regionally, public sector workers should be paid differently, according to where 
they work as the level of private sector wages varies dramatically across different 
parts of the UK; for example, workers in central London earn 55% more than 
others – so should remuneration in the public sector also take into account 
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regional differences in the cost-of-living (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2003).  As 
pointed out by Borooah et al. (1996),   if it is true that some regions of the UK are 
“cheaper” than others and that such differences persist over time, then a policy of 
paying nationally determined unemployment benefits might have, depending upon 
the region of residence, significantly different consequences for the real incomes 
of the unemployed and so affect their participation in the labour market. A study 
of regional variations in the cost-of-living has several important implications; 
Borooah et al (1996) pointed out three: first, there is the adjustment of social 
security benefit levels to take account of regional differences in prices. Secondly, 
conclusions about the relative deprivation or prosperity of regions, as measured by 
real disposable income, could also be susceptible to change in the face of regional 
variations in the cost-of-living. Lastly, conclusions about the number of persons 
living in poverty could also alter when regional cost-of-living variations are 
allowed for.  
The empirical evidence on wage inequality in the UK is mainly based on 
the measure of wage inequality derived by deflating nominal wages with the 
national RPI. Less attention has been paid to regional disparities in wage 
inequality in the UK and most of the existing measures of the RPI do not account 
for regional variations in the cost-of-living.  
    In attempting to shed some light on this area, this chapter focuses on 
changes in the difference in the log hourly wage for workers with a college degree 
and workers with a high school degree or workers with a less than high school 
degree in the UK between 1997 and 2008. Data on individual wages are based on 
LFS data; wages are deflated by a regional RPI that is derived by using  the 
national RPI excluding housing expenditure augmented by a weighted price of 
housing component that varies across 12 regions using weights derived from the 
FES and price for rents derived from the Family Resources Survey (FRS). The 
real hourly wage is therefore deflated using a new RPI that allows for variation in 
the cost-of-living by 12 UK regions. Moreover this paper attempts to investigate 
how much the cost-of-living accounts for the observed  level of wage dispersion 
over a period in which inequality was static or falling.  In fact, from 1997 to 2008 
wage inequality in the UK decreased by about 0.021 (Standard deviation) to 0.051 
(50-10 gap) log points.   
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 This chapter is organised as follows: part two explains the methodology 
followed by the ONS to construct the RPI and presents some related issues; part 
two also explains how the regional RPI is derived. Part three presents the 
econometric methodology; in part four the data sets used are discussed. Part five 
discusses the results, and part six concludes.  
 
4.2   RPI and the cost-of-living  
This section begins by discussing how the RPI is calculated by the ONS (section 
2.1). The second part of this section describes how the Regional RPI used in the 
main estimates is derived. 
 
4.2.1   National RPI: descriptions and drawbacks  
The RPI is defined (ONS, 2007)47as an average measure of change in the prices of 
goods and services bought for the purpose of consumption by the vast majority of 
households in the UK. The spending pattern underlying the RPI is that of an 
average private UK based household, excluding certain households: the top 4% of 
households by income and “pensioner” households where state benefits provide at 
least 75% of their income.  To represent price movement in the RPI basket 
specific representative items are chosen48; there are currently 650 representative 
items that have fairly broad specifications and collectors must choose a variety 
that conforms to that specification.  
The methodology for deriving the RPI involves weighting together 
aggregated prices for different categories of goods and services so that each takes 
its appropriate share within household budgets. The RPI uses aggregate average 
expenditure to calculate weights implying that each index household contributes 
to the weights an amount proportional to its expenditure. 
  The data used to produce the weights49 are based on the Expenditure and 
Food Survey (EFS), renamed the Living Costs and Food Survey (LCF) in 2008 
and formerly the FES. The EFS/FES/LCF is a continuous household survey which 
                                                 
47 Consumer Price Indices Technical Manual , page 3, 2007.  
48 Details on the collection of the data in the RPI are presented in the Appendix.  
49 The RPI weights are constructed on the same population basis as the RPI; i.e. excluding the 
expenditure of the top 4% and pensioner households; these households are excluded because they 
have very different spending patterns from most households.  
146 
 
monitors the spending patterns of around 6,000 to 6,500 household across the 
country each year.  
The RPI is an annually chain-linked index: each year a separate index on 
the most recent January is produced and each year’s indices are then chained 
together to produce an index covering several years. Within each year the RPI is a 
fixed quantity price index that measures the change in the price of a basket of 
fixed composition: a price index such as the RPI measures the proportional 
change in the cost of buying some fixed bundle of goods as prices change; 
however as pointed out by Blow and Crawford (2002), when prices change, 
consumers can mitigate the effect of price increases on their cost-of-living by 
substituting away from goods that have become relatively more expensive 
towards those that have become relatively cheaper. Therefore because the RPI 
ignores the substitution effects it may suffer from substitution bias when 
compared to a true cost-of-living index. Nevertheless the RPI Technical Manual 
(ONS, 1998) explains that the RPI is not intended to measure what people often 
refer to as ”the cost-of-living”; a cost-of-living50 index measures the average 
change in prices with reference, not to a fixed list of demands, but to a fixed 
standard of living (Crawford and Smith, 2002).  
Based on the above methodology the ONS provides four different 
measures of inflation that differ in the exclusion or inclusion of housing costs: the 
RPI including all items  (CHAW); the RPI excluding mortgage interest payments 
(CHMK); the RPI excluding mortgage interest payments and indirect taxes  
(CBZW) and the RPI excluding housing (CHAZ). 
The RPI all items (CHAW) includes costs of housing at national level. 
Costs for home-owners are represented by nominal mortgage interest payments 
(MIPs) that are measured using a model of the payments being paid for 
mortgagees by an average household; the calculation starts with the average price 
of new and existing houses bought on mortgages in each year in the past 23 years. 
Essentially the current approach is to multiply the average outstanding mortgage 
debt (calculated as a weighted average of the values of mortgages taken out over 
the previous 23 years) by current interest rates.  The main source of house price 
data is the “mix-adjusted” Department of the Environment, Transport and Regions 
                                                 
50 Konus (1924) first defined a true cost-of-living as the minimum cost of achieving some 
reference welfare level when the price vector is pt, relative to the minimum cost of achieving the 
same welfare with the price vector ps. 
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(DETR) house price index. “Mix-adjusted” means that the sample is weighted to 
ensure that there is no steep change in the sample average house price due to 
different sizes or types of properties being recorded each year. This house price 
index is compiled from sample information on mortgages loaned from building 
societies, banks and other mortgage lenders. The sample is trimmed specifically 
for the RPI purposes by removing house transactions where the mortgagers’ 
income given in the mortgage application is over the top 4% threshold used to 
define index households. The house price estimate is calculated by combining the 
most recent month’s Halifax house price index with earlier months’ data from the 
DETR index. The interest rates used at present are a weighted average of the 20 
largest building societies and the nine largest banks’ basic mortgage interest rates 
adjusted.   In each month of the 23 year calculations the house price is multiplied 
by 55% for houses bought after 1981 and by 65% for houses bought before 1981 
(these percentage are the assumed proportions of the mortgage that was 
borrowed). This gives the average current debt outstanding on mortgages for each 
month of each of the 23 years and those figures are subdivided by eligible tax 
relief (£30000 or less) and the rest.  The two average debt figures are then 
multiplied by average mortgage interest rates net and gross of tax relief, as 
charged by building societies. This results in an average mortgage interest 
payment in each of the two tax categories for owner occupied households. The 
two indexes are then added together to give the average mortgage interest 
payments  that is multiplied by the proportion of owner-occupiers who have lived 
in their house for less than 23 years; then by the proportion of under 23 year 
owner-occupiers with mortgages and then by the proportion of index households 
which are owner-occupiers. This gives an average payment of all index 
households that is the measure for housing used in the RPI CHAW.  
The RPI CBZW excludes these mortgage interest payments as well as 
indirect taxes and includes, as housing costs, national rent; information on rents 
comprising private sector, local authority and social landlord rent. Private sector 
rents are collected from estate agents in around 150 locations around the country. 
The price collected is then net of any inclusive water, sewerage or council 
charges, as these are accounted for by separate centrally collected items. Local 
authority rent information is provided by the Department of Communities and 
Local Government (DCLG) and the equivalent bodies within the developed 
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administrations. Registered social landlord data are from the Tenant Services 
Authority.  
The RPI CBZW also includes council tax and rates; water and other 
charges; repairs and maintenance charges and dwelling insurance. 
The RPI excluding housing (CHAZ) does not include any of the previous 
housing costs. Any RPI that calculates housing costs based on mortgages is likely 
to be higher than the RPI that includes rents (CBZW) as a measure for housing 
costs due to the fact that not only weights for mortgages are larger than those for 
rents, but also mortgage payments are higher than rents. As explained by 
Crawford (1996), these factors together make the cost-of-living indices extremely 
sensitive to fluctuations in mortgage interest rates; on average a 1 % increase in 
mortgage interest rates raises the RPI  by 0.5 per cent. In addition, as explained 
above, the methodology used to calculate the cost for housing based on mortgages 
differs from the one that uses rents. 
However in any of the measures of inflation available from the ONS there 
are two aspects that the RPI does not account for. The first one is the variation of 
housing related expenditure by region in the UK, the other one is the difference in 
the inflation rates that different household types experience across the UK. 
This paper focuses on the former. At present the ONS does not calculate 
regional inflation figures.  Fenwick and O’Donoghue (2003) explain why 
particular features of the RPI sample design and price collection methods are not 
suitable for regional price level comparisons. First of all the EFS/FES/LCF 
sample is not designed to be representative of individual regions but it is designed 
to represent the shopping habits of the average UK consumer and therefore does 
not reflect differences in the range of items purchased and expenditure shares in 
different regions of the country. Similarly, the collection of price data is designed 
for the construction of national price indices only and not regional ones.  Regional 
spending patterns would be required so that regional indices could reflect 
accurately the consumption basket by residents of the region; the information 
needed for such an exercise is contained in the ONS’s annual Expenditure and 
Food Survey but the sample size within regions is not sufficient to generate 
reliable statistics for the regions. 
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Based on the idea that differences in cost-of-living indices between 
population groups are generated entirely by their spending pattern and that 
housing tenure is likely to generate large differences in inflation rates, Crawford 
and Smith (2002) calculate household-specific cost-of-living indices. They group 
these indices across households according to whether they pay rent for their 
accommodation, whether they own it with a mortgage or whether they do not pay 
any housing costs at all.  They show that inflation rates across renters, house 
owners and mortgage holders display large differences between them. The biggest 
difference occurs between mortgagors and the other two groups. In 1989, for 
example, the inflation rate for mortgagors was about 12.9 per cent while for the 
other two groups it was 6.3 per cent. During the 1990s, mortgagors experienced 
much more variation in the inflation rate than the renters and owners. This 
coincides with the increase in mortgage rates during the 1980s.  From 1988 
onwards, increases in interest rates pushed the cost-of-living of home-owners up 
faster while rents lagged. The interest rate cuts from the early 1990s had the 
reverse effect, cutting the rate of increase for home-owners relative to the average 
while the average rents rose more sharply. The results show that using household-
specific price indices gives a different picture of the evolution of inequality in 
living standards over the period from the one that emerges if these inflation 
effects are ignored.  For example, between 1978 and 1979 inequality increased on 
the measure that assumes common inflation rates, whilst the measure that allows 
for differential inflation effects shows a decline in inequality over the same 
period.  
 
4.2.2   Methodology: Constructing a Regional RPI 
Throughout this chapter the National RPI refers to the one provided by the ONS 
(CBZW) excluding mortgage interest payments and indirect taxes and including 
other national housing costs (gross rents); since the RPI/CBZW is the benchmark 
against which the derived Regional RPI is compared, both weights and the 
housing costs are derived by accounting for the housing component of the 
RPI/CBZW. 
 The Regional RPI refers to the one that is proposed as a new measure of 
the cost-of-living taking into account regional differences in housing costs over 
time and the National RPI/CHAZ is the one that excludes any housing costs and 
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that is used as a base to construct the new measure. Using the RPI/CHAZ  as a 
base is more convenient than using the RPI/CBZW since the derived regional 
housing index can be just added to the RPI/CHAZ without the need to derive the 
cost of non-housing consumption by subtracting changes in the cost of housing 
from the National RPI, moreover  this would give the same RPI as taking the 
CBSW and adjusting for regional variations.    
The Regional RPI described in this section is essentially a new measure of 
the cost-of-living that partially updates the national RPI/CHAZ with regional 
housing index allowing therefore the original RPI to vary by regions. Housing 
cost is measured by price of gross rent51 from 1997 to 2008, derived from the 
household data from FRS carried out jointly by the ONS and the National Centre 
for Social Research52.  
The categories of renters from which the cost of housing are derived are 
very similar to those considered by the ONS, such as households renting from 
councils; those renting from housing associations; and those renting privately, in 
both unfurnished and furnished accommodation.  
Rental costs in the UK vary significantly across regions and over time. 
Since the 1990s, rental prices have been increasing consistently, particularly in 
London and the  South East.  Information based on the FRS shows that in 2008 
the average nominal weekly household rent in London was about £163. This was 
about 57% higher than the average rent in Scotland (£70) in the same year and 
47% higher than the rent in London in 1997 (£86). Housing costs not only vary 
considerably across regions in the UK but also they represent a large share of total 
expenditure; for example in 2008, housing costs made up 34% of total 
expenditures of people living in London and only made up 18% of people living 
in Northern Ireland (FES, 2008). 
 Wages are usually deflated using the national RPI which does not capture 
any regional variation in prices. The measurement of changes in real living 
standard requires nominal wages to be converted into real wages. To investigate 
the role of housing costs on wages of workers located in different parts of Britain, 
                                                 
51 Consistently to the housing components for both the RPI/CBZW and the housing components 
used to derive the weights, gross rent includes council tax and rates, water and other charges, 
repair and maintenance and dwelling insurance.   
52 Because data do not exist before 1997, it has not been possible to extend the analysis to earlier 
time periods.  
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the measure used is the cost of housing, specifically gross rent faced by 
households in region r (r=1…12). In a similar vein to the methodology followed 
by Moretti (2010), the cost of housing used in this paper reflects the increase in 
the cost of housing experienced by individuals working in the same British region. 
Using gross rents has the advantage of being easy to measure and comparable to 
the ones used by the ONS in the construction of the RPI. To derive the regional 
RPI, the national RPI calculated by the ONS is partially updated by the cost-of-
housing represented by gross rents, i.e. rent plus main charges. 
 To account for housing expenditure patterns in the 12 UK regions, the 
national RPI is re-weighted by appropriate regional plutocratic weights53 based on 
the same data (FES) and the same housing expenditure classifications used by the 
ONS to derive weights for the National RPI. Therefore weights are derived as the 
share of the total housing expenditure in total consumption expenditure in region r 
at the household level;  the total housing expenditure  includes rent, rates, water, 
council tax and other regular housing payments such as central heating repairs and 
maintenance; the total consumption expenditure includes the total  housing 
expenditure, fuel, light and power; food expenditure; alcoholic drinks, tobacco; 
clothing and footwear, households goods, services, personal goods and services 
and motoring.  
Deriving regional weights represents an improvement with respect to the 
methodology followed by Moretti (2010) that in fact does not derive local weights 
but uses the same national weights used to derive the CPI. In this paper, weights 
are derived by regions and for renters only; because the housing expenditure 
varies across regions so does the share of total expenditure. As underlined by the 
RPI technical manual (2007), “the RPI uses aggregate average expenditure to 
calculate weights implying that each index household contributes to the weights 
an amount proportional to its expenditure”.  Therefore the weights affect the 
different items in different ways, hence  the distribution of weights will differ. 
 The cost of housing faced by a worker in a region is measured as the 
average of the weekly rent. The rationale for using rental costs is that rental costs 
are a better approximation of the user cost of housing; since houses are an asset, 
their prices reflect both the user cost as well as expectations of future appreciation 
                                                 
53 The alternative approach is the democratic; democratic indices weight sample household equally 
and give straightforward means (arithmetic and geometric).  
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(Moretti, 2010). The use of rents as proxy for housing costs is one of the 
approaches54  to the treatment of durable goods in a consumer price index or an 
RPI (Diewert, 2003) and corresponds to the rental equivalence approach.  This 
approach to the treatment of durables is conceptually simple: it values the services 
yielded by the use of consumer durable goods for a period by the corresponding 
market value for the same durable for the same period of time (Diewert, 2003). 
  In a similar vein to the ONS methodology, the weighted sum of the cost 
of housing is normalised to 100 in 1997 and non-housing consumption normalised 
to 100 in 1997. The final Regional RPI (RRPI) can therefore be written as: 
 
1)      RRPIrt= (NRPI*(1-wrt) ) + (WHrt* rentrt) 
where r corresponds to the 12 regions in the UK; (1-Wrt) captures the 
weight for non-housing consumption expenditure by region (r) and year (t), 
assuming that the cost of non-housing consumption is the same for all individuals 
in all regions. WH is the share of housing cost by region and year, and rent is the 
index used as a proxy for cost of housing.  
Another aspect that differs from the methodology used by Moretti (2010) 
is that while he uses the  price for rent considering the monthly cost of renting a 2 
or 3 bedroom apartment paid on average by graduate or high school graduate 
workers, in this chapter the rent is used irrespective of skill groups55. This is 
motivated by the idea of generating a house index that is more comparable to the 
one provided by the ONS that generates RPI irrespective of level of education or 
composition of the  households. In order to compare consistently the price of rent 
across regions, the derived average weekly rents are based on houses with 2 to 4 
bedrooms. 
Unlike Moretti, information for the price for rent is not based on 
individual data but is derived at household level. This is due to the lack of data at 
individual level; although potentially this could be derived from the 
EFS/FES/LCF that contains information on the level of education of households 
                                                 
54See Diewert (2003) for a survey of alternative approaches.   
55 This means that the measure used by Moretti will possibly add more variation to the final 
estimates. 
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as well as the size of housing, due to the small sample the disaggregation by 
region would lead to imprecise estimates56.  
 
 
How concentration of graduates and prices affect national estimates of wage 
dispersion.  
The following table A provides an illustrative example about  how the notional 
concentration of graduates in one area is likely to affect estimates of wage 
dispersion. The example uses hypothetical weights as a share of graduate and non 
graduate workers as well as  hypothetical nominal weekly wages (in Pounds) and 
Regional RPI. 
Supposing there are two regions, Region 1 and Region 2, characterised by 
workers of only 2 types of education (graduate and high school) unevenly 
distributed between the two regions; let assume that the two regions are  
characterised by different population size specifically in Region 1 is concentrated 
25% of the national labour force and in Region 2 being characterised by a higher 
concentration of the labour force, that is 75% of the national labour force let us 
assume that  Region 1 has a lower concentration of graduates (0.4) and a lower 
concentration of high school graduates (0.1) and is more expensive than Region 2 
with a regional RPI equal to 1.4;  by contrast Region 2 has a higher share of 
graduates (0.6)  but also a relatively higher share of high school graduates (0.9) 
and is relatively less expensive than Region 1 with a regional RPI equal to 0.95. 
Let us also assume that both graduate and high school graduate workers in Region 
1 earn more than their counterparts in Region 2. The calculated weighted average 
graduate–high school wage gap decreases by 14% (0.20) when using the Regional 
RPI with respect to the nominal wage. In example 2, the Regional RPIs used 
(column 6) are the RPIs for London in 1997 as a  proxy for the RPI in Region 1 
and the average RPI in all remaining  UK regions in the same year as a proxy for 
the RPI for Region 2. In this case, the nominal weighted average graduate-high 
school wage gap is only 5% (0.08) higher than the regional one; example  3 keeps 
the hypothetical share of workers by education and the RPI in 1997 but imposes 
the same nominal weekly wages in the 2 regions allowing only to differ by 
                                                 
56 For example, in 2008 observations for graduate workers by regions ranged from 48 to 258. 
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education.  In this case the difference between the graduate-high school wage gap 
using the nominal wage and that one obtained deflating the nominal wage by the 
regional RPI decreases even more, being only 4%  higher.   
This simple example illustrates how the regional deflation on the average 
national wage may differ in magnitude depending on the combination of other 
factors. Specifically, the final estimates of the regional deflation are likely to be 
determined by the combination of at least three elements: the concentration and 
distribution of graduates/non graduates across regions; the difference in prices and 
therefore the difference between the cost-of-living of different regions and the 
regional difference in the wages of graduate/non graduate workers. The less 
difference that exists between those three elements across regions, the smaller will 
be the role of the regional deflation. 
Table A: Illustrative example 
           
  Share Share Wage Wage Region. 
RPI   Graduate High 
school 
Graduate High 
school 
Example 1.       
Region 1 0.4 0.1 200 120 1.4 
Region 2 0.6 0.9 150 100 0.95 
Average  Based on Nominal wage    170 102   
Graduate- High school gap (as ratio)      1.67   
Average  based on regional deflated wage    151.9 103.3   
Graduate- High school gap (as ratio)     1.47   
Change in the National-Regional wage gap 0.2 
 
  
Example 2.      
Region 1 0.4 0.1 200 120 1.13 
Region 2 0.6 0.9 150 100 0.98 
Average  Based on Nominal wage    170 102   
Graduate- High school gap (as ratio)      1.67   
Average  based on regional deflated wage    162.6 102.5   
Graduate- High school gap (as ratio)     1.59   
Change in the National-Regional wage gap 0.08 
 
  
Example 3.     
Region 1 0.4 0.1 150 120 1.13 
Region 2 0.6 0.9 150 120 0.98 
Average  Based on Nominal wage      150 120   
Graduate- High school gap (as ratio)      1.25   
Average  based on regional deflated wage    144.93 120.8   
Graduate- High school gap (as ratio)     1.20   
Change in the National-Regional wage gap 0.05   
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Table B shows how those three elements interact and determine what we 
observe in the UK. The table uses data from LFS for 1997, considering separately 
London, the South East and the remaining British regions as a single region and 
provides an idea about how the regional deflator affects the graduate wage gap for 
the two regions separately and what is its role for the whole of the UK.  The table 
reports the share for each region with respect to the total population (column 1); 
the regional deflator for London, South East and the remaining regions (column 
2), the share of graduates, high school and less than high school workers in each 
region (columns 3, 4 and 5 respectively), their hourly wage  in both real and 
nominal terms (in brackets)  (column 6, 7 and 8) as well as the graduate-high 
school and graduate less than high school gap  reported both as difference 
(column 9 and 10)  and ratio (column 11 and 12). The first difference worth 
noting is that London had a higher Regional RPI  in 1997 equal to 113.55, while 
the RPI for the South East was lower (105.59) but still higher than the average 
Regional RPI of the remaining regions (97.22).  This is shown in column 2. These 
differences are due to the regional variation in the cost of housing.  London and 
the South East also present the higher share of graduates (22% and 16% 
respectively); moreover the share of less than high school graduates in London 
comprises only about 8% of the working population.   
The last column reports the graduate wage gap separately in London, the 
South East and the remaining regions in the UK. The example below shows that 
despite the graduate high school wage gap in London being lower than that in 
both the South East and the rest of the UK, the overall effects of the latter take 
over giving a final average wage gap that is higher than that of London and the 
South East considered separately. As shown in column 9, comparing  wages  
deflated by the Regional RPI to the nominal wage reported  in parenthesis, the 
level of the absolute graduate high school wage gap decreases by about 11%  in 
London and 4.8% in the South East, while it increases  by about 2.4% in the rest 
of the UK. The overall effect at a national level of the Regional RPI will be a 
decrease of about 4.2% of the graduate high school wage gap compared to the 
nominal gap. A similar pattern can be observed when looking at the graduate less 
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than high school wage gap reported in column 9; the use of the regional RPI 
decreases this by 11% in London, and by about 5.6% in the South East, while it 
increases by about 2.4% in the rest of the UK resulting in an average national 
decrease of about 4.2%. Columns  11 and 12 also report respectively the  graduate 
–high school wage gap and graduate-less than high school wage gap; however the 
use of the regional deflator does not make any change to the ratio compared to the 
one derived using the national deflator. 
 The illustrative example together with the table reporting evidence from 
1997 documents that  the observed regional dispersion of graduate and non-
graduate shares, together with the relatively small differences in price levels  
(captured by the Regional RPI) as well as the relative small difference in the 
hourly wage earned by graduates in London  and the in the Rest of the UK while 
make more difference to estimates of real wage levels for subpopulations 
concentrated in certain (more expensive) areas, will result in an  overall national 
effect on wage gaps that is almost zero.   
 
Table B: Illustrative example. 
 
Notes: Based on the LFS  and EFS/FES/LCF   for 1997, nominal wage in brackets.   
           G = graduate; HS= high school graduate: LHS = less than high school graduates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
Pop 
Share
 
(1) 
Reg. 
RPI 
 
(2) 
G 
Share 
 
(3) 
HS 
Share
 
(4) 
LHS
Share
 
(5) 
G 
Hourly
Wage 
(6) 
HS 
Hourly
Wage 
(7) 
LHS 
Hourly
Wage 
(8) 
G-HS 
Wage 
Gap 
(9) 
G-HS 
Wage 
Ratio 
(10) 
G-LHS 
Wage 
Gap 
(11) 
G-LHS
Wage 
Ratio 
(12) 
London  11.7 113.5  22  14.3 7.6 11.22 8.18 6.6 3.04 1.37 4.62 1.7
             (12.69) (9.27) (7.50) (3.42)  (1.37) (5.19)  (1.69)
 
South  14.7 105.5  16  17.2 13.2 12.2 8.46 6.67 3.74 1.44  5.53  1.83
East              (12.83) (8.9) (7.00) (3.93)  (1.44)  (5.83)  (1.83)
 
Rest  
of the UK 
73.6 97.2  62  68.5 79.2 11.43 7.64 6.37 3.78 1.5  5.06  1.79
            (11.16) (7.47) (6.22) (3.69)  (1.49)  (4.94)  (1.79)
 
National              11.55 7.87 6.43 3.64 1.47  5.12  1.8
              (11.76) (7.97) (6.42) (3.9)  (1.48)  (5.34)  (1.83)
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4.3. Identification and estimation 
Because the aim of this chapter is to investigate if and how much regional 
variations in the cost-of-living can account for changes in both the graduate high 
school wage gap and the 90-10 wage gap between 1997 and 2008, the 
econometric methodology estimates both the conditional nominal and real wage 
difference between workers with  a graduate and high school degree as well as the 
difference between workers with a college or more degree and  a less than a high 
school degree. The baseline estimates are based on a regression of the log hourly 
wage, nominal and real separately, on a dummy variable  indicator for graduates 
interacted with a dummy for each year.  
Controls include race, gender, year dummies, and a cubic for potential 
experience. Other regressions are run adding regional fixed effects. 
As explained by Wooldridge (2006), when wages appear in logarithmic 
form and dummy variables are used for all time periods, the use of aggregate price 
deflators will only affect the intercepts but will make no difference for the slope 
estimates. In fact when the log wage is used as a dependent variable, provided that 
a year dummy is included in the regression, using real or nominal wages will only 
affect the coefficient of the year dummy57 . 
As pointed out by Manacorda et al. (2007) in analysis of UK data it is 
standard practice to define education by the highest level of qualifications 
obtained. This criterion is particularly appropriate in a cross-country comparison 
due to the difference in the schooling systems, and in fact the highest level of 
education has been the criteria adopted in chapter 2 and chapter 3.   
Because this chapter only focuses on the UK and extends the analysis to 
migrants, using the highest level of education is not longer appropriate since  the 
LFS does not always record the education of immigrants accurately.  In fact a 
large proportion of migrants in the LFS reports holding “other qualification” 
suggesting that the foreign qualifications are classified in this category; on the 
other hand for the UK born workers the response of “other” category is likely to 
refer to a very low level of education. Therefore to overcome these limitations  
                                                 
57 Following Wooldridge ( 2006) suppose to deflate wages of 2008 at 1997 denoting the deflator 
factor for 2008 wages P2008  (1.31 using RPI =100 in 1997) then the log of real wage for each 
individual in the 2008 sample can be written as:  log (wagei/P2008) =log(wagei)- log(P2008). 
Because wages differ across people but P2008 does not, the log(2008) will be absorbed into the 
intercept of 1985. However this conclusion will change if the RPI differs for people living in 
different parts of the country. 
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this chapter I classify education by using  the variable “age left full time 
education”. Following Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2007), the main 
estimates are based on three education groups defining anyone who left full time 
education at the age of  16 or less as “less than high school”; anyone who left full 
time education between the ages of 17 and 20 as “high school graduate”; and 
anyone who left education at the age of 21 or later as “college graduate” therefore 
all universities graduates will be included in the latter category even if they have 
15 years of schooling. In order to keep the analysis as consistent as possible with 
Moretti (2010), the sample for the baseline estimates includes all UK born 
workers, aged 25-60 working both full time and part time. However, additional 
specifications extend the analysis to all of the working age population. 
The baseline regression specification can be written as follows: 
 
2) Log wiT=  δ0+  XiT + C*Yt + Yt + εrT 
 
Where wiT is the nominal hourly wage for individuals i in year T; XiT 
includes a set of controls such as cubic in potential experience, gender, race; C is 
an indicator for college interacted with each year; Yt is a year dummies and ε is an 
error term. 
The baseline specification for the real wage changes in the dependent 
variable that now can be written as the nominal wage divided by the RPIr where r 
= 1,…..12, therefore the specification to estimate the conditional real wage 
difference between graduate workers and high school (less than high school) can 
be written as: 
 
3)  Log (wiT/RPIrT) =  δ0+  Xi + C*Yt + Yt + εr 
 
Additional specifications also add region fixed effects to the baseline 
regressions58. 
 
                                                 
58 The same net  effect (on the graduate coefficient) to the regional deflation could be obtained by 
adding region-year dummy interaction terms (since deflating is common to one region in any one 
year), however the approach adopted in this work makes clear the effect on levels. 
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4.4. Data 
The empirical analyses are based on the combination of three datasets: The 
Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS), (renamed Living Costs and Food Survey 
(LCF) in 2008 and formerly the Family Expenditure Survey (FES)) provide the 
information used to construct regional housing weights. The Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) is the primary source for individual earnings and education data and the 
Family Resources Survey (FRS) from 1997 to 2008 provides the information on 
housing price rents across regions. The lack of information for rental prices for all 
regions before 1997 does not allow the analysis to be extended to an earlier time 
period.59  
The EFS/FES/LCF is used to derive weights and is the same data source that the 
ONS uses to derive the RPI. The EFS/FES/LCF is a continuous cross-sectional  
survey that has been carried out by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) since 
1957 which monitors the spending patterns of around 6,000 to 6,500 household 
across the country each year.   
The FES ran from 1957 to March 2001. From April 2001 onwards, the 
data continues to be collected in the EFS, formed by combining the FES with the 
National Food Survey (NFS). The LCF is a continuous survey conducted by the 
ONS, which moved from a financial year to a calendar year basis from 2008. In 
the EFS/FES/LCF, households are sampled from randomly selected postcode 
sectors stratified according to region across the UK, car ownership and socio-
economic status. 
There are two major components to the survey. A two-week paper-based 
diary that records all expenditures and an interview that collects information on 
household demographics, income and some retrospective information on regular 
purchases (such as rent, mortgage payments and utility bills) and irregular, 
expensive purchases (such as durables and holidays). Expenditures are calculated 
and recorded as household-level weekly averages in a number of relatively 
disaggregate categories- for food there are around 100 such categories. Data is 
collected throughout the year to cover seasonal variations in expenditures.  In 
addition to expenditure and income data, the EFS/FES/LCF collects information 
                                                 
59 Similarly when this paper has been started data to derive weights  (LCF) for 2009 were not 
released yet. 
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on socio-economic characteristics of the households, e.g. composition, size, social 
class, occupation and age of the head of household.  
However the EFS/FES/LCF has a number of drawbacks. One is that it 
does not cover all households such as people living in retirement homes, military 
barracks or student halls of residence or residents in temporary homes. Another 
problem is mainly due to the response rate. Around one-third of those initially 
approached do not respond to the survey.  
 Established in 1973, the LFS is the largest survey of households living at 
private addresses and in NHS accommodation in the UK, conducted by the Office 
for National Statistics (ONS). Since 1992, the LFS has been a rotating quarterly 
panel. Information is recorded in four quarters; each quarter’s LFS sample of 
53,000 UK households is made of five “waves” each of approximately 11,000 
private households. Each wave is interviewed in five successive quarters, earnings 
information is only recorded in waves 1 and 5.  A single stage sample of addresses 
with a random start and constant interval is drawn from the Postcode Address File 
(PAF) sorted by postcode.  The LFS also contains information at regional level, 
where region is determined according to usual residence. The LFS identifies 20 
regions60. These 20 regions are unified to be consistent with the 12 more limited 
regions identified in the EFS/FES/LCF. These comprise the North East, North 
West, Yorkshire, East Midlands, West Midlands, East, South East,   South West, 
London, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland. The LFS contains detailed 
information on individual characteristics, age, marital status, migration status, job 
characteristics, wages and hours worked. It also contains information on the 
housing tenure of the individuals; giving on average 11000 observations of 
graduates reporting a non zero wage in each year and between 38000 and 58000  
non-graduate workers with a positive wage.  
The data used for the price of rents are based on the FRS from 1997 to 
2008; the FRS is a continuous survey with an annual target sample size of 24,000 
private households. Fieldwork is carried out jointly by the Office for National 
Statistics and the National Centre for Social Research. The survey was launched 
                                                 
60 The 20 regions indicated in the LFS are the following: Tyne and Wear; Rest of North East; 
Greater Manchester; Merseyside; Rest of North West; South Yorkshire; West Yorkshire; Rest of 
Yorkshire & Humberside; East Midlands; West Midlands Metropolitan County ; Rest of West 
Midlands; East of England; Inner London; Outer London; South East; South West; Wales 
Strathclyde; Rest of Scotland, Northern Ireland. 
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in October 1992 to meet the information requirements of the Department for 
Work and Pensions (DWP) analysts. Households interviewed in the survey are 
asked a wide range of questions about their circumstances, including receipt of 
Social Security benefits, housing costs, assets and savings. Before 2002 the survey 
for Northern Ireland was carried out for the Department for Social Development 
(DSD) by the central survey unit of the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research 
Agency (NISRA) of the department of finance and personnel.  
The price for rent used to construct the regional RPI is the total amount of 
rent eligible for Housing Benefit paid by a household before the deduction of any 
housing benefits. In particular, the tenants used to derive information are only 
those renting privately, therefore tenants who are in rent free accommodation are 
excluded from the sample. Although these are rents for low income households 
and may possibly under-estimate the costs for graduates, they are very similar to 
the rents used by the ONS in the construction of the RPI (CBZW). 
There are at least three other potential data sources that could be used as 
proxy for housing costs to construct a Regional RPI. The first one is the private 
rent available from the Department for Communities and Local Government 
based on the Survey of English Housing (SEH). The SEH presents a few 
limitations: first of all figures available are mean rents over two financial years, 
for example 1997 figures are a mean of the 1996-1997 and the 1997-1998 rents.  
Secondly, from 2008, information at regional level is no longer available; finally 
the SEH only covers English regions, therefore excluding Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland for which there is no other  comparable information on private 
rents.  
The second possible data source is represented by the regional housing 
price available from the Nationwide Building Society that covers quarterly house 
price changes from 1973 to 2008. The construction of a regional RPI requires data 
to be comparable with housing costs used by the ONS, however the housing 
prices available from the Nationwide are neither fully comparable to the RPI 
using mortgage interest or the RPI using rents. Moreover, the Nationwide 
definition of regions differs in significant ways from the ONS definition.61 
The third possible data source available for the UK is based on the 
Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) and is equivalent to the local authority rents 
                                                 
61 See Holly, Pesaran and Yamagata (2010) for details on difference in regional definitions. 
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data. RSL rents are derived from the Regulatory and Statistical Return that the 
Tenant Services Authority (TSA) sends out once a year to all RSLs. One concern 
related to the use of the RSL rents is that they tend to be for low income 
households and are therefore likely to under-estimate housing costs, particularly 
in London. 
Rents from the FRS are available for all 12 regions and they reflect the 
differences across UK regions and the increase over time; the FRS remains the 
more comparable housing cost with those used by the ONS for the construction of 
the national RPI. 
The full samples used for the empirical analysis are men and women aged 
respectively 16-64 and 16-59, though the baseline estimations replicating 
Moretti’s focus on individuals between 25 and 60, so the analysis is limited to 
workers who are employees, both full time and part time; considering only their 
main job, and who report a positive wage. To limit the effect of outliers, following 
the existing literature in the UK (Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth 2007) only 
observations with an hourly wage between one and a hundred pounds at 1997 
levels are used.   
 
4.5. Results 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
This section begins with some descriptive evidence on the distribution of workers 
by level of education (graduate, high school and less than high school) across UK 
regions and over time followed by a discussion on the differences in levels and 
measures of dispersion of hourly and log wage. The sample is based on the 
working age population (16-59 for women and 16-64 for men) working both full-
time and part-time, employees and considering the main job only.  
Figure 4.1 together with Table 4.1 describe the distribution across UK 
regions of workers by level of education in 2008.  Graduate workers are not 
evenly distributed across the British regions and are overrepresented in the South-
East and in particular in London. This is shown by figure 4.1. In 2008 about 38% 
of the National graduate work force was concentrated in two regions: London 
(21.1%) and the South East (16.2%). These two regions also experience the higher 
concentration of the total working age population, respectively 11.5% and 15.0%.  
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As documented in Table 1, Northern Ireland and the North East hosted the lowest 
shares of graduate workers, 1.8% and 3.0% respectively, while 1.7% and 4.4% of 
the total working age population were concentrated in the two regions 
respectively. The  high school graduates distribution in London and the South 
East is in proportion with its population share, with the highest percentage of high 
school workers being concentrated in the South East (16.5%) and London 
(11.4%). Only 6.2% of the “less than high school” workers are concentrated in 
London. 
Over the sample period the share of graduates in the UK population rose 
from 15% in 1997 to 23% in 2008, with an average increase over time of 56%. 
Figure 4.2 looks at the changing regional concentration of graduates over the 
sample period, giving the graduate share in each region for 1997 and 2008. It 
shows that the share of graduate workers has been increasing over time in all 12 
regions, particularly in London where the share of graduates increased by about 
53% between 1997 and 2008. This, coupled with the fact that, as documented in 
Table 4.3a, in the same time period the average cost of housing in the UK has 
been increasing by 79% with the increase being higher in London (89%) implies 
that graduate workers are more likely to face a higher cost-of-living than in 1997 
and to experience relatively greater rises in housing related costs than other 
education groups. 
Table 4.2 reports the percentage distribution of workers  by level of 
education in the 12 UK regions in 1997 and 2008. In 2008 nearly 43% of the 
London work force had a graduate level of education compared to 29% in 1997; 
the South East is the second region with the larger percentage of graduates 
specifically 17% in 1997 and about 27% in 2008. On the other hand the North 
East reports the lowest share of graduates both in 1997 (10% ) and 2008 (17%), 
while  in 1997 about 71% of the North East working population had a less than 
high school level of education; almost double the share in London in 1997 (37%). 
Between 1997 and 2008 there has been a relative convergence in the level of 
graduate workers across the UK regions with the higher percentage increase 
experienced by Wales (76%), Yorkshire (64%)  and North East (61%) and the 
lowest (39%) by the  East Midlands. Despite the change in this relative 
concentration of graduate workers, the absolute concentration of them in specific 
regions (London and the South East) remains the major focus of this study 
because the absolute shares matter for housing calculation.  
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The picture painted about the distribution of workers by education across 
the UK regions implies that the greater part of graduate workers is concentrated in 
the more expensive regions: London and the South East.  
Based on the FRS, Table 4.3a reports weekly nominal rental prices across 
British regions in 1997 and 2008, the increase from 1997 to 2008 (column 3) and 
the percentage increase relative to the national mean (column 4). The table 
documents that the populations of London and the South East experience higher 
rents compared to both the UK average and the remaining regions and this is 
persistent over time. In 2008 the average weekly rent was about £163 in London  
and £123  in the South East while the UK average rent equalled £92. Northern 
Ireland and Scotland remain the “cheapest” regions in terms of housing costs. 
Looking at the UK as a whole between 1997 and 2008,  the nominal price for rent 
increased  by about £41 with an average change of 79%; the increase in price for 
rents  in London was 89% (£77) higher than the national one while in the North 
East  the increase was about 28%, lower than that of the UK. These statistics 
coupled with those reported by Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1 suggest that graduate 
workers in London and the South East are more likely to have experienced both a 
higher cost-of-living and a more rapid increase in costs due to their higher 
housing expenditure over the sample period implying that the relative increase in 
their real wages might be smaller than those of counterparts living in less 
expensive regions.   
The differences in the cost of housing faced by workers of different levels 
of education could also reflect differential changes in quality of housing (Moretti, 
2010). 
However as explained later on in this chapter (page 166 and page 167) a 
very well know bias in the construction of any cost-of-living index  is that the 
“constant basket” approach ignores the quality in existing goods and services and 
this is mainly due to the fact that quantity data are usually unavailable to the 
researcher.  
To show that not all variation in house prices across regions can be 
explained by differences in quality, table 4.3b based on the Survey of English 
Housing for the year 2005,  use as  proxies for quality of housing across the UK 
regions the availability of a spare room, the kitchen wide over 6.5ft and the 
availability of a garden. The SEH does not contain any information on Scotland, 
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Wales, and Northern Ireland therefore Table 4.3b only refers to the 9 English 
regions.  
Considering the availability of a spare room reported in percentage in 
column 1, houses in London displays the lowest percentage (39%)  while almost 
63% of the houses in the North East have a spare room; similarly when looking at 
the measures of kitchen, column 2 reports the percentage of housing having a 
kitchen wide more than  6.5ft; again houses in London, though being more 
expensive, have a lower percentage of kitchen wider than 6.5 ft. Considering the 
percentage of houses having a garden, 82% of the houses in London have one 
while expect the Yorkshire and the Humber, in the remaining regions more than 
90% of the houses have a  garden. The statistics reported in columns 1-3 
demonstrate that even though the cost of housing are higher in London, they do 
not necessarily reflect a higher quality of housing.  
 
 To better understand if and by how much the national and regional RPI 
diverge, Figure 4.3 plots the trends of the two series (National RPI and Regional 
RPI) by region in the UK from 1997 to 2008. The figure clearly shows the 
remarkable differences between the two RPIs for London; the higher level of the 
regional RPI in London clearly illustrates that the actual cost-of-living in London 
is higher than what the national RPI demonstrates, other things equal (i.e. 
accounting for housing – but not other costs which may be higher (or lower) in 
London. These results are consistent with Borroah et al. (1996) who demonstrate 
that the relative expensiveness of London and the South East, over 1979-90, 
increased when housing cost was included.  The Regional RPI in London is not 
only higher than the national one but is also the highest across the regions. The 
difference between the two trends can be interpreted as due to the (higher) cost of 
housing in London coupled with the higher share of housing expenditure over the 
total expenditure. The second region for which the regional RPI highly diverges 
from the national one is the South East; this is not surprising given that this is one 
of the regions with the highest price for housing. 
The opposite is true for the remaining regions, particularly for Scotland  
and the North East that appear to face a lower cost-of-living than the one 
represented by the national RPI. Less difference between the two RPIs  is found in 
the East and South East, where the gap is less evident.  
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Table 4.4 reports real hourly wages for all workers, as well as men and 
women separately, in 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2008 when using different 
measures of inflation for the nominal wage deflator. Column one reports the 
nominal hourly wage; column two reports the hourly wage deflated by the 
National RPI provided by the ONS; column three reports the hourly wage deflated 
by the Regional RPI. The table documents that the real hourly wage deflated by 
the Regional RPI is lower than that deflated by the national one until 2000 but 
higher after 2000. As explained later this effect is likely to be due to the fact that 
until 2000 deflating wage by the Regional RPI generates average lower wage in 
all regions, however after 2000 this is only true for London and the South East 
with the remaining regions experiencing higher Real (Regional) wage that 
overcome the lower wage in London and the South East. In fact from 1997 to 
2000 deflating hourly wages by the Regional RPI the real hourly wage for all 
workers decreases from 6  (8%) to 12  (13%) pence an hour with respect to the 
hourly wage deflated by the National RPI while after 2000 it increases from 10 
(11%) to 27 (30%) pence an hour with respect  to the hourly wage deflated by the 
National RPI. However, it is important to stress that the differences in the hourly 
wage deflated using the National RPI and the one deflated using the Regional one 
are not that great.  On average men experience a higher loss in wages due to the 
regional cost of housing though the difference is negligible.  
Because London and the South East are the most expensive British 
regions, it is reasonable to consider these regions separately in contrast to the 
other UK regions. Table 4.5 reports the hourly wage deflated by using the 
National RPI and the Regional RPI from 1997 to 2008 for the whole of the UK, 
London, the South East and all the other remaining regions together.  There is 
now a clear trend that better explains the decrease of regional wage up to 2000 
and the decrease afterwards; in fact from 1997 to 2008  in London and South East 
the hourly wage deflated by the Regional RPI is always lower than that deflated 
by the National RPI but it is  always higher in the remaining regions. The hourly 
wages deflated by the Regional RPI are particularly lower in London;  on average 
the decrease in real hourly wage due to the cost of housing  ranges between 1.10 
(11%) to 2.18 (18%) pence in London and 0.22  (2%) to 0.57  (6%) pence in the 
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South East62; by contrast in the remaining regions the hourly wage deflated by the 
Regional RPI is on average higher 15 (2.2%)  to 81 (9.4%)  pence. These figures 
imply that the National RPI is likely to underestimate the cost-of-living in London 
and the South East while overestimating it in the remaining regions.  
          To consider how different measures of inflation can also affect the measure 
of wage dispersion, Table 4.6 reports some common measures of wage inequality 
based on the log hourly wage for all workers for the years 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006 
and 2008. Column 1 reports wage dispersion for wages deflated by the National 
RPI; column 2 reports similar measures for wages deflated by the Regional RPI, 
column 3 reports the difference between column 2 and column 1.  The measures 
used are standard deviation, variance, the 90-50 gap, 90-10 gap and 50-10 gap.  
There are a few aspects that are worth noting. When using a regional 
deflator, there are hardly any changes with respect to  the national one; in fact 
using the Regional RPI the  average changes  in wage inequality from 1997 to 
2008 decreased from 0.006 to 0.016 log points with respect to the national 
deflator,  using as a measure of dispersion either the standard deviation or the 
variance.  The differences are slightly more notable when looking at the 90-50, 
90-10 and 50-10 wage gap, though still not striking. Using the difference between 
the 90th and 50th percentile as a measure of dispersion, when deflating wages by 
the regional RPI, the difference decreases from 0.011 to 0.019 log points with 
respect to the national deflator; the difference for the 50-10 gap ranges between 
0.005 and 0.021 log points and while this is notable, slightly more difference can 
be seen in the 90-10 gap. Using the regional RPI to deflate wages, the 90-10 wage 
gap decreases from 0.019 to 0.033 log points with respect to the national deflator. 
However the differences are not substantial.  For example, in 2006 the 90-10 
wage gap for all workers was equal to 1.349 when using the national deflator and 
decreases to 1.316 when using the regional one. Panel B of table 4.6 also reports 
the changes in wage inequality from 1997 to 2008; the panel documents that from 
1997 to 2008  LFS estimates of wage inequality in the UK decreased. This is true 
for all measures used except for the 90-50 for which there has been almost no 
change. For example, over the time  period analysed, the standard deviation 
                                                 
62 Leunig and Overman (2008)  provide the theoretical justification to this explaining that in terms 
of living standards there exists an optimal  city size: in practice if cities are larger or smaller than 
the optimum then  productivity, wages and employment will be lower than they could be.  
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decreases by 0.021 log points, while the highest decrease can be observed for the 
50-10 wage gap (-0.051). Using the regional deflator does not make much 
difference to those measures both in terms of sign and in terms of magnitude.  
Because the 90-10 gap can be used as a proxy for the graduates-less than 
high school gap, given that the number of graduates is concentrated in areas 
(London and the South East) that are more expensive and therefore  as shown in 
Table 4.5, those are the areas whose costs are  likely to be underestimated by the 
current RPI provided by the ONS. This raises the question on whether  the 
construction and therefore the use of a regional RPI would be more appropriate 
and representative of the real cost-of-living.  Table 4.7 presents similar measures 
of dispersion for the 12 regions in the UK in 2008. While, by construction, these 
within-region measures reported are the same when using any measure of 
inflation (National RPI or Regional RPI), it documents the variation of wage 
inequality across the UK regions. The first relevant aspect is that the more 
expensive regions (London and the South East) are also the regions where wage 
inequality is higher than the national average. For example in 2008, considering 
the standard deviation as a measure of wage dispersion, London experienced 
approximately an 8% higher wage dispersion (based on the standard deviation) 
than the national average; the dispersion increases (14%)  when looking at the 90-
10 gap in London compared to the UK average suggesting also that graduate 
workers in the London area experience higher wage dispersion than their 
counterparts in the rest of the UK, higher for example than the North East  and 
Northern Ireland. This highlights the importance of regional specific studies on 
wage inequalities.  
Table 4.8 compares regional changes in the level of the real hourly wage 
from 1997 to 2008 for all workers, when deflating wages by respectively the 
National RPI and the Regional RPI. The table demonstrates two main facts: the 
first is the variation in changes in real hourly wages within UK regions. Based on 
the national RPI, column 1 documents that when deflating the real hourly wage by 
the national RPI London experienced the highest increase  (£2.43) corresponding 
to 53% higher than the national one (£1.59) while the East Midlands experienced 
the least growth (£1.15) in real hourly wages corresponding to  28% less than the 
average increase in real hourly wages. Column 2 shows how those changes vary 
when deflating the real hourly wage by the appropriate Regional RPI that 
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accounts for different levels of rent. Although the within variation by region in 
changes remains, there are two main new trends: in regions where the cost of 
housing is typically higher (i.e. London and the South East) the estimated changes 
in regional real hourly wages over time become smaller. In London the real hourly 
wage increase is £1.37 compared to £2.43 based on the National RPI and is now 
29% lower than the average UK increase (£1.93); similarly in the South East the 
real hourly wage change (£1.61) is now 17% lower than the UK average. This 
implies that because graduates are more concentrated in those two regions, and 
due to the higher rises in living expenses, their real hourly wages have been 
increasing by less than the UK national average rate. 
The opposite occurs for the rest of the regions. When accounting for 
regional specific rents the change in real hourly wages between 1997 and 2008 is 
higher. Scotland  is now facing the highest gain (61 pence) with respect to the UK 
average, corresponding to a real hourly change between 1997 and 2008  32% 
higher than the UK. 
These findings confirm that the national measure of inflation that does not 
account for regional variations in the cost-of-living can affect estimates of real 
wage growth in local areas. The previous description about how level of wage 
changes depending on the measure of inflation used (i.e. regional or national ) 
suggests that the actual National RPI provided by the ONS may not reflect the 
actual level of prices and therefore the actual cost-of-living faced by differently 
skilled  workers of different British regions.  
To document this, Table 4.9 shows the average weekly rent for 1997 and 
2008 by level of education for the UK, London and the South East.  In both years 
considered, graduate workers paid a higher weekly rent than the high school 
graduate and less than high school graduates. For example, in 1997, graduates’ 
weekly rent equalled £98.31, while high school and less than high school workers 
were paying respectively £65.77 and £46.30, when looking at graduates in 
London the rent rises to £112.40. Similarly in 2008, graduates in the UK were 
paying an average weekly rent of £164.39, higher   than both the high school 
(£105.72) and less than high school (£84.58). When focusing the analysis on 
graduates located in London, these differences are amplified with graduate weekly 
rent now being around £244.2 almost double that of the less than high school 
graduates in the same area. As explained in the data section, those rents are the 
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total amount of rent eligible for Housing Benefit paid by a household before the 
deduction of any housing benefits. The tenants used to derive information from 
are only those renting privately, those renting from Landlord Associations and 
from Councils, however  tenants who are in rent free accommodation are excluded 
from the sample. The last three rows of table 4.9 report the percentage increase for 
graduate, high school and less than high school respectively in the UK, London 
and the South East. The table documents that graduate workers in London 
experienced the highest increase in weekly rent (117%) from 1997 to 2008, 
compared to the average percentage increase for all graduates in the UK (67%). 
The relationship between increasing share of graduates and increasing 
price for rent is shown in figure 4.4 reporting the average rent by region and year 
from 1997 to 2008 in the horizontal axis and the share of graduates per region and 
year from 1997 to 2008 on the vertical one. The positive relationship indicates 
that regions that have experienced the largest increase in the share of graduates are 
the regions where the average cost of housing is higher and increased the most.  
To observe how graduate workers are more likely to face a higher and 
rising cost-of-living affecting the real wage, Table 4.10 gives the absolute real 
hourly wage differences  for college and high school graduate workers, for male 
and female when deflating the hourly wage by the National or the Regional RPI. 
The table shows that the observed differences are very small and not significantly 
different. Panel A reports changes for graduate men and women; on average 
despite the persistent gender gap, graduate men and women  face a lower hourly 
wage when accounting for regional cost of housing; this is true except that women 
in 2008  gain 7 pence when deflating wages by the Regional deflator Panel B 
reports similar results for high school graduates; in this case  the difference 
between hourly wage deflated by national RPI and regional RPI is positive  in 
relative terms only in 1997 but there is a gain when using the regional RPI.  Table 
4.11 gives more details of the real hourly wage for all workers by 12 UK regions 
in 2008 using the National and Regional RPI documenting that when looking 
separately at regions the hourly wage for graduate workers  in London and the 
South East decreases when deflating wages by the Regional RPI while it increases 
in the remaining regions.   
The trends  and levels of the hourly wage for graduates and high school  
when using the National or Regional RPI are better understood  from figures 4.5a 
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and 4.5b that display the time series of the real hourly wage respectively for 
graduate and high school for all workers by regions from 1997 to 2008.  For each 
region, the real hourly wage deflated by the national RPI is graphed alongside the 
real hourly wage deflated by the Regional RPI. Although graduate workers in 
London earn on average more than other graduates in the rest of the UK they also 
clearly face a higher cost-of-living than the one reported by the National RPI 
earnings, therefore a lower wage in real terms. This difference is persistent and 
increasing over time due to the increasing cost of housing affecting real wages in 
London more than it does in other regions. Similarly, for workers in the South 
East, the real wage is lower than the national real wage. Graduate workers in 
Scotland have the advantage of a lower cost of housing and so experience a higher 
real wage than the one actually determined by the ONS. While there is not much 
difference for the East Midlands, West Midlands and South West, in the 
remaining regions graduate workers earn more. The difference between real 
wages deflated by the National and Regional RPI is qualitatively similar when 
looking at the high school workers (figure 4.5b), though the gap is lower.  
Figures 4.6a and 4.6b compare the trends in real hourly wages deflated by 
National and Regional RPI for male and female graduates and high school 
graduate workers in London and in the UK as a whole. Figure 4.6a plots the trend 
for real hourly wages for male graduates and high school working in London and 
in the UK as a whole; while there is not much difference when looking at the 
average real hourly wage for the UK the gap persists within and versus London. 
This is more remarkable for graduates; in fact the figures show that graduate 
workers “lose” more in absolute terms compared to high school due to the 
housing costs in London though the main trend remains. Figure 4.6b reports 
similar results for females. The figures highlight the persistent gender wage gap 
within both graduate and high school workers, but also show that the hourly wage 
has been increasing for graduates more than for high school graduates.  
Figure 4.7 plots the wage difference between graduates and high school 
and graduates and less than high school for all workers in the UK using  the 
National RPI and the Regional RPI. The dashed navy line plots the wage gap 
when using the regional RPI; the figures show that both graduate-high school and 
graduate-less than high school  wage gaps decrease  over time  and are lower  
when using the regional RPI that accounts for the housing-cost-of-living 
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compared to the  gap based on the National RPI. Table 4.12 reports the difference 
between the wage gap based on the National RPI and the one based on the 
regional one  for graduate-high school and graduate-less than high school 
workers. On average, the difference is higher for the graduate-high school 
(column 6).  
 
 
4.5.2 Estimation results 
This section presents the estimates of to what extent accounting for these spatial 
issues affects estimates of the changing returns to education, beginning with an 
exploration of how much of the changes in nominal wage differences between 
graduates and high school  observed in table 4.11 are due to regional differences 
in the cost of housing in the UK. Table 4.13 replicates table 4 of Moretti (2010). 
Model 1 estimates the conditional nominal wage difference between college 
graduate workers and high school. All estimates are from a pooled sample 
containing observations from 1997 to 2008 based on a regression of the log 
nominal hourly wage on an indicator  for college interacted with an indicator for 
each year, year dummies, a cubic in potential experience, and dummies for gender 
and race. In order to compare the estimates with those of Moretti, the sample 
includes workers aged 25-60, who are UK natives working both part time and full 
time.  The coefficients given in the table are the college-year dummy interaction 
terms from 1997 and 2008 and represent the conditional wage difference for a 
given year.  
In 1997, the nominal gap is 1.4 % higher than the real gap and 1.8%  
higher   in 2008. Column 3 reports the difference in the estimates between 1997 
and 2008, and indicates that the conditional nominal wage difference between 
workers with a high school degree and workers with college or more has 
decreased by 0.017 log points over the period. The conditional difference between 
the wage of graduates and high school graduates decreases by only an additional 
0.05% (from 0.017 to 0.018) when using the regional deflator63. However this fall 
                                                 
63 Because the within-group variance explains the most part of the increase in wage inequality (see 
Rienzo 2010 for an extensive review) it is also relevant to analyse the inequality in the within-
group. Estimates from model 2 based on the Nominal wage  show  that the within-group variance 
increased from 0.234 in 1997 to 0.249 in 2008 with a difference of  0.015; when looking at the 
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is not statistically significant. This stands in contrast with the main estimates of  
Moretti (table 4, 2010) who reports that in the US between 1980 and 2000 the 
conditional nominal wage difference between workers with a college degree and a 
high school degree increased significantly. Moretti demonstrates that the 
conditional difference between the wage of college graduates and high school 
graduates is .60 in nominal terms and only .53 in real terms when the Local CPI is 
used as a deflator.   
The difference between the estimates for the UK and those reported by 
Moretti for the US can be explained by any differential regional changes that 
jointly affect the final national estimates.  
 The reasons can be related to the combination of three elements, as 
explained earlier in the illustrative example A: the different concentration of 
graduate/non graduate workers across less and more expensive regions; the 
difference in the regional RPI; the difference in the hourly wage of workers in 
more expensive regions with respect to less expensive regions. 
While Moretti (2010) reports that in 2000 in some of the US metropolitan 
areas  the largest share of workers with a graduate degree among their residents 
was  58%, this was about 5 times the fraction of the college graduates in cities 
with the lowest share. Based on the LFS in the same year, 2000, London is the 
only area with the highest share of graduate workers (about 32% ) which is on 
average only twice the share of graduates in any other region. The share of 
graduates in London has increased over time (reaching 43% in 2008) but so did 
the share of graduates in all regions.  Similarly, the relative shares of UK 
graduates concentrated in London remained relatively constant over the sample 
period, at around 20%.  
Another aspect that could help to explain the difference between the UK 
and US estimates can be related to the cost-of-living. Moretti documents that  
between 1980 and 2000  the housing costs, measured by the monthly rent, for 
graduate and high school workers increased by 147% and 127% respectively. 
Data based on the  FRS shows that  between 1997 and 2008 in the UK the housing 
costs, measured by weekly rent, for graduates and high school graduates increased 
                                                                                                                                     
within-group derived by the model 2 that accounts for the Regional cost-of-living the level of the 
within-group variance  increased from 0.228 in 1997 to  0.244 in 2008 ; though the level is slightly 
lower there is not much difference in the increase, and unlike the other measures of inequality 
presented earlier and in the estimates, the within-group variance has been increasing over time.  
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on average  respectively by 67% and 61% for the whole UK and by 117%  and 
87%  for London, while it increased more (83%) for less than high school workers 
in the UK and 84% for those in London.  This will result in a smaller difference 
between the National and the Regional RPI and therefore will reflect in a smaller 
effects of the regional deflation. 
Additionally, data for the price of housing based on Nationwide shows that 
the increase in price of housing between 1980 and 2000 has been higher (245%) 
than the similar increase between 1997 and 2008 (185%), implying that the time 
period analysed by Moretti because characterised by a higher increase in price of 
housing, will also reflect in a bigger difference between the national and the 
regional measures of inflation. Another element that may have a role for the 
estimates can be related to the relatively small difference between the real hourly 
wage of workers, particularly graduates, in London  and the rest of the country. 
As documented by Table 4.12, based on the National RPI between 1997 and 2008, 
the wage gap of graduates to high school workers decreased by 0.21 pence an 
hour (5%); this contrasts with  the pattern depicted for the US between 1980 and 
2000 by Moretti (2010). Moreover, using the regional deflator in 2008 the wage 
gap is only 9 pence (2.4%) higher than the 1997 one. Despite the fact that the 
regional RPI deflator decreases (London and the South East)  or increases (rest of 
the UK) the real wage level in 12 years (1997 -2008)  there is very little difference 
between the two sets of estimates of the change in wage inequality (based on 
nominal and regional deflator). 
 It is likely that the picture for the US as painted by Moretti may rely on 
the existence of more variation for the rental prices and a higher proportion of 
graduates in more expensive areas that will affect the final estimates. The crucial 
condition that allows us to estimate a real hourly wage model like model 2 is that 
the price deflator varies each year.   
For the UK, the more expensive areas made up only the 25% of  the 
sample used, while for the remaining 75% the use of the Regional RPI translates 
into an increase rather than a decrease in real wage. This might possibly explain 
the fact that deflating wage by regional RPI makes little difference to the 
estimates of the relative wage gaps of graduates versus high school workers. 
Another reason may be related to the fact that the cost of housing used in 
the construction of the index here may not fully capture differences in regional 
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prices in the UK. London, together with the South East, is the region experiencing 
the higher share of weekly expenditure and higher costs not only for housing but 
also for transport and recreation (Family Spending 2009, ONS). Baran and 
O’Donoghue (2002) report that in 2000, London prices were, on average, 6.8 % 
more expensive; goods in London were on average 2.6% more expensive and 
services were 13.0 % more expensive. Due to data limitation, the disaggregation 
of rents by education has not been feasible, however this could have helped more 
in explaining the different cost-of-living faced by  workers with different levels of 
education, located in different British regions.  
This confirms that a more appropriate RPI should be constructed based on 
the regional figures rather than the national one.  
The estimates reported in columns 4 and 5 include region fixed effects to 
control for unobserved regional heterogeneity. The estimates on the college-year 
interaction terms are not statistically different from the specifications that exclude 
regional fixed effects. The table shows that when using the regional real wage as 
the dependent variable, the conditional real wage difference between graduate and 
high school is smaller in real terms than in nominal; however this difference is not 
significantly different from zero. 
As discussed by Moretti (2010), there are at least two aspects that might 
bias the estimates of the return to education and related wage differentials. The 
first concern might be related to unobserved differences in worker quality. The 
unobserved ability of graduates and high school graduates may vary differentially 
across regions and this could bias the estimates of the conditional wage 
differences between graduates and high school. Specifically what may be more 
important is the change over time in the average ability of college graduates 
relative to high school graduates in a given region is systematically related to 
changes over time in housing prices in that region. In particular  if average 
unobserved ability of graduates relative to high school graduates grows more 
(less) in expensive regions compared to less expensive regions, then the real  
graduates returns are biased downward (upward) (Moretti, 2010). Similarly 
Duranton and Monastiriotis (2002) suggest that the unobserved ability component 
that usually is included when measuring return to education, will not matter 
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provided that there is no spatial bias in the distribution of unobserved abilities64. 
They argue that the most likely spatial selection is probably to be about higher 
unobserved abilities in London, any failure to correct for this when London stands 
out as being “more expensive”  may lead to overestimates of the true regional 
inequalities.  
The second element that might be a source for bias of the estimates relates 
to the unmeasured quality differences in housing; in fact the different cost-of-
living faced by workers of different levels of education could also reflect 
differential changes in quality of housing (Moretti, 2010); for example the relative 
increase in the cost of housing experienced by college graduates may be 
overestimated if apartments rented by graduates are subject to more quality 
improvements than apartments in regions with many high school graduates.  If 
these features have improved more in cities with many graduates, the estimates 
may be overestimating the relative increase in cost-of-living experienced by 
college graduates. The lack of attention towards the quality change of goods in 
any measure of inflation is a well known bias in the cost-of-living literature 
(Diewert, 1993). Hausman (2002) explains that the “constant basket“ approach  
ignores, among other aspects,  the quality change in existing goods and that a use 
of a cost-of-living index based on utility (or expenditure functions)  allows 
estimation of each of the effects of substitution, new goods and quality change. To 
estimate these effects, both price and quantity data are needed, unfortunately the 
latter are usually not available to the researcher. 
Following Moretti, Table 4.13 restricts the analysis to UK born only 
workers though they are included in the additional specifications; excluding 
immigrants in the baseline regressions can be motivated by fact that in the US 
context immigration is often viewed as a proximate cause of the rising wage gap 
between high and low skilled workers (Card, 2010). Though the skills 
composition of migrants in the UK is different from that of the US, Manacorda et 
al. (2007) provide evidence that the native-immigrants wage differential is 
sensitive to the share of immigrants in the working age population; in fact they 
                                                 
64 Duranton and Monastiriotis (2002) explain that this bias selection problem can take three forms: 
First unobserved regional fixed-effects could lead to different educational choices for youngsters 
of similar abilities (or different participation choices for females); a second type of bias could be 
due to the migration patterns leading to an uneven spatial distribution of unobserved abilities; third 
unobserved ability may affect the probability of being in full-time employment. For example if the 
probability to find a full time job differs across regions, the distribution of unobserved 
characteristics for individuals at work across regions will be different.  
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show that a 10% rise in the population share of immigrants is estimated to 
increase native-migrant wage differential by 2%.  
Immigrants, defined as workers born outside the UK, represent an 
increasing part of the working population (about  14% in 2009, Wadsworth 2010).  
In addition, the  share of immigrants with a graduate level of education has been 
increasing over time.  Another relevant reason to include immigrants in the 
estimations is motivated by the fact that the concentration of immigrants in 
London and the South-East has been increasing over time, for example in 2009 
about 39% of the London population was made up of foreign-born people 
(Rienzo, 2010). Table 4.14 extends the analysis to immigrants. The returns to 
education are now lower (columns 1 and 2) than when immigrants were excluded, 
the nominal wage gap in 1997 was about 2% higher than the real one in the same 
year and 5% higher in 2008. The decrease in both the nominal and real 
conditional difference between wage of graduate workers and high school is 
higher (respectively 0.025 and 0.038) but still not statistically significant. 
Table 4.15 reports similar estimates separately for men and women aged 
25 to 60, only UK born, working both part time and full time. The returns to 
graduate education are higher for women than men in any time period. Deflating 
by the regional RPI makes little difference to the estimated graduate returns for 
both men and women in any year. Over time, although the conditional wage 
difference between college and high school increases for men, both in nominal 
and real terms, and decreases more for women, there is no statistically significant 
change in the graduate returns over time.  
Table 4.16 reports similar estimates to tables 4.14 and 4.15 but extends the 
sample to cover the working age population (16 to 59 for women and 16 to 64 for 
men). The table documents that the estimated graduate to high school are sensitive 
to the sample age selection. Panel A of table 4.16 reports results from similar 
models to those in table 4.14. Considering all workers (men and women together), 
the conditional nominal wage differential  between graduate and high school 
workers is now higher though not significantly (-0.033) than when restricting the 
analysis to workers aged 25-60 only (0.025); when using the regional deflator the 
decrease is now 0.045 compared to 0.038 when excluding younger workers. Panel 
B and C extend the analysis to men and women separately. The magnitude of both 
nominal and real conditional wage differentials is lower for men. For women, 
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both the nominal and real conditional wage differentials are higher than men. The 
increases in the conditional (nominal and real) wage differentials when including 
younger workers may be due to cohort effects: table 4.3A of the appendix shows 
how the tenure of workers changes by education and age: the share of workers 
aged 35 or less renting is higher than when considering the whole sample (Table 
4.2A). This implies that cohorts of different levels of education may be affected 
differently by the cost of housing. However, it has not been possible to analysis 
the effects of cost of housing by cohorts because longitudinal data would be more 
appropriate to that purpose.  
Table 4.17 expands the estimates by analysing the wage differential 
between graduate and less than high school workers; this may be a proxy for the 
90-10 gap which, over the sample period analysed, has  been higher than any 
other measures of wage dispersion.  The estimates in Table 4.17 are based on a 
sample of workers aged 25-60, UK born only, working part time and full time.  
When using the Regional RPI the wage gap is lower than the nominal conditional 
one, though not significantly, and this is true in all years reported (1997, 2002 and 
2008).   In this case the nominal and real wage differentials  are always decreasing 
either when considering the whole sample (men and women together) or men and 
women separately. In all cases the regional deflator decreases the wage 
differentials; the magnitude is higher for women (0.128 and 0.143 respectively 
nominal and real) than it is for men (0.070 and 0.092 respectively nominal and 
real).  
Including workers with lower levels of educational results appears to 
influence the sample included by increasing the magnitude of both nominal and 
real conditional wage differentials.   
 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
The existing literature investigating the trends in and causes of wage inequality in 
the UK usually measures wages in real terms by deflating nominal wages using 
the national Retail Prices Index (RPI).  However the RPI does not account for 
differences in regional housing costs. Expenditure on housing is the largest 
component of total household expenditure and varies considerably through 
regions in the UK. Over time, housing costs have grown differentially across 
179 
 
regions. Moreover, graduate workers appear to be more concentrated in more 
expensive British regions and increasingly so over time. 
This chapter has shown that when accounting for regional differences in 
the cost of housing the most common measure of UK inflation, the RPI, appears 
not to fully represent the cost-of-living in the various British regions. The national 
RPI underestimates the cost-of-living of workers living in the regions with the 
most expensive housing (London and the South East) and overestimates the cost-
of-living for “cheaper” housing regions (Northern Ireland, Scotland). This 
inevitably has some implications when using the National or regional RPI to 
deflate the hourly wage. 
When deflating hourly wages by the regional RPI, the average level of 
wages is lower by 8% to 11% an hour for all workers in London and the South 
East, whilst it is higher by 2% to 9% in the remaining regions. However, though 
the use of a regional deflator makes a significant difference to levels, it does not 
make much difference to the graduate high school wage gap in any year or over 
time.  
This paper shows how a regional deflator could be used in principle and 
further work could be based on extending this. The use of deflators and their 
measures are crucial in terms of policy decisions: since the decisions about how 
we compute inflation statistics can have a direct impact on policy decisions 
(Checchetti, 2007). Acknowledging the regional disparities in the cost-of-living in 
the UK also means that a study of regional variations in the cost-of-living has 
several important implications; Borooah et al (1996)   pointed out three: first, 
there is the adjustment of social security benefit levels to take account of regional 
differences in prices. Secondly, conclusions about the relative deprivation or 
prosperity of regions, as measured by real disposable income, could also be 
susceptible to change in the face of regional variations in the cost-of-living. 
Lastly, conclusions about the number of persons living in poverty could also alter 
when regional cost-of-living variations are allowed for. Moreover, future research 
should also look at how differences in the regional cost-of-living should be taken 
into account to set minimum wages at a regional basis rather than at a national 
one. 
As pointed out by Meullbauer and Murphy (2008), housing, location and 
demographic choices are closely connected.  Housing markets are crucial for 
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understanding regional evolutions and regional disparities in economic activities 
and living standards. Moreover, migration between regions plays a role in the 
working of regional housing and labour markets. House prices and the related 
cost-of-living have several effects on the labour-market and on the choices made 
by households for household formation and location. 
 The failure of the National RPI to appropriately reflect the real cost-of-
living of different UK regions suggests the need for regional specific studies and 
related policy to address the existing regional differences in the labour market and 
standards of living; the persistence in regional unemployment rates is perhaps one 
symptom of those differences. The attention to more regional oriented analysis is 
also motivated by the fact that London, for example, is the most unequal region in 
the UK; although it has the highest proportion of households in the top tenth of 
income nationally, it also has the highest rate of income poverty of any region in 
England, with the highest proportion of people of all ages living below the 
poverty rate (The Guardian, 2009). 
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Appendix 4.1 
A4.1: The RPI construction  
RPI price data are collected from a range of shopping locations across the UK. 
Locations are defined as clusters of enumeration districts broadly representing a 
central shopping area and the areas where the local shopping population tend to 
live. The sample is stratified by region (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the 
nine English Regions) and size of location. The number of locations per region is 
proportional to aggregate regional expenditure by households. In total, there are 
around 150 locations, with the number of locations per region ranging from 5 in 
Northern Ireland to 22 in the South East. In each location, a random selection of 
outlets is chosen from a sampling frame based on an enumeration by price 
collectors of all the outlets in the location.   Prices are collected from the 
randomly selected outlets for over 550 pre-defined items. The latter are 
purposively selected to represent typical expenditure in each of the 85 different 
categories of expenditure, called “sections”. For most items, it is sufficient for the 
purposes of calculating the national RPI to collect one price quote only in each 
location.  This means that the number of quotes per region for most items is 
similar to the number of locations per region. Each month over 110,000 price 
quotes are collected locally but the number of regions varies from around 4,000 in 
Northern Ireland to over 16,000 in the South East, reflecting the sizes of the local 
shopping population and the amount they spend. Each month over 10,000 prices 
are also collected centrally from major chains with national pricing policies; these 
are combined with the locally collected prices according to the proportion of 
expenditure they represent locally; this is where ONS gathers prices direct from 
retailers to construct centrally calculated indices. Although prices may vary by 
region, there is no regional dimension to the calculation itself. 
Tables A.4.2a and A.4.2b report respectively the average rent per person 
and the share of housing expenditure by region from 1997 and 2009. As 
documented in table A.4.2a, the average rent per person has been increasing over 
the sample period in all regions; however London, the South East and the East 
have the highest rent. Table A.4.2b reports the share of housing expenditure based 
on the FES from 1997 and 2008; London displays the highest share overall in the 
UK; in 2008 housing costs made up 29% of the total consumption for Londoners; 
Northern Ireland presents the lowest share for housing, with 14% in 2009. Table 
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A.4.2c reports the regional RPI for all regions over time from 1997 and 2009. The 
table provides evidence of how much the regional PRI differ by the national RPI. 
Once again London displays a higher regional RPI over time and within regions 
and higher than the national RPI; this implies that the national RPI provided by 
the ONS does not properly reflect the cost of living faced by workers in the 
London area. Similarly, in some regions, the cost of living experienced is lower 
than the one painted by the national RPI (Northern Ireland, North East and 
Yorkshire). Table A.4.2d reports the percentage of workers with a graduate 
degree; in 2008 about 43% of workers in London had a graduate degree; followed 
by the South East with about 27% of graduates, the share in the remaining regions 
falls up to 17% in the North East. Figures A.4.2a and A.4.2b plot the 
characteristics of tenure by level of education in all years; while figure A.4.2a   
presents the share for all workers, figure A.4.2b  reports the characteristics of 
tenure for younger cohorts, those aged 35 or less. It is quite clear that younger 
cohorts are more likely to rent rather than paying mortgages or owning their own 
house. However, the fact that on average the great majority of workers pay 
mortgages recalls the need to calculate three different indices per tenure (rent, 
owner, mortgages) pointed out by Crawford and Smith (2002) and based on the 
motivation according to which a change in prices of goods or services (e.g. 
housing) can only affect the measure of inflation if the household pays for those 
goods or services.   
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of Workers by Education Within Region, All 
Workers, 2008 
 
 
Notes: NE= North East; NW=North West; Y=Yorkshire; EM=East Midlands; WM=West 
Midlands; E=East; SE=South East; SW=South West; Lon=London; W=Wales; S=Scotland; 
NI=Northern Ireland. Sample is based on men (16-64) and women (16-59) working full time and 
part time, employees and main job only. Graduate refers to anyone who left full time education at 
21 or later; “High school graduate” refers to anyone who left full time education between the ages 
of 17 and 20; “less than high school” refers to those who left education at age 16 or less. 
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Table 4.1: Distribution of Workers by Education across Regions, 2008 
 Graduate High 
School 
Less than High 
School 
%  of total 
working 
 age population  
North East 3.0 3.7 5.6 4.4 
North West  8.8 9.8 12.5 10.8 
Yorkshire 7.9 8.2 10.5 9.1 
East Midlands  6.1 7.7 9.1 7.9 
West Midlands  6.9 7.7 9.6 8.3 
East 8.1 9.5 9.0 8.9 
South East 16.7 16.5 13.1 15.0 
South West 7.5 9.4 8.9 8.7 
London  21.1 11.4 6.2 11.5 
Wales  4.0 4.7 4.9 4.6 
Scotland  8.1 9.4 9.2 9.0 
Northern 
Ireland  
1.8 2.1 1.5 1.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Notes: Based on the LFS. Sample is based on men (16-64) and women (16-59) working full-time 
and part time, employees and main job only. Graduate refers to anyone who left full time 
education at 21 or later; “High school graduate” refers to anyone who left full time education 
between the ages of 17 and 20; “less than high school” refers to those who left education at age 16 
or less. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Percentage of Graduate Workers by Region, 1997 and 2008 
 
 
Notes: Based on LFS.Sample is based on men (16-64) and women (16-59) working full-time and 
part time, employees and main job only. Graduate refers to anyone who left full time education at 
21 or later. 
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Table 4.2: Distribution of Workers by Education, UK Regions 1997-2008 
Region 1997 2008 
 Graduate High 
School 
Less 
than 
High 
School 
Graduate High 
School 
Less than 
High 
School 
North East 10.3 19.5 70.2 16.6 26.5 56.8 
North West  13.1 22.2 65.1 19.4 28.5 51.7 
Yorkshire  12.7 21.9 65.7 20.8 28.0 51.0 
East 
Midlands  
13.5 24.6 62.3 18.7 30.3 51.0 
West 
Midlands  
13.6 23.4 63.4 20.1 28.6 51.2 
East 14.1 28.4 57.9 21.5 33.1 44.9 
South East 17.5 31.6 51.3 26.7 34.3 38.8 
South West 14.6 29.8 55.9 20.8 33.6 45.5 
London  28.9 33.2 37.5 42.9 31.5 25.1 
Wales  12.2 28.0 59.8 21.5 31.6 47.1 
Scotland  14.0 26.4 59.8 21.7 32.6 45.5 
Northern 
Ireland  
17.2 30.1 53.1 24.8 37.6 37.8 
Notes: Based on the LFS. Sample is based on men (16-64) and women (16-59) working full-time 
and part time, employees and main job only. Graduate refers to anyone who left full time 
education at 21 or later; “High school graduate” refers to anyone who left full time education 
between the ages of 17 and 20; “less than high school” refers to those who left education at age 16 
or less. 
 
 
 
Table 4.3a: Rental Prices by Regions, 1997-2008 
Region 1997 2008 1997-2008  
weekly rent change 
% change 
 to the UK 
increase 
North East 42.50 71.78 29.28 -28.1 
North West 48.86 83.53 34.67 -14.9 
Yorkshire & The Humber 43.20 78.64 35.44 -13.0 
East Midlands 44.58 81.31 36.73 -9.8 
West Midlands 48.46 84.39 35.93 -11.8 
East 56.89 100.38 43.50 6.8 
South East 69.87 123.88 54.01 32.5 
South West 56.28 103.17 46.89 15.1 
London 86.10 163.22 77.12 89.3 
Wales 46.41 77.37 30.96 -24.0 
Scotland 37.96 69.68 31.72 -22.1 
Northern Ireland 35.93 68.63 32.70 -19.7 
UK 51.42 92.17 40.75  
 
Source: Based on Family Resources Survey. 
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Table 4.3b: Variation in quality measure of house, 2005. 
Regions  Variation in House Characteristics 
  Has spare room
(1) 
Kitchen  over 6.5ft wide 
(2) 
Has a garden
(3) 
North East 62.7  93.9  86.3 
North West 56.4  93.6  86.0 
Yorkshire and the Humber 58.1  88.6  92.3 
East Midlands 58.2  92.4  96.2 
West Midlands 59.6  92.6  96.1 
East 62.0  92.4  95.2 
London 39.1  85.3  82.2 
South East 57.6  92.8  94.5 
South West 60.4  91.8  93.1 
 
Notes: Based on Survey of English Housing 2005. 
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Table 4.4: Mean of Hourly Wage 
Year   Nominal 
Wage 
Real wage    
(National RPI) 
Real  Wage  
(Regional RPI) 
1997 All workers 7.65 7.65 7.59 
Men 8.69 8.69 8.61 
Women 6.51 6.51 6.49 
2000 All workers 8.86 8.42 8.31 
Men 9.97 9.47 9.35 
Women 7.63 7.25 7.16 
2003 All workers 10.05 8.85 8.95 
Men 11.2 9.86 9.96 
Women 8.8 7.75 7.84 
2006 All workers 11.33 9.3 9.57 
Men 12.48 10.24 10.53 
Women 10.07 8.27 8.54 
2008 All workers 12.15 9.25 9.52 
Men 13.39 10.19 10.48 
Women 10.79 8.22 8.47 
Notes: Based on the LFS. Sample is based on men (16-64) and women (16-59) working full-time 
and part time, employees and main job only. Wages are deflated at 1997 level. 
    
 
 
Table 4.5: Real Hourly Wage by Aggregate Regions, 1997-2008 
  UK  London  South East Rest of the UK 
Year N. RPI   R. RPI N.RPI R. RPI N. RPI R. RPI N. RPI  R. RPI
1997 7.65 7.58 9.58 8.47 8.58 8.17 7.17 7.33 
1998 7.87 7.76 9.97 8.79 8.93 8.36 7.32 7.47 
1999 8.09 8.00 10.23 9.13 9.10 8.59 7.53 7.69 
2000 8.42 8.31 11.01 9.60 9.41 8.96 7.80 7.97 
2001 8.74 8.72 11.59 10.13 9.71 9.18 8.07 8.39 
2002 8.8 8.86 11.46 10.16 9.89 9.46 8.15 8.52 
2003 8.85 8.95 11.63 9.90 9.97 9.45 8.19 8.70 
2004 9.02 9.17 11.66 9.87 9.97 9.47 8.41 9.00 
2005 9.20 9.43 11.99 10.27 10.11 9.67 8.58 9.26 
2006 9.30 9.57 11.92 10.41 10.20 9.79 8.70 9.39 
2007 9.33 9.63 11.96 10.13 10.37 10.15 8.71 9.45 
2008 9.25 9.52 12.02 9.84 10.22 9.78 8.60 9.41 
Notes: Based on the LFS. Sample is based on men (16-64) and women (16-59) working full-time 
and part time, employees and main job only. Wages are deflated at 1997 level. N. refers to 
National, R: refers to regional. 
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Table 4.6: Measures of Wage Dispersion and Changes over Time, Log 
Hourly Wage 
Year All workers Real wage RPI 
(National) 
Real  Wage RPI 
(Regional) 
Difference
Panel B:                                               Wage Dispersion 
1997 Standard 
Dev. 
0.588 0.582 -0.006 
  Variance 0.346 0.339 -0.008 
  90-50 0.766 0.750 -0.016 
  90-10 1.396 1.375 -0.021 
  50-10 0.630 0.625 -0.005 
2000 Standard 
Dev. 
0.580 0.572 -0.009 
   Variance 0.337 0.327 -0.010 
   90-50 0.760 0.749 -0.011 
   90-10 1.370 1.351 -0.019 
   50-10 0.611 0.602 -0.009 
2003 Standard 
Dev. 
0.557 0.546 -0.011 
   Variance 0.310 0.298 -0.012 
   90-50 0.768 0.749 -0.019 
   90-10 1.351 1.320 -0.031 
   50-10 0.583 0.571 -0.012 
2006 Standard 
Dev. 
0.561 0.553 -0.009 
   Variance 0.315 0.306 -0.010 
   90-50 0.763 0.752 -0.011 
   90-10 1.349 1.316 -0.033 
   50-10 0.585 0.564 -0.021 
2008 Standard 
Dev. 
0.567 0.557 -0.010 
   Variance 0.321 0.310 -0.011 
   90-50 0.767 0.751 -0.016 
   90-10 1.347 1.326 -0.021 
   50-10 0.579 0.575 -0.005 
 
Panel B:                      1997-2008        Change in Wage Dispersion 
  
    National RPI Regional RPI   
  Standard dev.  -0.021 -0.025 -0.004 
  Variance -0.025 -0.029 -0.004 
  90-50 0.001  0.001 0.000 
  90-10 -0.049 -0.049 0.000 
  50-10 -0.051 -0.050 0.001 
Notes: Based on the LFS. Sample is based on men (16-64) and women (16-59) working full-time 
and part time, employees and main job only. Wages are deflated at 1997 level. 
                            
189 
 
 
Table 4.7: Measures of Wage Dispersion, by Region 2008 
   Standard Dev. 90-10 90-50 50-10 
North East 0.508 1.169 0.68 0.489 
North West 0.518 1.249 0.708 0.541 
Yorkshire 0.518 1.229 0.705 0.524 
East Midlands 0.551 1.267 0.752 0.515 
West Midlands  0.543 1.291 0.749 0.541 
East 0.579 1.388 0.79 0.597 
South East 0.590 1.413 0.788 0.625 
South West 0.555 1.271 0.722 0.549 
London  0.602 1.508 0.781 0.728 
Wales  0.534 1.272 0.764 0.508 
Scotland  0.541 1.304 0.753 0.551 
Northern Ireland  0.502 1.169 0.703 0.466 
UK  0.557 1.326 0.751 0.575 
 
Notes: Based on the LFS. Sample is based on men (16-64) and women (16-59) working full-time 
and part time, employees and main job only. Wages are deflated at 1997 level. Using regional RPI.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.8: Changes in Real Hourly Wage by Region, 1997-2008  
Region Based on National RPI  
 
Based  on Regional RPI 
  (1) (2) 
North East 1.18 2.10 
North West 1.28 1.99 
Yorkshire 1.37 2.07 
East Midlands 1.15 1.78 
West Midlands 1.47 2.13 
East 1.54 1.99 
South East 1.64 1.61 
South West 1.50 1.80 
London 2.43 1.37 
Wales 1.54 2.32 
Scotland 1.65 2.54 
Northern 
Ireland 
1.74 2.39 
UK 1.59 1.93 
 
Notes: Based on the LFS. Sample is based on men (16-64) and women (16-59) working full-time 
and part time, employees and main job only. Wages are deflated at 1997 level.  
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Table 4.9: Changes in Weekly Rent, by Education Group  
 1997 
 UK London South East 
 
Graduates 98.31 112.40 118.62 
High School 65.77 85.27 78.59 
Less than high  
School 
46.30 61.03 58.25 
 2008 
Graduates 164.39 244.28 187.44 
High School 105.72 160.84 134.61 
Less than high  
School 
84.58 112.32 101.21 
 1997-2008    Percentage   Increase 
  
Graduates 67.2% 117.3% 58.0% 
High School 60.7% 88.6% 71.3% 
Less than high  
School 
82.7% 84.1% 73.7% 
Based on the FRS. 
 
 
Table 4.10: Real Hourly Wage for Graduate Workers and High School 
Workers 
  1997 2002 2008 1997-2008 
change  
1997 2002 2008 1997-2008 
change  
Panel A 
Graduates 
   Men Women 
National 
RPI 
12.95 14.61 14.08 1.13 10.31 11.72 11.6 1.28 
Regional 
RPI 
12.63 14.41 14.02 1.38 10.1 11.6 11.67 1.57 
Diff. 0.32 0.2 0.07 -0.25 0.21 0.11 -0.07 -0.28 
Percentage  2.5% 1.4% 0.5% -18.2% 2.1% 1.0% -0.6% -18.1% 
Panel B 
High School graduates 
   Men Women 
National 
RPI 
9.25 10.09 9.93 0.68 6.88 7.7 8.01 1.14 
Regional 
RPI 
9.11 10.1 10.22 1.11 6.78 7.75 8.28 1.49 
Diff. 0.14 -0.01 -0.29 -0.43 0.09 -0.05 -0.26 -0.36 
Percentage 1.5% -0.1% -2.9% -38.9% 1.4% -0.6% -3.2% -23.9% 
Notes: Based on the LFS. Sample is based on men (16-64) and women (16-59) working full-time 
and part time, employees and main job only. Wages are deflated at 1997 level. Graduate refers to 
anyone who left full time education at 21 or later; “High school graduate” refers to anyone who 
left full time education between the ages of 17 and 20. 
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Figure 4.3: National and Regional RPI, UK 1997-2008 
 
 
                  Source:EFS/FES/LCS and FRS 
 
Figure 4.4: How Increasing Share of Graduates Relate to Increasing Price for 
Rent 
 
Notes: Based on the FRS and LFS, 1997-2008. 
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Figure 4.5a:Real Hourly Wage for Graduate Workers by Region,  
All Workers 1997-2008 
 
Notes:  Based on the LFS. Graduate refers to anyone who left full time education at 21 or later. 
 
Figure 4.5b: Real Hourly Wage for High School Workers by Region, All 
Workers 1997-2008 
 
Notes: Based on LFS.  High School workers are defined as those who left school between 17 and 
20 years old.  
10
12
14
16
10
12
14
16
10
12
14
16
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
North East North West Yorkshire East Midlands
West Midlands East South East South West
London Wales Scotland Northern Ireland
Real hourly wage using the National RPI
Real hourly wage using the Regional RPI
6
8
10
12
6
8
10
12
6
8
10
12
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
North East North West Yorkshire East Midlands
West Midlands East South East South West
London Wales Scotland Northern Ireland
Real hourly wage using National RPI
Real hourly wage using Regional RPI
193 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.11: Real Hourly Wage for Graduate Workers by Region, 2008 
Region based on National RPI based  on 
Regional RPI 
Difference  
  (1) (2)  (3) 
North East 11.23 12.95 1.72 
North West 11.32 12.46 1.14 
Yorkshire 11.27 12.59 1.32 
East Midlands 11.79 13.01 1.22 
West Midlands 12.43 13.61 1.18 
East 13.27 13.80 0.53 
South East 13.83 13.23 -0.60 
South West 11.79 12.14 0.35 
London 14.88 12.18 -2.70 
Wales 11.33 12.64 1.31 
Scotland 12.73 14.62 1.89 
Northern Ireland 11.27 12.61 1.34 
UK 12.93 12.92 -0.01 
Notes: Based on the LFS. Sample is based on men (16-64) and women (16-59) working full-time 
and part time, employees and main job only. Wages are deflated at 1997 level. Graduate refers to 
anyone who left full time education at 21 or later.   
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Figure 4.6a: Real Hourly Wage for Graduate and High School Male 
Workers, London and UK 1997-2008 
 
Notes: Based on the LFS.  Graduate workers are defined as those who left school at age 21 or more.  High school workers 
are defined as those who left school between 17 and 20 years old. 
 
Figure 4.6b: Real Hourly Wage for Graduate and High School Female 
Workers,  London and UK 1997-2008 
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Notes: Based on LFS. Graduate workers are defined as those who left school at age 21 or more. High school workers are 
defined as those who left school between 17 and 20 years old. 
             
Table 4.12: Graduate-high School and Graduate-less than High School 
 
Year Grad.-High School Wage Gap 
  
Grad.-less than High School Wage Gap 
 National  RPI Regional Diff. National       RPI Regional RPI Diff. 
1997 3.80 3.64 0.16 5.35 5.07 0.28 
1998 3.94 3.74 0.20 5.51 5.19 0.32 
1999 3.88 3.71 0.17 5.55 5.25 0.30 
2000 4.21 3.97 0.24 5.95 5.57 0.38 
2001 4.33 4.11 0.22 6.04 5.67 0.37 
2002 4.48 4.30 0.18 6.11 5.81 0.30 
2003 4.41 4.18 0.23 5.98 5.60 0.38 
2004 4.09 3.90 0.19 5.72 5.38 0.35 
2005 4.09 3.92 0.17 5.62 5.33 0.30 
2006 4.14 4.00 0.14 5.60 5.34 0.26 
2007 4.04 3.86 0.18 5.50 5.20 0.30 
2008 4.01 3.73 0.28 5.40 4.99 0.41 
1997-2008  
Change 
0.21 0.09 0.12 0.05 -0.08 0.13 
Notes: Based on the LFS. Graduate refers to anyone who left full time education at 21 or later.  
 
 
Figure 4.7: Graduate-High School and Graduate-Less then High School 
Wage Gap, UK 1997-2008 
 
Notes: Based on the LFS. Graduate refers to anyone who left full time education at 21 or later; 
“High school graduate” refers to those who left full time education between the age of 17 and 20. 
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Table 4.13:  Nominal and Real Conditional Wage Difference between 
Workers with a High School Degree and Workers with College or more, UK 
Born 
 
  
  
1997 
 
(1) 
2008 
 
(2) 
1997-2008 
Change 
(3) 
1997 
 
(4) 
2008 
 
    (5) 
1997-2008 
Change 
(6) 
Model 1        
Nominal Wage Dif.  0.419*** 0.402*** -0.017 0.408*** 0.388*** -0.014 
 (0.01) (0.017) (0.00) (0.008) (0.007) (0.00) 
 
Model 2        
Real Wage Dif.         0.413*** 0.395*** -0.018 0.410*** 0.382*** -0.028 
 (Regional RPI) (0.009) (0.016) (0.00) (0.007) (0.012) (0.00) 
Region Fixed  
Effects 
 
No 
 
No 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region in parentheses.  Sample is based on men and women aged 25-60, 
employees, working full time and part time, main job only UK born only. The dependent variable in Model 1 
is the log of nominal hourly wage. The dependent variable in Model 2 is the log of real hourly wage, deflated 
by regional  RPI.  Controls include a cubic in potential experience, year fixed effects, gender and race. 
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Table 4.14: Nominal and Real Conditional Wage Difference between 
Workers with a High School Degree and Workers with College or more, 
Migrants and UK Born  
 
  
  
1997 
 
 
(1) 
2008 
 
 
(2) 
1997-
2008 
Change 
(3) 
1997 
 
 
(4) 
2008 
 
 
(5) 
1997- 
2008 
Change 
(6) 
Model 1 
Nominal Wage  0.408*** 0.383*** -0.025 0.399*** 0.402*** 0.003 
Difference (0.01) (0.014) (0.00) (0.012) (0.011) (0.00) 
Model 2 
Real Wage dif.  0.401*** 0.363*** -0.038 0.371*** 0.364*** -0.007 
Regional RPI (0.007) (0.01) (0.00) (0.011) (0.011) (0.00) 
Region Fixed  
Effects    
 
No 
 
No 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region in parentheses.  Sample is based on men and women aged 25-60, 
employees, working full time and part time, main job. The dependent variable in Model 1 is the log of 
nominal hourly wage. The dependent variable in Model 2 is the log of real hourly wage, deflated by regional  
RPI.  Controls include a cubic in potential experience, year fixed effects, gender and race. 
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Table 4.15: Nominal and Real Conditional Wage between Workers and with 
College or more and High School Degree, by Men and Women 
    1997 
 
 
(1) 
2008 
 
 
(2) 
1997- 
2008 
Change 
(3) 
1987 
 
 
(4) 
2008 
 
 
(5) 
1997-
2008 
Change 
(6) 
Panel A. Men              
Nominal Wage Diff. 0.366*** 0.370*** 0.004 0.357*** 0.354*** -0.003 
 (0.009) (-0.016) (0.00) (0.006) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
Real Wage Diff. 0.360*** 0.351*** -0.009 0.359*** 0.348*** -0.011 
 Regional RPI (0.007) (0.009) (0.00) (0.006) (0.01) (0.00) 
              
Panel B. Women           
Nominal Wage  0.466*** 0.427*** -0.029 0.452*** 0.413*** -0.039 
Difference (0.015) (0.019) (0.00) (0.015) (0.012) (0.00) 
              
Real Wage Diff. 0.460*** 0.411*** -0.049 0.454*** 0.407*** -0.047 
Regional RPI (0.014) (0.015) (0.00) (0.014) (0.015) (0.00) 
 
Region  Fixed             
 Effects No No   Yes Yes    
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. Sample includes workers aged 25-60, 
only UK born, working part-time and full-time. The dependent variable in Model 1 is the log of 
nominal hourly wage. The dependent variable in Model 2 is the log of real hourly wage, deflated 
by regional  RPI.  Controls include a cubic in potential experience, year fixed effects, gender and 
race.  
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Table 4.16: Additional Specifications: Nominal and Real Conditional Wage 
between Workers and with College or more and High School Degree: All 
Working Force Population 
    1997 
 
 
(1) 
2008 
 
 
(2) 
1997-
2008 
Change 
(3) 
1997 
 
 
(4) 
2008 
 
 
(5) 
1997-
2008 
Change 
(6) 
Panel A. All Workers          
Nominal Wage Diff. 0.430*** 0.397*** -0.033 0.419*** 0.383*** -0.036 
Difference  (0.009) (0.016) (0.00) (0.011) (0.011) (0.00) 
        
Real Wage Diff. 0.421*** 0.376*** -0.045 0.422*** 0.376*** -0.046 
 Regional RPI (0.011) (0.009) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
        
Panel B. Men        
Nominal Wage Diff. 0.389*** 0.380*** -0.009 0.381*** 0.365*** -0.016 
  (0.007) (0.02) (0.00) (0.008) (0.014) (0.00) 
        
Real Wage Diff.  0.381*** 0.356*** -0.025 0.384*** 0.357*** -0.027 
Regional RPI (0.008) (0.009) (0.00) (0.008) (0.01) (0.00) 
        
Panel C. Women       
Nominal Wage Diff. 0.461*** 0.406*** -0.055 0.449*** 0.393*** -0.056 
  (0.015) -0.015 (0.00) (0.018) (0.012) (0.00) 
        
Real Wage Diff.  0.453*** 0.388*** -0.065 0.451*** 0.386*** -0.065 
Regional RPI (0.017) (0.012) (0.00) (0.017) (0.013) (0.00) 
 
Region Fixed  
Effects 
No No   Yes Yes   
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region in parentheses Sample includes workers aged 16 to 64, 
employees, working full time and part time, main job only. The dependent variable in Model 1 is 
the log of nominal hourly wage. The dependent variable in Model 2 is the log of real hourly wage, 
deflated by regional  RPI.  Controls include a cubic in potential experience, year fixed effects, 
gender, race and control for migrants.  
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Table 4.17:  Additional Specifications: Nominal and Conditional Wage 
Difference between Workers with a Graduate Degree or more and Workers 
with a Less than High School Graduates 
 
  1997 
 
 
(1) 
2008 
 
 
(2) 
 1997-
2008 
Change 
(3) 
1997 
 
 
(4) 
2008 
 
 
(5) 
1997-
2008 
Change 
(6) 
Panel A. All workers       
Model 1        
Nominal Wage Diff. 0.696*** 0.601*** -0.095 0.669*** 0.575*** -0.094 
  (0.008) (0.016) (0.00) (0.016) (0.012) (0.00) 
        
Model 2        
Real Wage Diff. 0.675*** 0.562*** -1.113 0.677*** 0.562*** -0.115 
Regional RPI (0.013) (0.017) (0.00) (0.013) (0.017) (0.00) 
        
Panel B. Men       
Model 1        
Nominal Wage Diff. 0.650*** 0.580*** -0.07 0.623*** 0.551*** -0.072 
  (0.014) (0.018) (0.00) (0.017) (0.013) (0.00) 
Model 2        
Real Wage Diff. 0.628*** 0.536*** -0.092 0.630*** 0.537*** -0.093 
Regional RPI (0.018) (0.018) (0.00) (0.015) (0.015) (0.00) 
Panel C. Women       
Model 1        
Nominal Wage Diff. 0.746*** 0.618*** -0.128 0.720*** 0.595*** -0.125 
  (0.013) (0.018) (0.00) (0.022) (0.015) (0.00) 
Model 2        
Real Wage Diff. 0.727*** 0.584*** -0.143 0.726*** 0.584*** -0.142 
Regional RPI (0.017) (0.017) (0.00) (0.019) (0.017) (0.00) 
        
Region  Fixed 
Effects 
  No No   Yes Yes    
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region in parentheses Sample includes workers aged 25-60, 
employees, working full time and part time, main job only. The dependent variable in Model 1 is 
the log of nominal hourly wage. The dependent variable in Model 2 is the log of real hourly wage, 
deflated by regional  RPI.  Controls include a cubic in potential experience, year fixed effects, 
gender, race and control for migrants. 
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Appendix 4.2 
 
  
Table A.4.2a: Price for Rent by Region, 1997-2008 UK 
Region 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
North East 42.5 41.1 44.1 44.4 47.3 49.8 52.0 55.8 58.1 61.6 65.2 71.8 
North West 48.9 49.9 53.6 53.6 56.6 56.5 60.7 65.0 69.5 71.7 78.1 83.5 
York& Humber 43.2 42.5 44.5 47.7 50.0 55.1 58.2 58.9 65.0 72.4 73.0 78.6 
East Midlands 44.6 48.0 47.5 51.0 53.6 58.0 61.7 65.6 67.6 74.9 75.7 81.3 
West Midlands 48.5 49.5 51.5 53.7 57.5 62.1 60.4 63.1 68.7 77.4 79.6 84.4 
East 56.9 60.9 62.8 66.5 69.1 74.0 81.0 81.5 83.1 95.1 97.1 100.4 
South East 69.9 78.1 74.9 76.1 86.7 88.0 98.1 101.8 105.4 111.2 109.6 123.9 
South West 56.3 62.2 60.3 66.7 67.2 72.5 74.6 78.6 84.5 91.6 93.7 103.2 
London 86.1 91.5 89.5 98.3 104.8 108.0 124.1 128.5 130.8 132.8 141.2 163.2 
Wales 46.4 46.3 50.4 51.3 54.8 56.7 57.3 60.8 63.0 68.6 69.8 77.4 
Scotland 38.0 41.2 43.0 44.9 47.9 48.6 49.9 54.6 58.2 60.4 64.5 69.7 
Northern Ireland 35.9 37.5 39.2 44.1 47.0 53.6 55.8 57.6 63.4 64.5 70.9 68.6 
UK 51.4 54.1 55.1 58.2 61.9 65.2 69.5 72.7 76.4 81.9 84.9 92.2 
Notes: These data relate to rents derived from the Family Resources Survey. 
 
 
 
 
A.4.2b Share of Housing Expenditure by Region, 1997-2008 of housing 
expenditure by region, 1997-2008  
Region  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
North East 0.22 0.20 0.24 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.27 
North West 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.27 
York&Humber 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.26 0.22 0.27 0.25 
East Midlands 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.25 
West Midlands 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.26 
East 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.27 
South East 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.29 
South West 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.27 
London 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.34 
Wales 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.24 
Scotland 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.27 
Northern Ireland 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.18 
Based on the EFS/FES/LCS   
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Table A.4.2c  Regional and National RPI, 1997-2008 
  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
North East  95.6  96.3  98.0  98.6  100.6  101.7  102.5  104.0  105.2  106.0  111.3  113.4 
North West  98.3  99.6  102.3  102.8  103.8  104.5  105.9  107.6  109.0  110.7  115.7  119.5 
York& Humber  96.2  97.4  99.3  100.7  101.2  103.9  105.4  106.1  106.5  111.4  113.0  117.4 
East Midlands  96.7  99.1  100.3  102.1  102.9  104.7  106.2  107.8  108.3  112.0  113.7  118.6 
West Midlands  98.0  99.5  101.5  102.8  104.2  106.0  105.5  106.4  108.5  113.1  116.1  119.6 
East  101.2  103.8  105.7  107.6  108.6  110.8  113.7  114.2  115.0  121.1  123.9  127.4 
South East  105.6  109.4  110.3  111.0  114.8  116.0  120.5  122.5  125.2  128.6  129.6  139.2 
South West  101.0  104.4  105.2  107.6  108.0  110.2  111.3  112.8  116.1  119.6  123.3  128.8 
London  113.6  116.5  116.4  122.2  124.7  126.1  134.9  138.5  143.2  141.9  146.2  161.3 
Wales  98.0  98.7  101.5  102.2  103.8  104.7  105.0  106.2  106.7  109.9  113.7  117.6 
Scotland  93.4  96.0  97.8  98.9  100.1  101.0  102.3  102.9  104.1  106.1  110.1  111.5 
Northern Ireland  93.9  95.8  97.3  99.5  100.9  103.2  104.2  104.8  106.7  107.2  113.2  114.1 
National RPI  100.0 102.0 103.7 105.3 108.1 110.6 113.5 115.8 118.4 122.0 125.9 131.5 
Source: EFS/FES/LCS , FRS and ONS. 
 
 
Table A.4.2d:Percentage of Graduate Workers, 1997-2008 
Notes: Based on the LFS. Sample includes workers aged 16-64,working full time and part time, 
 employed and main job only. Graduate workers are defined as those who felt school at age 21 or 
more 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
North East 10.3 11.5 10.7 10.6 12.2 12.3 13.6 14.9 14.5 16.6 17.2 16.6 
North west  13.1 13.2 14.1 15.3 15.7 15.6 15.8 15.1 17.8 18.9 19.1 19.4 
Yorkshire  12.7 14.4 13.9 13.5 15.0 15.2 16.0 16.3 16.7 13.3 18.9 20.8 
East Midlands  13.5 13.2 14.5 14.8 15.1 15.1 15.8 14.6 17.8 19.6 19.0 18.7 
West Midlands  13.6 13.0 12.7 14.3 14.3 15.5 15.7 17.0 17.5 19.7 20.0 20.1 
East  14.1 14.6 16.1 14.8 16.6 16.6 17.4 22.4 20.6 21.0 22.9 21.5 
South East 17.5 18.9 19.0 18.8 20.1 21.0 22.2 24.7 23.3 24.4 25.3 26.7 
South West 14.6 14.8 15.7 16.4 16.3 15.8 17.4 18.6 19.5 20.4 21.2 20.8 
London  28.9 29.8 30.3 31.8 34.6 35.4 34.8 34.9 38.6 39.7 42.3 42.9 
Wales  12.2 12.4 13.5 13.9 16.8 17.7 17.7 16.0 19.0 18.5 19.4 21.5 
Scotland  14.0 15.1 15.5 15.5 17.6 17.7 17.5 17.1 19.8 18.8 21.9 21.7 
Northern Ireland 17.3 18.2 18.7 18.1 19.4 20.4 20.0 25.2 25.2 25.8 23.5 23.8 
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Figure A.4.2a: Proportion of Workers by Education, 1997-2008,  
(Using Age Left School ) 
 
Notes: Based on the LFS. “Higher” workers are defined as those who left school at age 21 or 
more.  “Intermediate” are defined as those who left school between age 17 and 20; “lower” are 
defined as those who left school at 16 or less. 
 
Figure A.4.2b: Tenure by Education all Workers, London Area 1997-2008 
 
Notes: Based on the LFS. “Higher” workers are defined as those who felt school at age 21 or 
more.  “Intermediate” are defined as those who left school between age 17 and 20; “lower” are 
defined as those who left school at 16 or less. 
 
.16
.27
.57
.16
.27
.57
.17
.27
.56
.17
.28
.55
.18
.29
.53
.19
.29
.53
.19
.29
.52
.20
.29
.51
.21
.30
.50
.21
.30
.48
.23
.30
.47
.23
.31
.46
0
.2
.4
.6
0
.2
.4
.6
0
.2
.4
.6
1997 1998 1999 2000
2001 2002 2003 2004
2005 2006 2007 2008
Higher Intermediate Lower
.09
.59
.32
.09
.63
.28
.12
.58
.30
.10
.60
.30
.11
.62
.27
.12
.59
.29
.10
.59
.31
.11
.62
.27
.13
.57
.30
.10
.61
.29
.11
.64
.26
.14
.57
.30
.11
.56
.33
.12
.61
.27
.14
.57
.29
.11
.55
.33
.13
.58
.29
.17
.53
.31
.12
.56
.32
.13
.58
.28
.14
.55
.31
.11
.59
.30
.10
.61
.29
.15
.55
.30
.12
.56
.33
.12
.56
.32
.16
.55
.30
.12
.53
.34
.13
.54
.33
.16
.54
.3
.14
.52
.35
.15
.51
.34
.15
.51
.34
.13
.51
.36
.13
.49
.38
.15
.47
.38
0
.2
.4
.6
0
.2
.4
.6
0
.2
.4
.6
Higher Interm. Lower Higher Interm. Lower Higher Interm. Lower Higher Interm. Lower
Higher Interm. Lower Higher Interm. Lower Higher Interm. Lower Higher Interm. Lower
Higher Interm. Lower Higher Interm. Lower Higher Interm. Lower Higher Interm. Lower
1997 1998 1999 2000
2001 2002 2003 2004
2005 2006 2007 2008
Owners Mortgagors Renters
204 
 
Table A.4.2c: National and Regional RPI Using Alternative Price for Housing  
  
 
 
Notes: Price for rents are based on the private rents available from the Department 
for Communities and Local Government.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6
8
10
12
6
8
10
12
6
8
10
12
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
North East North West Yorkshire East Midlands
West Midlands East South East South West
London Wales Scotland Northern Ireland
Real hourly wage using National RPI
Real hourly wage using Regional RPI
205 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion  
The level of wage inequality generated by a country’s labour market is of 
fundamental importance for understanding poverty and social stratification. 
Despite the existence of a large economic literature investigating causes and 
trends in wage inequality mainly in the UK and the US, the persistence and 
increase in wage dispersion in these and other countries still calls for analysis and 
further research. 
This thesis has attempted to investigate the role of composition, immigration and 
cost-of-living on the increasing wage inequality for the UK and other countries 
since the late 1980s to 2008.  
The empirical analysis of this thesis began by examining  to which extent 
changing characteristics of the labour force can help to account for the fact that 
residual or within-group wage inequality –wage dispersion among workers with 
the same education and experience- accounts for most of the growth in wage 
inequality.  The investigation is performed separately for men and women in the 
UK, US and Italy from 1987 to 2004. This comparative research is motivated by 
the different experiences of the three countries in terms of wage dispersion, the 
changing characteristics of the labour force in all countries, as well as the different 
labour market institutions that could also affect differently levels and trends of 
wage dispersion (Blau and Kahn, 1996). 
The descriptive statistics of chapter 2 has documented that inequality has risen in 
a number of dimensions in the U.S., the UK and Italy since the late 1980s. Wage 
dispersion has widened within narrow segments of society and the economy as 
well. It is not just the share of income going to the top fifth that has risen, but also 
wage differentials of workers in similar education and experience groups - has 
exhibited a similar pattern. Not only have more highly skilled and educated 
workers moved ahead faster than those with less skills and education, but even 
within the upper groups, those with most skills, and the best education, have 
moved ahead faster still. 
When comparing trends and levels of the increasing residual wage 
inequality, my cross-country findings present some support for conclusions 
concerning residual inequality trends proposed by the main empirical literature 
(Juhn, Murphy, Pierce 1993, Autor, Katz and Kearney 2005, 2008; Acemoglu 
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2002, Lemieux 2006), however the analysis also reveals some remarkable 
differences among the three countries, both in the level and sometimes in the 
direction of the trends of wage inequality. Residual  wage inequality accounts for 
most of the variation in wage inequality from 1987 to 2004, not only for the U.S. 
but also for Italy and the UK. In the U.S. from 1987 to 2003, changes in the 
residual for men accounted for the 86% of the overall change in the total variance, 
and 53% for woman. In the UK, despite the decrease in overall variance of wage 
both for men (0.033) and women (0.034), the residual variance increased by 0.014 
log points. More strikingly, the within-group variance in Italy explains almost all 
wage inequality, with the bulk of the increase occurring during the 1990s.  
When looking for particular explanations for these different trends a single 
reason is not forthcoming and the composition effects hypothesis appears to hold 
only for the U.S.; in the UK and Italy when controlling for distribution of skills, 
both at 1987 and at 2004, the residual variance still explains the bulk of the 
increase, suggesting a more marginal role for the composition effects. In partial 
contrast with AAK (2005) who show that composition effect was concentrated in 
the lower tail of the earnings distribution, I find that for Italy composition effect 
only affects the upper tail (90-50 gap) earnings distribution.  
The fail in attributing to the compositional changes in the labour force the 
spurious effect in increasing residual wage inequality in Italy and UK, means that 
there is more to be understood about the interactions among changing 
characteristics of the labour force, the labour market institutions and the 
macroeconomic conditions.  
For the Italian experience the modest role of the increase in educational 
attainment on the residual, could be related to the observed decrease in 
educational premia along with a stable trend in the demand for skills (Naticchioni 
et al. 2008). The centralised wage structure that characterizes the Italian labour 
market and that is likely to limit the differential in rewards to skills (both observed 
and unobserved) may in part explain, along with the low share of graduate 
workers, why the composition effects fail  to exert a spurious effect of the 
observed increasing within-group inequality.  
In both the UK and the U.S. residual wage inequality has been growing in tandem 
with the share of immigrants in the labour force; immigration is often view as a 
proximate cause of the rising wage inequality; however the overall impact of 
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immigration on native inequality depends not only on the effects on between-
group differentials but also on the effects on within-group inequality.  
Based on this framework chapter three focuses on the effects of immigration on 
the residual wage inequality in the UK and US between 1994 and 2008, in 
particular it seeks to assess whether and to what degree immigration contributed, 
along with technology, institutions and traditional explanations, to widening 
inequality.  
This investigation reveals that the presence of immigrants does not have a 
causal relationship with the increase in residual inequality. Even when treating 
natives and immigrants as two separate groups, the trend of residual variance 
inequality for natives does not significantly change, suggesting that inequality for 
natives is not due to the unobservable skills of immigrants acting in the same 
labour market.  
When the share of immigrants in the labour force is held fixed at its value 
in the base year, the role of the residual components ranges from 0.002 to 0.009 
for natives and up to 0.008 for all workers. Although the composition effect still 
explains most of the growth in the residual for natives and the whole labour force, 
the results also suggest that the presence of immigrants plays a role in explaining 
the growth in the residual variance observed, albeit a very small share. On 
average, the non-causal effect of immigration on residual variance ranges between 
0.1% and 0.5% of the observed change between 1994 and 2008. 
The increasing number of immigrants in the labour market has been a 
major policy and public concern in both the UK and the U.S. The current 
economic downturn has added further momentum to what in many countries 
already represents an important and controversial public policy issue about the 
impact of rising numbers of immigrants on the labour market outcomes for 
natives, particularly the impact of immigration on the wages of native workers.  
In terms of public policy the findings of chapter three confirming almost 
no effect of the increase of immigration on wage inequality in the UK and the 
U.S., imply that the increasing share of immigration in the UK and U.S. should 
not be a concern in the public policy agenda.   
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Recently, (January 2010), the National Equality Panel Report outlined that 
Britain is an unequal country, more than many other industrial countries and more 
than a generation ago. There are several differences in labour market outcomes 
and inequality across the English regions with inequality in many dimensions 
being wider in London than in any other region.  
Motivated by the fact that expenditure on housing is the largest component 
of total household expenditure and varies considerably through regions in the UK, 
and that graduate workers are more concentrated in more expensive British 
regions, in chapter 4 I reassessed how estimates of wage inequality from 1997 to 
2008 vary when regional differences in the cost of housing in the UK are taken 
into consideration.  In order to do so, the real wage is deflated by a specially 
constructed regional Retail Price Index (RPI). This is a new measure of the cost-
of-living that partially updates the national RPI with a regional housing index, 
therefore allowing the RPI to vary by regions.  
This investigation does reveal a number of new points: when accounting 
for regional differences in the cost of housing the most common measure of UK 
inflation, the RPI, appears not to fully represent the cost-of-living in the various 
British regions. The national RPI underestimates the cost-of-living of workers 
living in the regions with the most expensive housing (London and the South 
East) and overestimates the cost-of-living for “cheaper” housing regions 
(Northern Ireland and Scotland). This inevitably has some implications when 
using the National or regional RPI to deflate the hourly wage. 
When deflating hourly wages by the regional RPI, the average level of 
wages is lower by 8% to 11% an hour for all workers in London and the South 
East, whilst it is higher by 2% to 9% in the remaining regions. However, though 
the use of a regional deflator makes a significant difference to levels, it does not 
make much difference to the graduate high school wage gap in any year or over 
time.   
The failure of the National RPI to appropriately reflect the real cost-of-
living of different UK regions recalls how the use of deflators and their measures 
are crucial in terms of policy decisions: since the decisions about how we 
compute inflation statistics can have a direct impact on policy decisions 
(Checchetti, 2007). The results of chapter 4 also suggest the need for regional 
specific studies and related policy to address the existing regional differences in 
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the labour market and standards of living in the UK. For example, London has the 
highest proportion of households in the top tenth of income nationally; it also has 
the highest rate of income poverty of any region in England, with the highest 
proportion of people of all ages living below the poverty rate (The Guardian, 
2009). 
 
The increasing gap between the wages of skilled versus unskilled men 
suggests that the demand for skills has increased, either because of changes in 
technology or changes in the structure of product markets, and that the supply of 
skilled labour has not changed fast enough to compensate (Gosling et al., 1996). 
This may be because of the failure in the education and training system which 
prevents unskilled workers gaining the skills demanded by the labour market. 
Therefore, to reduce the skills shortages and improve opportunities for workers at 
the bottom of the distribution, it is likely that policies that encourage children to 
stay on at school and more people to go into adult and further education are 
needed.  
A number of analysts have pointed to the way in which large inequalities 
are associated with societies having lower levels of happiness or well-being in 
other aspects, and to the social problems and economic costs resulting from these. 
Among the general public as well as scholarly researchers, it has spurred a 
vigorous debate about how to regard widening inequality and what, if anything, to 
do about it. Although there has been much debate over whether the proper object 
for public-policy concern is inequality per se or simply the low incomes of those 
at the bottom of the distribution, either view leads to the conclusion that it would 
be good to raise the earnings power of the lowest-income workers. Although there 
remains widespread disagreement about the relative importance of different 
explanations for the recent increase in inequality and the obstinate persistence of 
poverty, the role of institutions and labour market skills and workers education 
figure high on nearly everyone’s list. It can be in the interest of the wealthy, as 
well as the poor, to raise the incomes of the poor. For example, minimum wage 
legislation has been framed with the intent to compress wage inequality. But the 
effectiveness of the minimum wage as an income redistribution tool is often 
criticised, since by raising the cost of labour it can have negative effects on output 
and employment. 
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 Particular policies can be used to alter both the skill endowment of the 
workforce and the shape of the wage distribution. There is, for example, some 
controversy about the role that migrants should play in reducing domestic labour 
shortages in particular sectors and occupations; this has been investigated by Ruhs 
and Anderson (2010) who questioned how to link the admission of migrant 
workers to the “needs” of the domestic labour market.  
Moreover, providing potentially low-income workers with more of the 
kind of “human capital” that matters for labour market outcomes is an avenue for 
public policy. Growth in the quality of the U.S. workforce has been a major 
source of productivity growth and economic mobility over the past century.  
When considering whether the degree of inequalities is “justified” or not, 
differentials in wage that reflect differences say in work experience, creating 
differences by age, might be seen as logical. As claimed by Krueger (2005) “[…] 
inequality has both positive and negative effects. On the positive side, differential 
rewards provide incentives for individuals to work hard, invest, innovate. On the 
negative side, differences in rewards that are unrelated to productivity are 
corrosive to civil society and cause resources to be misallocated.” 
As outlined by Krueger (2005), societies must strike a balance between the 
beneficial incentive effects of inequality and the harmful welfare-decreasing 
effects of inequality. The optimal balance will differ across societies and time, but 
too much inequality can repress innovation. Expanding education and training 
programs for less-skilled workers could be an effective component of a strategy to 
restore a better balance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
211 
 
References 
 
Abdurrahman, A. and G. Borjas (2007) ‘Cross-country variation in the impact of 
international migration: Canada, Mexico, and the United States’, Journal 
of the European Economic Association, 663-708.  
Acemoglu D. (2002) ‘Technical change, Inequality, and the Labour Market’, 
Journal of Economic Literature 40(1): 7-72 
Ashenfelter, O. and R.  Layard (1999) Handbook of labour economics. 
Handbooks in economics. Vol. 5. Amsterdam; Oxford ; North-Holland. 
Ashworth, J., and  S. C.  Parker (1997) ‘Modelling regional house prices in the 
UK’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 44 (3) (08): 225.  
Autor D., L.F.  Katz, and M.  Kearney (2005) ‘Rising Wage Inequality: the Role 
of Composition and Prices’,  NBER Working Paper No. 11628 
Autor, H.,D., and L.F.  Katz (1999) Changes in the Wage Structure and Earnings 
Inequality. Handbook of Labour Economics, Volume 3, North Holland. 
Autor, H.,D., L.F.  Katz, and M. Kearney (2008) ‘Trends in U.S. wage inequality: 
Revising the revisionists’, Review of Economics & Statistics 90, (2) 
(05),300-23.  
Baran, D. (2004) ‘Consumer prices  index and retail prices index: updating 
weights for 2004.’ ONS.  
Baran, D. and J. O’ Donoghue (2002) ‘Price levels in 2000 for London and the 
regions compared with the national average’, ONS. 
Bell, B and J. Van Reenen (2010) ‘Bankers’ pay and extreme wage inequality in 
the UK’, CEP DP21. 
Becker, G. (1964) ‘Human capital: a theoretical and empirical analysis  with 
special reference to education’, New York , NBER.  
Bernard, A. B., Redding, S. J. ,  Schott P. K.  and  H. Simpson (2003) ‘Relative 
wage variation and industry location’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol.70, Issue 4, p. 431-459.  
Black, D., Kelensikova, N.,  and  L.J. Taylor (2009)  ‘Earnings function when 
wages and prices vary by location’, Journal of Labour Economics. 
212 
 
Blanchflower, D., and A. Oswald (2003) ‘Calculating an appropriate  regional 
funding adjustment for Worcestershire: a report for  Worcestershire 
County Council’,  Worcestershire County Council. 
Blanchflower, D., and A. Oswald (2005) ‘Regional wages and the need of a better 
area cost adjustment’, Public Money and Management, Vol. 25 (2).  
Blau, F., D., and L., M.  Kahn (1996) ‘International differences in male wage 
inequality: Institutions versus market forces’, The Journal of Political 
Economy, 104 (4) (Aug.): 791-837.  
Blau, F., D., and  L.,M.  Kahn (1996) The gender earning gap: some international 
evidence. In  Differences and Changes in wage Structures, edited by 
Richard B. Freeman and Lawrence  F. Katz. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press 
(for NBER), 1995.  
Blow, L., and I. Crawford (2001) ‘The cost of living with the RPI: Substitution 
bias in the UK retail prices index’, The Economic Journal 111 (472, 
Features) (Jun.): F357-82.  
Borjas, G. J. (2006) ‘The impact of immigration on the labour market’, Paper 
prepared for the conference of Labour and Capital flows in Europe 
Following Enlargement, organised by International Monetary Fund, the 
Joint Vienna Institute, and the National Bank of Poland.  
Borjas, G., J., R., B., Freeman, and L.,F.   Katz (1996) ‘Searching for the effect of 
immigration on the labor market’, The American Economic Review 86, (2, 
Papers and Proceedings of the Hundredth and Eighth Annual Meeting of 
the American Economic Association San Francisco, CA, January 5-7, 
1996) (May): 246-51.  
Borjas, G.,J., J., Grogger,  and G. Hanson (2008) ‘Imperfect substitution between 
immigrants and natives: A reappraisal’, NBER Working Papers 13887. 
Borjas, G. J. (2008) Labor economics. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Higher 
Education  
Borooah V. K., McGregor P.P.L., McKee P.M., and G.E. Mulholland (1996)  
‘Cost-of-living differences between the regions of the United Kingdom’,  
in New Inequalities, The changing distribution of income and wealth in the 
United Kingdom. (Eds.) J. Hills.  
213 
 
Boudarbat, B. and T. Lemieux (2008) ‘Why are the relative wages of immigrants 
declining? A distributional approach’,  Canadian Labour Market and Skills 
Researcher Network. WP n.65.  
Bound J. and G. Johnson (1992) ‘Changes in the Structure of Wages in the 1980s: 
an Evaluation of Alternative Explanation’, American Economic Review 
82(3): 371-92. 
Brunello, G., Fort, M. and G. Weber (  2009 ) Chnges in Complulsory schooling, 
education and the distribution of wages in Europe.  The Economic Journal, 
Vol. 119, Issue 536, pp. 516-539. 
Burkhauser, R.,V., Feng, S. and S., P. Jenkins. (2007) ‘Using the P90/P10 index 
to measure the US Inequality trends with Current Population Survey Data: a view 
from inside the Census Bureau Vaults’, ISER Working Paper 2007-14. 
Colchester: University of Essex. 
Cappellari, L. (2002) ‘The Dynamics and Inequality of Italian Men’s Earnings: 
Long-Term changes or Transitory Fluctuations?’,  The Journal of Human 
Resources, vol.39, No.2, pp.475-499. 
Card D., and J. DiNardo  (2002) ‘Skill Biased Technological Change and Rising 
Wage Inequality: Some Problems and Puzzles’, Journal of Labor 
Economics 20(4): 733-83. 
Card, D., (2005) ‘Is the new immigration really so bad?’,  Economic Journal 115, 
(4), F300-F323. 
Card, D., (2009) ‘Immigration and inequality’, The American Economic Review. 
Vol. 99, No. 2. 
Card, D., and T. Lemieux (2001) ‘Can falling supply explain the rising return to 
college for younger men? A cohort-based analysis’, The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 116, (2) (May): 705-46.  
Card, D., F.  Kramarz, ,and T. Lemieux (1999)  ‘Changes in the Relative structure 
of wages and employment : A comparison of the United States, Canada , 
and France’, The Canadian Journal of Economics. Vol.32, no.4 , pp. 843-
877. 
214 
 
Card, D., Lemieux, T. and C. Riddel, (2003) "Unions and the Wage Structure", in 
John T. Addison and Claus Schnabel (eds.) The International Handbook of 
Trade Unions, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,  pp. 246-92. 
Card, D. and A. Krueger (1995) ‘Myth and measurement: the new economics of 
the minimum wage’, Princeton University Press. 
Carneiro, P.,  and J.J. Heckman  (2002) ‘Human Capital Policy’, in Inequality in 
America What role for human capital policies?’ (ed. Friedman B.M.), The 
MIT press. 
Checchetti, S. (2007) Housing in inflation measurement. VOX. 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/248 
Chewick, B., (1978) ‘The effect of Americanization on the earnings of foreign-
born men’,  Journal of Political Economy 86,897-922.  
Chiquiar, D.,  and H. Gordon(2005) ‘International migration, self-selection, and 
the distribution of wages: Evidence from Mexico and the United States’, 
Journal of Political Economy 113, (2) (04),239-81.  
Clark, K., and J. Lindley (2006) ‘Immigrant labour market assimilation and 
arrival effects: Evidence from the UK labour force survey’, IZA 
Discussion Papers 2228.  
Consumer price indices technical manual. (2007) Office for National Statistics.  
Crawford I. (1996) ‘UK household cost-of-living indices, 1979-92’, in  New 
Inequalities, The changing distribution of income and wealth in the United 
Kingdom.( Eds.)  J. Hills.  
Crawford, I., and Z. Smith (2002)  ‘Distributional aspects of inflation’,  Institute 
of Fiscal Studies Commentary 90.  
Deaton, A. (2000) ‘Inequalities in income and inequalities in health’,  NBER 
wp.7141. 
Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer (1980a) Economics and Consumer Behavior. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Dell’Aringa, C. and C Lucifora (2001) ‘Inside the black-box: Labour market 
institutions, wage formation and unemployment in Italy’, Rivista di 
Politica Economica, 90(X-XI), 21-70.  
215 
 
Deschenes, O. (2001) ‘Unobserved ability, comparative advantage and the rising 
return to education in the United States: a cohort-Based approach’, 
Princeton University Industrial relations section, Working Paper No. 465.  
Devicienti, F. (2003) ‘The rise in wage inequality in Italy. Observable  factors or 
unobservables?’,WP Laboratorio Riccardo Ravelli.  
 
Diewert, E.  (1993) ‘The early history of Price Index research’,  in Essays in Index 
number theory, Volume 1. W.E. Diewert and A.O. Nakamura, eds. 
Amsterdam :Elsevier, pp33-65. 
Diewert, E.  (2003) ‘The treatment of owner occupied housing and other durables 
in a consumer price index’, Discussion paper No. 03-08, University of 
British Columbia. 
 DiNardo, J., N.,M.,  Fortin,  and T. Lemieux (1996) ‘Labor market institutions 
and the distribution of wages, 1973-1992: A semiparametric approach’, 
Econometrica 64, (5) (Sep.),1001-44.  
Duranton G., and V. Monastiriotis (2002) ‘Mind the gap: The evolution of 
regional earnings inequalities in the U.K., 1982-1997’, Journal of Regional 
Science 42 (1).  
Dustmann, C.,  J., Ludsteck, and  U. SchÖnberg (2009) ‘Revisiting the German 
wage structure’,  Quarterly Journal of Economics 124, (2) (05): 843-81.  
Dustmann, C., F., Fabbri, and I. Preston (2005) ‘The impact of immigration on the 
british labour market’, The Economic Journal 115, (November), F324-41.  
Dustmann, C.,  T., Frattini,   and I. Preston (2008) ‘The effect of immigration 
along the distribution of wages’,  Cream Discussion Paper series 0803.  
Fenwick, D, and J. O' Donoghue (2004)  ‘Developing estimates of relative 
regional consumer price levels’, ONS. 
Firpo, S., N.M. Fortin , and  T. Lemieux (2009) ‘Unconditional quantile 
regressions’, Econometrica 77 (3) (05): 953-73.  
Gallin, J. (2006) ‘The long-run relationship between house prices and income: 
Evidence from local housing markets’,  Real Estate Economics 34 (3) 
(Fall2006): 417-38.  
216 
 
 Goldin, C. and  L. F. Katz (2007) ‘Long-Run Changes in the Wage Structure: 
Narrowing, Widening, Polarizing,’ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 38(2007-2), pp: 135-
168.  
 
Goos, M. and M. Alan (2003) ‘Lousily and lovely Jobs: The Rising Polarization 
of Work in Britain’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 89:1, 
February 2007, pp 118-133. 
Gosling, A. and  T. Lemieux (2004) Labor Market Reforms and Changes in Wage 
Inequality in the United Kingdom and the United States In: Seeking a 
Premier Economy: The Economic Effects of British Economic Reforms, 
1980-2000 eds. Card, D., Blundell, R. and Freeman, B.R.  
 
Gosling, A., S. Machin,   and C. Meghir (2000) ‘The changing distribution of 
male wages in the UK’,  The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 67, NO. 
4: 635-666 . 
Gould, E.,D., and O. Moav (2008) ‘When is "too much" inequality not enough? 
The selection of Israeli emigrants’, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers n. 6955. 
Green, D. A., and T. Lemieux (2008) ‘The impact of unionization on the 
incidence of and sources of payment for training in Canada’, In The 
economics of education and training., eds. C. Dustmann, B. Fitzenberger 
and S. Machin, 267-291, Studies in Empirical Economics. Heidelberg: 
Springer, Physica-Verlag.  
Green, F., and Y.  Zhu (2008) ‘Overqualification, job satisfaction, and increasing 
returns to graduate education’,  Oxford Economic Papers, 1-24. 
Gregg, P. and  S. Machin (1994) ‘Is the UK rise in inequality different’, in Barrell, 
R. (ed.), The UK Labour Market. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 
Hanson, G. H., (2006) ‘Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States’,  
Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 44(4), pages 869-924, December. 
Hausman, J. (2003) ‘Sources of bias and solutions to bias in the Consumer Price 
Index’,  The Journal of Economic Perspective, Vol. 17 N.1: 23-44.  
Hayes, P. (2005) ‘Estimating UK regional price indices 1974-96’,  Regional 
Studies 39 (3) (05): 333-44.  
217 
 
Henley, A. (2005) ‘On regional growth convergence in Great Britain’, Regional 
Studies 39 (9) (12): 1245-60.  
Hills, J., Brewer, M., Jenkins, S., Lister, R., Lupton, R., Machin,S., Mills, C., 
Modood,T., Rees, T., Riddel,S. (2010) ‘An anatomy of economic 
inequality in the UK: report of the national equality panel’. Government 
Equalities Office. 
Holly, S., M. H. Pesaran, and T. Yamagata (2010) ‘Spatial and temporal of house 
prices in the UK’, IZA Discussion Paper DP 4694.  
Inman, P. (2010)  ‘ Inflation index move is ‘insidious’ benefit cut, say TUC’ from 
The Guardian, 12 October.  
Juhn, C., K.,M., Murphy, and B. Pierce (1993) ‘Wage inequality and the rise in 
returns to skill’, The Journal of Political Economy 101, (3) (Jun.) 410-42.  
Katz, L.,F., and K.M.  Murphy (1992) ‘Changes in relative wages, 1963-1987: 
Supply and demand factors’,  The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, (1) 
(Feb.),35-78.  
Konus A.A. (1924) ‘The problem of the true index of the cost of living’, 
Reprinted in Econometrica,vol.7 page 10-29.   
Krueger, A. (2002) ‘Inequality, too much of a good thing’, in Inequality in 
America What role for human capital policies? (ed. Friedman B.M.), The 
MIT press. 
Krugman, P. (1994). ‘Past and prospective causes of high unemployment’, in 
Reducing unemployment: Current Issues and Policy Options. Proceedings 
of a Symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Kansas City, Mo: Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City).  
Kuznets, S. (1955) ‘Economic growth and Income inequality’, American 
Economic Review  45:1-28. 
Lemieux, T. (2006a) ‘Post-secondary Education and Increasing Wage Inequality’, 
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 96(2): 195-199. 
Lemieux, T. (2002) ‘Decomposing Changes in Wage Distributions: A Unified 
Approach’ , Canadian Journal of Economics, 35(4), November 646-688. 
218 
 
Lemieux, T. (2006) ‘Increasing residual wage inequality: Composition effects, 
noisy data, or rising demand for skill?’,  The American Economic Review 
96, (3) (Jun.): 461-98.  
Lemieux, T. (2008) ‘The changing Nature of Wage Inequality’, Journal of 
Population Economics,  Springer vol. 21(1), 21-24. 
Leunig, T., and H. Overman (2008) ‘Spatial patterns of development and the 
British Housing Market’,  Oxford Review of Economic Policy. Vol. 24 
(1): 59-78.   
Levy, F. and R.J. Murnane  (1992). ‘U.S. earnings levels and earnings inequality: 
a review of recent trend s and proposed explanations, Journal of Economic 
Literature 30: 1333-81. 
Lilla M. and S. Staffolani (2007)’ The Evolution of Wage Inequality in Italy’,  
Economic Letter (2008). 
Lilla M., (2005) ‘Disuguaglianze salariali in Italia: nuove evidenze dai microdati 
SHIW’, Politica Economica, no.1, pp71-102. 
Lucifora, C. (2001) ‘Wage inequality and low pay: the role of labour market 
institutions’, in Gregory, M., W., Salverda and  S. Bazen (Eds.) Labour 
market inequalities, ed. Oxford University Press.   
Machado J.A.F.,  and J. Mata (2001) ‘Earnings function in Portugal 1982-1994: 
evidence from quantile regressions’, Empirical Economics 26: 115-134. 
Machin, S. (1996) ‘Wage inequality in the UK’, Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, 7, 47-62. 
Machin, S. (1999) ‘Wage Inequality in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s’, In P.Gregg 
and J. Wadsworth (eds) The State of Working Britain, Manchester 
University Press. 
Machin, S. (2008) ‘An appraisal of economic research on Changes in wage 
inequality’,  Labour, vol.22 p: 7-26.  
Machin, S. 2003. ‘Wage inequality since 1975’, in R. Dickens, P. Gregg, and J. 
Wadsworth (eds.) The Labour Market under new Labour, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke.  
219 
 
Machin, S. 2010. Changing wage structures: trends and explanations.  Working 
paper. 
Machin, S., and J. Von Reenen (2008) ‘Changes in wage inequality’, New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 
Manacorda  M. (2004) ‘Can the Scala Mobile Explain the Fall and Rise of 
Earnings in Italy? A Semiparametric Analysis, 1977-1993’, Journal of 
Labor Economics , 22(3). 
Manacorda, M., A., Manning,  and J. Wadsworth (2007) ‘The Impact of 
Immigration on the Structure of Wages: Theory and Evidence from 
Britain’,  Research in Labour Economics, 26, 125-155. 
Martins, P.S., and P.T. Pereira (2004) ‘Does education reduce wage inequality? 
Quantile regression evidence from 16 countries’,  Labour economics, 11, 
p: 355-371.  
Melly, B. (2005) ‘Decomposition of differences in distribution using quantile 
regression’. Labour Economics 12, (4), 577-90.  
Mincer, J. (1958) ‘Investment in human capital and personal income distribution’ 
Journal of Political Economy, 66(4), 281-302. 
Mincer, J. (1974) Schooling, Experience and Earnings New York: National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Mincer, J., (1997) ‘The production of human capital and the life cycle of earnings: 
Variations on a theme’, Journal of Labor Economics 15, (1, Part 2: Essays 
in Honor of Yoram Ben-Porath) (Jan.),S26-47.  
Moretti, E. (2004) ‘Workers ‘education, spillovers, and productivity: evidence 
from Plant-level production functions. The American Economic Review, 
Vol. 94, No. 3, pp. 656-690. 
Moretti, E. (2010) ‘Real wage inequality’, NBER Working Paper no. 14370.  
Muellbauer, J., and A. Murphy (2008) ‘Housing markets and the economy: the 
assessment’,  Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 24 (1): 1-33. 
Murphy, K., and  F. Welch (1992) ’The structure of wages’, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 107, 285-326. 
220 
 
Naticchioni P., A. Ricci, and E. Rustichelli (2008) ‘Wage Structure, Inequality 
and Skill-biased change: is Italy an Outlier?’, Labour Vol.22, Issue s1. 
Nickell, S. (2005) ‘Practical issues in UK monetary policy, 2000-2005, Bank of 
England. 
Office for National Statistics. (2007) Consumer price indices technical manual. 
2007.  Technical Report. 
Office for National Statistics. (2009) Family Spending. A report on the 2008 
Living costs and Food Survey.  (Eds.) Skentelbery R.  
Ottaviano, G., and G. Peri (2006)  ‘Rethinking the effects of immigration on 
wages.’ NBER Working Paper No. 12497. 
Peri, G., and C. Sparber (2009) ‘Task specialization, comparative advantages, and 
the effects of immigration on wages’,  NBER Working Paper no. 13389.  
Rienzo, C. and Carlos Vargas-Silva (2010) Briefing paper for the Migration 
Observatory, University of Oxford. 
Ruhs, M. and B. Anderson  (2010) “Who Needs Migrant Workers? Labour 
Shortages, Immigration and Public Policy”, Oxford University Press.  
 
Schmitt, J. (1995) ‘The changing Structure of Male earnings in Britain, 1974-
1988’, in R. Freeman and L.Katz (eds.), Changes and Differences in Wage 
Structures Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Schmitt, J., (2003) ‘Creating a consistent hourly wage series from the Current 
Population Survey’s Outgoing Rotation Group, 1979-2002’. 
Schmitt, J., and J. Wadsworth (2007)  ‘Changes in the Relative Economic 
Performance of Immigrants to Great Britain and the United States, 1980–
2000’,  British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 45, no. 4 (December), 
659-686. 
Sloane, P.J.  (2003) ‘Much ado about nothing? What does the overeducation 
literature really tell us?’, In F. Buchel, A. de Grip, and A. Martens (eds) 
Overeducation in Europe: current issues in Theory and Policy, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham.  
Wadsworth, J. (2010)  ‘Immigration and the UK Labour Market: evidence from 
economic research’, CEP discussion paper EA006.  
221 
 
Walker, I. and  Y. Zhu  (2008) ‘The college wage premium and the expansion of 
higher education in the UK’,  Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 110, 
695-709.  
Welsh, F. (1979) ‘Effects of cohort size on earnings: the baby boom babies’ 
financial bust’, The Journal of Political Economy, vol.87, issue 5, part 2.  
Wooldridge, J. (2006) Introductory econometrics a modern approach.  
  
